Eva L. v. Saul
| Decision Date | 22 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:20cv0162 (JFA) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | EVA L., Plaintiff, v. ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
This matter is before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment. (Docket nos. 20, 23). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), plaintiff seeks judicial review of the final decision of Andrew Saul, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner"), denying plaintiff's claim for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under the Social Security Act. The Commissioner's final decision is based on a finding by the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") and Appeals Council for the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review ("Appeals Council") that plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and applicable regulations.1
On July 23, 2020, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment (Docket no. 20), a memorandum in support (Docket no. 21), and a waiver of hearing (Docket no. 22). Thereafter, the Commissioner submitted a cross-motion for summary judgment (Docket no. 23), amemorandum in support (Docket no. 24), a memorandum in opposition (Docket no. 25), and a waiver of hearing (Docket no. 26).2
For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Docket no. 20) is granted in part; the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Docket no. 23) is denied; and the final decision of the Commissioner is remanded for further consideration.
On December 2, 2016, plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI with an alleged onset date of July 26, 2016. (AR 302-03, 306-10). The Social Security Administration ("SSA") initially denied plaintiff's applications on December 29, 2016. (AR 175-87, 190-202). Plaintiff requested reconsideration of the denials on February 7, 2017 (AR 261-62) which the SSA denied on April 11, 2017 (AR 221-36, 238-53).3 Subsequently, on May 9, 2017, plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ. (AR 273-74). The Office of Disability Adjudication and Review acknowledged receipt of plaintiff's request on June 7, 2017 (AR 275-77) and later scheduled a hearing before an ALJ on December 4, 2018 (AR 297). Plaintiff signed an "Appointment of Representative" form on June 16, 2017 authorizing Robert F. Kiel to represent her with respect to her claims, but on November 22, 2017, Mr. Kiel withdrew as plaintiff's attorney (AR 290-93).
On December 4, 2018, ALJ Raghav Kovtal held a video hearing in Washington, D.C. (AR 17).4 Plaintiff appeared in Falls Church, Virginia, and was not represented. (Id.). Plaintiffprovided testimony and answered questions posed by the ALJ. (AR 85-134, 140-41, 146-52). A vocational expert also answered questions from the ALJ and plaintiff. (AR 134-40, 141-46, 149-50). On January 31, 2019, the ALJ issued his decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled under sections 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act from July 26, 2016 through the date of his decision. (AR 17-29). On February 27, 2019, plaintiff signed an "Appointment of Representative" form authorizing Lindsay F. Osterhout to represent her with respect to her claims. (AR 12-13). Ms. Osterhout submitted plaintiff's request for review with the Appeals Council in a letter dated February 27, 2019. (AR 460-61). The Appeals Council denied the request on December 19, 2019, finding no reason under its rules to review the ALJ's decision. (AR 1-3). As a result, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. (AR 1). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481. Plaintiff was given sixty (60) days to file a civil action challenging the decision. (AR 2).
On February 14, 2020, plaintiff filed this civil action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Docket no. 1). On June 22, 2020, the court entered an order setting the briefing schedule for the parties' cross-motions on summary judgment. (Docket no. 13). Thereafter, the parties agreed to refer this matter to the undersigned magistrate judge for resolution. (Docket nos. 15, 18). On July 8, 2020, the parties filed a joint motion to amend the briefing schedule, which the court granted on the same day. (Docket nos. 17, 19). Plaintiff filed her motion for summary judgment on July 23, 2020. (Docket no. 20). The Commissioner filed his opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment on August 24, 2020. (Docket nos. 23-25). The parties waived oral argument on their motions. (Docket nos. 22, 26). This case is now before the court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. (Docket nos. 20, 23).
