De Eugenio v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.

Decision Date12 February 1954
Docket NumberNo. 11102.,11102.
Citation210 F.2d 409
PartiesDE EUGENIO v. ALLIS-CHALMERS MFG. CO.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Sidney P. McCord, Jr., Camden, N. J. (Starr, Summerill & Davis, William F. Hyland, Camden, N. J., on the brief), for appellant.

Robert G. Howell, Bridgeton, N. J. (George H. Stanger, Vineland, N. J., on the brief), for appellee.

Before MARIS, STALEY and HASTIE, Circuit Judges.

STALEY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff lost his right arm as a result of its being crushed between the rollers of a hay baler which had been manufactured by defendant. In accordance with the jury's verdict for plaintiff, we state that view of the record which is most favorable to him.

In 1940 defendant began designing a revolutionary device, a baler which would make cylindrical bales of hay. The pilot baler was built in May of 1941. That and several other machines of its kind were tested on farms through 1946, when commercial production was begun. As of June, 1947, about three thousand machines had been produced and distributed for sale.

The machine, called a Roto-Baler, was designed to operate as follows: The baler is mounted on a single axle which is toward the rear. Forward of the axle, there is a chute, the front of which slides over the ground on skids. On the chute there is a conveyer which scoops up the windrowed hay and carries it up to rolls which compress it into a thin mat. The mat is rolled into a cylinder, and, when the cylinder of hay has reached proper size, the conveyer stops, and the bale is then wrapped with twine and ejected from the rear of the machine.1 The baler is drawn over the ground behind and to the left of a tractor which also supplies the power for the machine's moving parts through a power take-off shaft. The chute is about seven feet long, and, when the machine is operated at the maximum speed recommended by defendant, an object would be carried from the bottom to the rollers in about one and three-quarter seconds. At the speed it was being operated on the day of the accident, the time was estimated at two or three seconds.

Plaintiff, his father and two brothers, operated a farming partnership in New Jersey. Defendant, through its dealer, Gawin, sold a Roto-Baler to the partnership, and, together with one Robb, defendant's field representative, delivered it to the firm at one of its farms. The baler was tested when delivered and was found to be operating improperly. The hay would accumulate or "bulldoze" in front of the chute. This bulldozing prevented a smooth flow of hay into the chute and into the rolls and a consequent irregularity in the size of the bales. A mass of the accumulated hay would suddenly pass up the chute and would literally choke the rolls, causing the entire unit to slacken its forward motion. When the lump of hay cleared the rolls, the baler would lunge forward or from side to side in an erratic manner, the sideways motion being aggravated by the fact that this was a two-wheeled machine with its one axle toward the rear, thus allowing the front of the chute to move to left or right as the baler pivoted on its axle. Furthermore, the pile-up of hay in front of the chute required that a man walk along at the left front of the chute and, with a fork, toss the hay into the chute. This was contrary to the machine's intended manner of operation since it was designed and sold as a one-man baler, the tractor driver supposedly being the only man required.

The above difficulties being discovered immediately upon delivery of the baler, Gawin and Robb remained for about two and one-half hours trying to correct them but were unsuccessful. They returned the next day and worked on the baler for about four and one-half hours while it was in operation but to no avail. The third time the machine was used Gawin again attempted to correct the faulty operation. On the occasions when Gawin and Robb were trying to adjust the machine, one of them would walk at the left front of the chute tossing the accumulated hay onto the chute, and, on those same occasions and in the presence of Gawin and Robb, plaintiff and one of his brothers did likewise.

On the day of the accident, plaintiff and his brothers were baling hay. It was the fourth time the baler had been used, but it still was not functioning properly. To take care of the hay that was piling up in front of the chute, plaintiff was walking along at its left front, just as Gawin and Robb had done. As stated, at times a large mass of the accumulated hay would pass up the chute and into the rolls, and, when it had cleared the rolls, the baler would lunge forward or to the side. Seconds after one such lump had passed up the chute, plaintiff was knocked off balance when struck on the shin by the left skid of the chute. He fell onto and was carried up the chute, and his right arm went through the rolls, up to his shoulder.

All the testimony as to how the baler actually did operate, as to what Gawin and Robb did, and as to the circumstances of the accident came from plaintiff and his witnesses and was, thus, undisputed. Defendant's only witness, the man who designed the machine, testified as to its design and construction and the manner in which it was supposed to operate.

