Evans v. Abney

Decision Date26 January 1970
Docket NumberNo. 60,60
Citation90 S.Ct. 628,396 U.S. 435,24 L.Ed.2d 634
PartiesE. S. EVANS et al., Petitioners, v. Guyton G. ABNEY et al
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

James M. Nabrit, III, New York City, for petitioners.

Louis F. Claiborne, Washington, D.C., for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court.

Frank C. Jones, Macon, Ga., for respondents.

Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

Once again this Court must consider the constitutional implications of the 1911 will of United States Senator A. O. Bacon of Georgia which conveyed property in trust to Senator Bacon's home city of Macon for the creation of a public park for the exclusive use of the white people of that city. As a result of our earlier decision in this case which held that the park, Baconsfield, could not continue to be operated on a racially discriminatory basis, Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966), the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that Senator Bacon's intention to provide a park for whites only had become impossible to fulfill and that accordingly the trust had failed and the parkland and other trust property had reverted by operation of Georgia law to the heirs of the Senator. 224 Ga. 826, 165 S.E.2d 160 (1968). Petitioners, the same Negro citizens of Macon who have sought in the courts to integrate the park, contend that this termination of the trust violates their rights to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the questions involved. 394 U.S. 1012, 89 S.Ct. 1628, 23 L.Ed.2d 38 (1969). For the reasons to be stated, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia should be, and it is, affirmed.

The early background of this litigation was summarized by Mr. Justice Douglas in his opinion for the Court in Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S., at 297-298, 86 S.Ct. at 487-488:

'In 1911 United States Senator Augustus O. Bacon executed a will that devised to the Mayor and Council of the City of Macon, Georgia, a tract of land which, after the death of the Senator's wife and daughters, was to be used as 'a park and pleasure ground' for white people only, the Senator stating in the will that while he had only the kindest feeling for the Negroes he was of the opinion that 'in their social relations the two races (white and negro) should be forever separate.' The will provided that the park should be under the control of a Board of Managers of seven persons, all of whom were to be white. The city kept the park segregated for some years but in time let Negroes use it, taking the position that the park was a public facility which it could not constitutionally manage and maintain on a segregated basis.

Thereupon, individual members of the Board of Managers of the park brought this suit in a state court against the City of Macon and the trustees of certain residuary beneficiaries of Senator Bacon's estate, asking that the city be removed as trustee and that the court appoint new trustees, to whom title to the park would be transferred. The city answered, alleging it could not legally enforce racial segregation in the park. The other defendants admitted the allegation and requested that the city be removed as trustee.

Several Negro citizens of Macon intervened, alleging that the racial limitation was contrary to the laws and public policy of the United States, and asking that the court refuse to appoint private trustees. Thereafter the city resigned as trustee and amended its answer accordingly. Moreover, other heirs of Senator Bacon intervened and they and the defendants other than the city asked for reversion of the trust property to the Bacon estate in the event that the prayer of the petition were denied.

'The Georgia court accepted the resignation of the city as trustee and appointed three individuals as new trustees, finding it unnecessary to pass on the other claims of the heirs. On appeal by the Negro intervenors, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed, holding that Senator Bacon had the right to give and bequeath his property to a limited class, that charitable trusts are subject to supervision of a court of equity, and that the power to appoint new trustees so that the purpose of the trust would not fail was clear. 220 Ga. 280, 138 S.E.2d 573.'

The Court in Evans v. Newton, supra, went on to reverse the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court and to hold that the public character of Baconsfield 'requires that it be treated as a public institution subject to the command of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of who now has title under state law.' 382 U.S., at 302, 86 S.Ct., at 490. Thereafter, the Georgia Supreme Court interpreted this Court's reversal of its decision as requiring that Baconsfield be henceforth operated on a nondiscriminatory basis. 'Under these circumstances,' the state high court held, 'we are of the opinion that the sole purpose for which the trust was created has become impossible of accomplishment and has been terminated.' Evans v. Newton, 221 Ga. 870, 871, 148 S.E.2d 329, 330 (1966). Without further elaboration of this holding, the case was remanded to the Georgia trial court to consider the motion of Guyton G. Abney and others, successor trustees of Senator Bacon's estate, for a ruling that the trust had become unenforceable and that accordingly the trust property had reverted to the Bacon estate and to certain named heirs of the Senator. The motion was opposed by petitioners and by the Attorney General of Georgia, both of whom argued that the trust should be saved by applying the cy pres doctrine to amend the terms of the will by striking the racial restrictions and opening Baconsfield to all the citizens of Macon without regard to race or color. The trial court, however, refused to apply cy pres. It held that the doctrine was inapplicable because the park's segregated, whites-only character was an essential and inseparable part of the testator's plan. Since the 'sole purpose' of the trust was thus in irreconcilable conflict with the constitutional mandate expressed in our opinion in Evans v. Newton, the trial court ruled that the Baconsfield trust had failed and that the trust property had by operation of law reverted to the heirs of Senator Bacon. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.