Under the Social Security Act, the court will affirm the Commissioner's final decision "when an ALJ has applied correct legal standards and the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence." Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bird v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012)). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1979)). It is "more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). In determining whether a decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court does not "undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the Secretary." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996)). It is the ALJ's duty to resolve evidentiary conflicts, not the reviewing court, and the ALJ's decision must be sustained if supported by substantial evidence. Smith v. Chater, 99 F. 3d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff was born in 1956 and was sixty-two years old at the time of the ALJ hearing on December 4, 2018. (AR 93, 302). She has one or two years of college education. (AR 93, 359). From 2002 to 2003, plaintiff worked as a legal secretary for Greenberg Taurig, LLP. (AR 316, 359). From 2004 to 2006, she was self-employed as a real estate agent. (AR 94-95, 316). During 2005, plaintiff also engaged in temporary assignments to include work as a legal secretary for Ruden McClosky and Legal Search Solutions, Inc. (AR 96, 316). From 2006 to2008, plaintiff returned to legal secretary work at Shutts & Bowen, LLP. (AR 316-17). At the end of 2008, plaintiff was self-employed. (AR 317). In 2009, she returned to Shutts & Bowen, LLP before moving to Virginia and beginning employment at Williams Mullen Clark & Dobbins PC. (AR 317). In 2010, plaintiff continued working for Williams Mullen but also engaged in employment at Collections by Jane, Ltd., Geologics Corporation, Chicos, and Wells Fargo Bank. (Id.). In 2011, plaintiff worked for Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, TS Employment, Inc., Geologics Corporation, and Nordstrom Inc & Subsidiaries. (AR 318).5 She also continued to work on a commission basis as a real estate agent. (AR 102-03). Plaintiff then moved to part-time employment as a legal secretary at BAC Florida Bank from 2014 to 2016 alongside working as a sales clerk at L'Occitane, Inc., beginning in 2015. (AR 318-19, 323-24, 447). She continued her employment at L'Occitane into 2017. (AR 319). During the same year, plaintiff also worked for Alta IT Services LLC as a customer representative and ADP TotalSource Company as a sales representative. (AR 319, 428-29). In 2018, plaintiff worked part-time at L'Occitane and Sephora, USA, Inc. (AR 331, 458).
On August 25, 2015, plaintiff reported to Ivan G. Carrasquilla, M.D., at Primecare of Coral Gables presenting with panic attacks, weight gain, and fatigue. (AR 573-74). She was experiencing fatigue, excessive sweating, hot flashes, and palpitations. (AR 573). Dr. Carrasquilla performed a general examination and found plaintiff to be in no acute distress. (Id.).She was well-developed and well-nourished. (Id.). He assessed plaintiff with anxiety and depression, heart palpitations, and an abnormal finding on her EKG examination, so referred her to cardiology. (AR 574).7 Dr. Carrasquilla also re-started plaintiff on fifty milligrams of Zoloft and began her on Alprazolam to be taken as needed for her panic attacks. (Id.). She was to follow up in four weeks. (Id.).8
Following complaints of a "shadow/curtain" in the upper visual field of her right eye beginning on August 26, 2015, plaintiff was seen by Neda Nikpoor, M.D., on August 27, 2015 at the University of Miami. (AR 480-83). Plaintiff explained that she was on the second day of taking Xanax and felt that this could be associated with her loss of vision, although two weeks ago she had noticed "many floaters." (AR 481). She did not have a history of retinal detachment although her brother did. (Id.). Dr. Nikpoor performed a basic eye examination to include a fundus exam, a slit lamp exam, a tonometry test, and a review of her pupils, dilation, and visual acuity. (AR 482). Plaintiff had macular off-right retinal detachment, myopia, and a horseshoe tear. (AR 483). Dr. Nikpoor advised plaintiff she would need surgery either the following day or the following Monday; plaintiff preferred to wait until Monday and was to have the procedure performed by William E. Smiddy, M.D. (Id.). Plaintiff was sent for a pre-operative examination given her history of an abnormal echocardiogram. (Id.).
Later the same day, plaintiff saw Aldo Pavon Canseco, M.D., for the pre-operative examination. (AR 478-80). A review of her systems resulted in largely normal findings,although her eyes were positive for visual...
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