European Adoption Consultants, Inc. v. Pompeo
| Decision Date | 31 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-cv-1676 (DLF),18-cv-1676 (DLF) |
| Parties | EUROPEAN ADOPTION CONSULTANTS, INC., Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL R. POMPEO, in his official capacity as U.S. Secretary of State, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
In December 2016, the Department of State (the "Department") issued a Notice of Debarment to plaintiff European Adoption Consultants, Inc. ("EAC") under the Intercountry Adoption Act ("IAA"), 42 U.S.C. § 14924 and 22 C.F.R. § 96.85, temporarily barring EAC from performing any intercountry adoption services. In this lawsuit, EAC seeks to set aside the debarment on the grounds that it violated the IAA, the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Compl., Dkt. 1. EAC also seeks reasonable fees and costs, plus interest. Id.
Before the Court is Secretary of State (the "Secretary") Michael Pompeo's partial motion to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) ("Rule 12(b)"), and partial motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ("Rule 56"), see Dkt. 17, as well as EAC's cross-motion for summary judgment, see Dkt. 27. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the Secretary's motions, granting summary judgment to the Secretary on Count I and dismissing Counts II and III, and deny EAC's motion.
EAC is an international adoption agency based in Strongsville, Ohio, Am. Compl., Dkt. 11 ¶ 5, and is "one of the largest, if not the largest," international adoption agency in the United States, id. ¶ 6. From the time of its founding in 1991, EAC has completed over 8,000 international adoptions for American families, id. ¶ 6, and has operated international adoption programs in China, Poland, India, Colombia, Bulgaria, Uganda, Ukraine, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Honduras, and Haiti, id. ¶ 7.
In 2000, Congress enacted the IAA, a statute that regulates international adoption agencies and implements the United States' obligations pursuant to the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (the "Hague Convention"). The Department of State subsequently promulgated regulations implementing the IAA's requirements in 22 C.F.R. Part 96. Pursuant to those regulations, the Department is authorized to temporarily and permanently debar accredited adoption agencies if it finds that (1) there is substantial evidence that the accredited agency is out of compliance with the standards contained in 22 C.F.R. § 96, Subpart F, and (2) there has been a pattern of serious, willful, or grossly negligent failures to comply with said standards, or there are other aggravating circumstances indicating that continued accreditation or approval would not be in the best interests of the children and families concerned. 22 C.F.R. § 96.85.
In or around summer 2016, the Department became aware of a series of complaints involving EAC. On December 16, 2016, after reviewing these complaints and other information, the Department issued a Notice of Temporary Debarment (the "Notice") to EAC. AR 79. The Notice temporarily debarred EAC for a period of three years, cancelling EAC's accreditation to provide adoption services in connection with Hague Convention adoptions and requiring EAC to immediately cease engaging in intercountry adoptions. EAC filed a timely opposition to the Notice and to its temporary debarment on March 14, 2017. AR 92.
Following pre-hearing written submissions from both EAC and the Department, the Department conducted a hearing in October 2017 before a Hearing Officer employed by the Department's Office of the Legal Adviser. The Hearing Officer issued her findings of fact and recommendation on December 12, 2017. AR 1. The Hearing Officer found "substantial evidence that EAC was out of compliance with applicable requirements and that the Department has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that EAC has engaged in a pattern of serious, willful, or grossly negligent failures to comply with the regulations," as well as substantial evidence of "aggravating circumstances indicating that continued accreditation or approval is not in the best interests of the children and families concerned." AR 4. The Hearing Officer enumerated fourteen separate violations of 42 U.S.C. § 14944 and 22 C.F.R. § 96, Subpart F, that she concluded the Department had proven by a preponderance of the evidence. AR 2-3. In light of these findings, the Hearing Officer recommended that EAC be temporarily debarred from December 16, 2016 to December 15, 2019, consistent with the three-year time frame proposed in the December 2016 debarment notice. AR 4.
On July 16, 2018, EAC filed this lawsuit. See Compl. On December 3, 2018, the Secretary filed a partial motion to dismiss and partial motion for summary judgment. See Def's Part. Mot. for S.J., Dkt. 10. EAC filed an amended complaint on December 26, 2018, see Am. Compl., Dkt. 11, and the Secretary filed his partial motion for summary judgment and partial motion to dismiss the amended complaint on March 12, 2019, see Def's Part. Mot. for S.J., Dkt. 17. EAC filed its cross motion for summary judgment on May 13, 2019. Dkt. 27.
Both parties moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, which provides that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. In the context of the IAA, which explicitly incorporates the APA standard of review, summary judgment requires the court to determine whether the agency's decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). In an "arbitrary and capricious" lawsuit, summary judgment "serves as the mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review." Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F.Supp.2d 76, 90 (D.D.C. 2006). The core question is whether the agency's decision was "the product of reasoned decisionmaking." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983)). An agency action is "arbitrary and capricious" if "the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise." Id. at 43.
On "judicial review of agency action, re-weighing the evidence is not the court's function." United Steel Workers Int'l Union v. PBGC, 707 F.3d 319, 325 (D.C. Cir. 2013). "Rather, the question for the court is whether there is 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support' the agency's finding." Id. (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). The court's review is "fundamentally deferential— especially with respect to matters relating to an agency's areas of technical expertise," Fox v. Clinton, 684 F.3d 67, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). The court will typically sustain an agency action unless the agency has committed a "clear error of judgment." Marsh v. Oregon Nat'l Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Secretary also moved to dismiss Counts II and III of EAC's amended complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1). Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must contain factual matter sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A facially plausible claim is one that "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This standard does not amount to a probability requirement, but it does require "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. A complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," but alleging facts that are "merely consistent with a defendant's liability . . . stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under Rule 12(b)(1), a party may move to dismiss a claim over which the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). "When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court must treat the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and afford the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged." Jeong Seon Han v. Lynch, 223 F. Supp. 3d 95, 103 (D.D.C. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Because Rule 12(b)(1) concerns a court's ability to hear a particular claim, "the court must scrutinize the plaintiff's allegations more closely when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) than it would under a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)." Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65 (D.D.C. 2011). If the court determines that it lacks jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the claim or action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(h)(3).
EAC's amended complaint contains three counts, alleging violations of the IAA, the APA, and the Due Process Clause, respectively. See Am. Compl. With respect to the first count, the Secretary moved for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See Def's Part. Mot. for S.J. at 45. With respect to the second and third counts, the Secretary moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R....
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