The special interrogatories and the jury's answers are set out below.2

The case was in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey solely by reason of diversity jurisdiction. Therefore, we must be guided by the substantive law of New Jersey. We have been unable to find any New Jersey cases which are of any help, nor has our attention been directed to any. Hence, we find the New Jersey law as best we can from the materials at hand. Diesbourg v. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 3 Cir., 1949, 176 F.2d 410.

Plaintiff had three strings to his bow. He charged negligence in the design and construction of the baler in that there was no barrier guard over the chute to prevent a man from falling onto it; negligence by Gawin and Robb in adjusting the baler or leaving it, improperly adjusted, for use by plaintiff and his partners; and negligence by Gawin and Robb in the instructions given as to the proper method of operation of this particular machine. If any one of those points has merit, the case was for the jury. Consequently, we will discuss only the matter of the alleged negligent instructions by Gawin and Robb since we think there is merit in that point.

This baler was designed and intended to be used as a one-man operation. Once the hay was windrowed, the tractor driver was supposed to be the only human needed for the correct functioning of the machine. This particular baler, however, did not so function. Because the chute was not properly picking up the hay, large masses of it were piling up at the front of the machine. This caused the flow of hay along the chute and into the rolls to be uneven, and, in turn, produced bales of irregular size. When a large mass of hay would pass into the rolls, the baler would slow down in its forward motion and then lunge ahead or to the side when the lump had cleared the rolls. It appears that Gawin and Robb did what they could to synchronize the timing and to adjust the machine but without success. While doing so, one of them walked along at the left front of the chute so that he could handle the accumulation of hay by pushing or lifting it onto the chute with a fork. This seems to have been the only way or, at least, the way selected by Gawin and Robb to make the machine operate so that it would even approximate the results it was built to produce. Their attempts at correction having failed, the baler was left with the partnership. It is a mistake to view this particular machine as a one-man baler simply because that was the way it was supposed to operate. In fact, it never did so operate. From the very beginning, two men were needed: the tractor driver and a man walking at the left front of the chute. At least, the jury could have so found. Since the baler would not operate as a one-man machine, Gawin and Robb, as defendant's representatives, had a clear duty to use due care in instructing plaintiff. Burdened by that duty, we think it was for the jury to say whether they breached it, that is, subjected plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm, by instructing him that the proper way to operate this machine was to walk along near the left front of the chute in order to fork the hay onto the conveyer. So placed, plaintiff was put in a position of rather obvious danger. If he were to trip over the stubble in the hay field or if he were tripped by a sudden lunge of the chute (as it appears that he was), the danger of being scooped up by the chute and carried into the rolls was quite foreseeable.

It is probably true, as defendant insists, that there is no duty to warn against the obvious, that is, that defendant had no duty to warn plaintiff to stay away from the front of the chute since the risk of...

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  • Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop
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    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
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    ...matter of law by asserting that the danger should have been fully apparent to anyone who so used it? In both De Eugenio v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 3 Cir., 1954, 210 F.2d 409, 413, and Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Wichman, 8 Cir., 1955, 220 F.2d 426, 427-428, the courts declined to upset jury......
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    ...cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. See Car v. General Ins. Corp., 5 Cir. 1947, 159 F.2d 985; De Eugenio v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 3 Cir. 1954, 210 F.2d 409; Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Griffen, 5 Cir. 1959, 265 F.2d VI. We are next met with the contentions that Borel's actio......
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    ...James, Law of Torts (1956), § 21.7, p. 1190. In support of its view, the Appellate Division in Klinsky cited De Eugenio v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 210 F.2d 409 (3 Cir. 1954), in which the law of New Jersey was applied. But the federal court was there dealing with assumption of risk in its ......
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    ...here has the burden of proving the assumption of risk--that is, the burden of proving the lack of duty. See De Eugenio v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 210 F.2d 409, 413 (3 Cir.1954), and James, supra, at 167 (indicating that defendant has the burden of proving assumption of risk in both senses ......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Trial of a Products Liability Case: Defendant's View
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Lawyer No. 2-2, December 1972
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    ...§ 395. 25 275 F. Supp. 861; affirmed 403 F.2d 766 (1968). 26 367 F.2d 751 (7 Cir. 1966), Defense Research Institute, Brief No. 67-6. 27 210 F.2d 409 (3 Cir. 1954). 28 See also 242 N.E. 2d 122 (Ind. App. 1968); 369 F.2d 259 (7 Cir. 1966). 29 See also 260 N.E.2d 89 (Ill. App. 1970). 30 Frumer......

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