We are of the opinion that in ruling as they did the Georgia courts did no more than apply well-settled general principles of Georgia law to determine the meaning and effect of a Georgia will. At the time Senator Bacon made his will Georgia cities and towns were, and they still are, authorized to accept devises of property for the establishment and preservation of 'parks and pleasure grounds' and to hold the property thus received in charitable trust for the exclusive benefit of the class of persons named by the testator. Ga.Code Ann., c. 69-5 (1967); Ga.Code Ann. §§ 108-203, 108-207 (1959). These provisions of the Georgia Code explicitly authorized the testator to include, if he should choose, racial restrictions such as those found in Senator Bacon's will. The city accepted the trust with these restrictions in it. When this Court in Evans v. Newton, supra, held that the continued operation of Baconsfield as a segregated park was unconstitutional, the particular purpose of the Baconsfield trust as stated in the will failed under Georgia law. The question then properly before the Georgia Supreme Court was whether as a matter of state law the doctrine of cy pres should be applied to prevent the trust itself from failing. Petitioners urged that the cy pres doctrine allowed the Georgia courts to strike the racially restrictive clauses in Bacon's will so that the terms of the trust could be fulfilled without violating the Constitution.

The Georgia cy pres statutes upon which petitioners relied provide:

'When a valid charitable bequest is incapable for some reason of execution in the exact manner provided by the testator, donor, or founder, a court of equity will carry it into effect in such a way as will as nearly as possible effectuate his intention.' Ga.Code Ann. § 108-202 (1959).

'A devise or bequest to a charitable use will be sustained and carried out in this State; and in all cases where there is a general intention manifested by the testator to effect a certain purpose, and the particular mode in which he directs it to be done shall fail from any cause, a court of chancery may, by approximation, effectuate the purpose in a manner most similar to that indicated by the testator.' Ga.Code Ann. § 113-815 (1959).

The Georgia courts have held that the fundamental purpose of these cy pres provisions is to allow the court to carry out the general charitable intent of the testator where this intent might otherwise be thwarted by the impossibility of the particular plan or scheme provided by the testator. Moss v. Youngblood, 187 Ga. 188, 200 S.E. 689 (1938). But this underlying logic of the cy pres doctrine implies that there is a certain class of cases in which the doctrine cannot be applied. Professor Scott in his treatise on trusts states this limitation on the doctrine of cy pres which is common to many States1 as follows:

'It is not true that a charitable trust never fails where it is impossible to carry out the particular purpose of the testator. In some cases * * * it appears that the accomplishment of the particular purpose and only that purpose was desired by the testator and that he had no more general charitable intent and that he would presumably have preferred to have the whole trust fail if the particular purpose is impossible of accomplishment. In such a case the cy pres doctrine is not applicable.' 4 A. Scott, The Law of Trusts § 399, p. 3085 (3d ed. 1967).

In this case, Senator Bacon provided an unusual amount of information in his will from which the Georgia courts could determine the limits of his charitable purpose. Immediately after...

To continue reading

Request your trial
99 cases
  • MedValUSA Health Programs v. MEMBERWORKS
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • May 17, 2005
    ...Id. Only once has a majority opinion discussed Shelley at any length—in order to distinguish it. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 436, 90 S.Ct. 628, 24 L.Ed.2d 634 (1970), arose from a trust, created in his will by Senator A.O. Bacon of Macon, Georgia, leaving land to the city for use as a whi......
  • Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • April 26, 1974
    ...States Supreme Court has declined to carry the principle of state action to such extremes. 15 For example, in Evans v. Abney (1970) 396 U.S. 435, 90 S.Ct. 628, 24 L.Ed.2d 634, the Georgia Supreme Court applied the common law doctrine that a testator, in establishing a trust, may circumscrib......
  • Palmer v. Thompson
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 14, 1971
    ...for perpetuating a segregated way of life. That a State may not do. As Mr. Justice Brennan said in Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 453, 90 S.Ct. 628, 638, 24 L.Ed.2d 634 (dissenting), where a State abandoned a park to avoid 'I have no doubt that a public park may constitutionally be closed do......
  • Shimman v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • October 1, 1984
  • Request a trial to view additional results
5 books & journal articles
  • CERCLA: convey to a pauper and avoid cost recovery under section 107(a) (1)?
    • United States
    • Environmental Law Vol. 33 No. 2, March 2003
    • March 22, 2003
    ...of release under this section, to any other person the liability imposed under this section."). (195) For example, Evans v. Abney, v. 396 U.S. 435 (1970), held that a determinable fee in parkland "for white people only" terminated automatically, without state action, and did not therefore v......
  • The Public–Private Distinction: Insights for Public Administration from the State Action Doctrine
    • United States
    • Public Administration Review No. 75-1, January 2015
    • January 1, 2015
    ...setting. 72 Public Administration Review • January | February 2015Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (19......
  • Keeping charity in charitable trust law: the Barnes Foundation and the case for consideration of public interest in administration of charitable trusts.
    • United States
    • University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 151 No. 5, May 2003
    • May 1, 2003
    ...to maintain the racially restrictive term could lead to trust failure rather than trust modification under cy pres. See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1970) (upholding the Georgia Supreme Court's finding that Senator A.O. Bacon would have wanted his trust supporting a white-only publ......
  • The Supreme Court of the United States, 1969-1970
    • United States
    • Political Research Quarterly No. 23-4, December 1970
    • December 1, 1970
    ...of accomplishment, the trust had failed and the property thus reverted to the heirs of the deceased, Senator Bacon. In Evan.s v. Abney (396 U.S. 435; 90 S. Ct. 628), an opinion by Justice Black (vote: Douglas and Brennan dissenting) held that no constitutionally protected rights had been vi......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT