Eva Beattie v. Harold G. Parkhurst

• Decision Date: 04 January 1933
• Citation: 163 A. 589,105 Vt. 91
• Parties: EVA BEATTIE v. HAROLD G. PARKHURST
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

163 A. 589

105 Vt. 91

EVA BEATTIE v. HAROLD G. PARKHURST

Supreme Court of Vermont

January 4, 1933

Special Term at Rutland, November, 1932.

View of Evidence on Exception to Overruling of Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict and To Set Aside Verdict---Automobiles---Duties of Motorists Approaching Intersection of Highways---Presumptions---Contributory Negligence---Jury Question.

1. On exception to action of trial court in refusing to grant defendant's motion for directed verdict and in overruling his motion to set aside verdict, evidence must be viewed in light most favorable to plaintiff.

2. Motorist approaching intersection of streets from unfavored direction, to free herself from imputation of contributory negligence, must look for approaching cars and look effectively, that is, with degree of care of careful and prudent person in like circumstances.

3. Motorist approaching intersection of highways will be presumed to have seen whatever was in range of her vision, if she looked.

4. That motorist is approaching intersection of highways from favored direction does not necessarily give him right of way over another motorist approaching intersection from unfavored direction, but right of precedence depends upon his distance from intersection, speed, etc.

5. Motorist approaching intersection of highways from unfavored direction, if there is no one approaching crossing upon other street within such distance as reasonably to indicate danger of interference or collision, is under no obligation to stop or wait, but may proceed to use crossing as matter of right.

6. Motorist approaching intersection of highways from unfavored direction, held not guilty of contributory negligence as matter of law, question being for jury, under facts disclosed by evidence.

ACTION OF TORT for negligence. Plea, general issue. Trial by jury at the March Term, 1932, Rutland County, Davis, J., presiding. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case.

Judgment affirmed.

Clayton H. Kinney for the defendant.

Jones & Jones for the plaintiff.

Present POWERS, C. J., SLACK, MOULTON, THOMPSON, and GRAHAM, JJ.

OPINION

SLACK

The plaintiff seeks to recover for personal injuries suffered by her and for damage to her automobile caused by defendant's negligence, which resulted in his automobile colliding with the automobile of the plaintiff at the intersection of West and Wales streets in the city of Rutland between three and four o'clock in the morning of January 1, 1932. The plaintiff had a verdict and judgment below, and the case is here on defendant's exceptions.

The exceptions briefed are to the refusal of the court to direct a verdict for defendant on the ground that plaintiff had failed to show freedom from contributory negligence, and to the overruling of his motion to set aside the verdict.

Following is a picture of the locus: West street runs nearly due east and west. Wales street runs north and south and intersects West street. Church street is a continuation north of Wales street from the north side of West street. At the intersection, West street is forty-six feet wide, Wales street is thirty feet wide, and Church street is twenty-nine feet wide. The streets are practically level at the intersections, but beginning just east of that point West street ascends to the east on a seven or eight percent grade for at least seven hundred feet. West street is visible that distance from the intersection, and south on Wales street to the north side of a building called the "harness shop," which stands on the east side of Wales street eleven feet south of the intersection.

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as it must be, tended to show that she drove her car, which was a Studebaker coupe, north along Wales street into the intersection, headed for Church street, and had reached a point where the front end of her car was in Church street when it was hit by defendant's car which was being driven west on West street; that just south of the harness shop she slowed her car down to five or seven miles an hour and put it into second gear; that she increased its speed from that point so that it was traveling from fifteen to twenty miles an hour at the place of collision that just before entering the intersection she sounded the horn and looked in both directions on West street; that she looked east on that street as far as Elm street, a distance of two hundred and ten feet; that she "didn't look didn't notice anything above Elm street"; that she did not see defendant's car before the collision; that an occupant of her car saw defendant's car just before the collision when it was thirty to thirty-five feet "up the road coming down," and that it was then traveling fifty miles an hour; that the defendant slid the wheels of his car or so applied the brakes that the wheels made distinct black marks in the surface of West street, which is asphalt and crushed stone, and was dry at the time; that the mark made by the left wheel of his car extended east on West street sixty-three feet from the point of collision,...