Evans v. Bibb Co.

• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: SOGNIER; BIRDSON, P.J., and CARLEY
• Citation: Evans v. Bibb Co., 342 S.E.2d 484, 178 Ga.App. 139 (Ga. App. 1986)
• Decision Date: 17 February 1986
• Docket Number: No. 71099,71099
• Parties: EVANS v. BIBB COMPANY.

Page 484

342 S.E.2d 484

178 Ga.App. 139

EVANS v. BIBB COMPANY.

No. 71099.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Feb. 17, 1986.

Rehearings Denied March 7, 1986.

Certiorari Denied May 7, 1986.

James D. Patrick, Jr., Columbus, for appellant.

William B. Hardegree, James E. Humes II, Columbus, for appellee.

SOGNIER, Judge.

Jerry Evans brought suit against The Bibb Company alleging in five counts numerous intentional and/or negligent acts committed by the company in relation to Evans' alleged discharge from employment. The trial court granted the company's motion for summary judgment and Evans appeals.

1. Appellant contends the trial court erred by granting appellee's motion for summary judgment on his wrongful discharge count because appellee's affidavits raise questions of fact whether appellee fired appellant (as contended by appellant) or whether appellant was placed by appellee under its long-term disability plan. On motion for summary judgment, the burden of establishing the non-existence of any genuine issue of fact is upon the moving party and all doubts are to be resolved against the movant. OCGA § 9-11-56; Friddell v. Rawlins, 160 Ga.App. 44, 45 (1), 285 S.E.2d 779 (1981). However, "[t]he summary judgment law does not require the defendant to show that no issue of fact remains, but rather [that] no genuine issue of material fact remains." (Emphasis in original.) McCray v. Hunter, 157 Ga.App. 509, 511, 277 S.E.2d 795 (1981). Here, no genuine issue of material fact is raised on the question of wrongful discharge because, even assuming appellant has been discharged, the evidence is uncontroverted that appellant was employed at will and not by contract. It has long been established in Georgia that an employee cannot bring an action against his employer for wrongful discharge from employment where he is an at will employee with no definite and certain contract of employment because the employer, with or without cause and regardless of its motives, may discharge the employee without liability. Troy v. Interfinancial, Inc., 171 Ga.App. 763, 766(1), 320 S.E.2d 872 (1984); OCGA § 34-7-1. Appellant argues he was wrongfully discharged for pursuing his rights under the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act, OCGA § 34-9-1 et seq. ("Act"), and urges this court to adopt a public policy exception to an employer's right to discharge an employee at will when the right is exercised in retaliation for the employee's assertion of his rights under the Act. See 32 ALR 4th 1221. Although many states have adopted such a policy, see inter alia Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (S.Ct.Tenn., 1984); contra Kelly v. Miss. Valley Gas. Co., 397 So.2d 874 (S.Ct.Miss., 1981); Meeks v. Opp Cotton Mills, 459 So.2d 814 (S.Ct.Ala., 1984), Georgia courts have refused to acknowledge any exceptions not encompassed by OCGA § 34-7-1, see Goodroe v. Ga. Power Co., 148 Ga.App. 193, 194 (1), 251 S.E.2d 51 (1978), and, in the absence of any express statutory provision for such a civil remedy in the Act, we decline appellant's invitation to create judicially such a remedy. "Courts may interpret laws, but may not change them. [Cit.]" City Council of Augusta v. Kennen, 150 Ga.App. 844, 845-846, 258 S.E.2d 651 (1979). "These inadequacies in our existing law, however, if they be such, cannot be supplied by the courts, and may only be corrected by the General Assembly." Davis v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 82 Ga.App. 460, 467, 61 S.E.2d 510 (1950). Thus, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to appellee on appellant's claim of wrongful discharge.

However, in Count I of his complaint, appellant also alleges that pursuant to appellee's written employment rules appellant is entitled to termination pay. " 'To entitle [appellee] to a summary judgment the undisputed facts as disclosed by the pleadings and evidence must negate at least one essential element entitling [appellant] to recovery and under every theory fairly drawn from the pleadings and evidence [cits.] and if necessary, prove the negative or nonexistence of an essential element affirmatively asserted by [appellant.]' [Cit.]" (Emphasis in original.) Waller v. Transworld Imports, 155 Ga.App. 438, 439, 271 S.E.2d 1 (1980). A question of fact does remain whether appellee discharged appellant or if appellant is on long-term disability because appellant, if discharged, has asserted a claim for termination pay which has not been pierced by appellee on its motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to appellee on this narrow issue in Count I of appellant's complaint.

2. Appellant contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to appellee on those parts of his complaint asserting he has a cause of action against appellee for alleged intentional violations of Federal law and safety regulations regarding cotton dust levels in the air in textile mill operations which resulted in appellant contracting byssinosis. We find no merit in this contention. "Under Georgia law, the existence of workers' compensation coverage excludes all other remedies against the employer. [Cits.]" United States v. Aretz, 248 Ga. 19, 20, 280 S.E.2d 345 (1981). Byssinosis is a work-related disease enumerated in the Act. OCGA § 34-9-280 (5); see also Venable v. John P. King Mfg. Co., 174 Ga.App. 800, 331 S.E.2d 638 (1985). Thus, appellant was foreclosed from pursuing a negligence action against appellee. Id. Although appellant alleges that appellee's acts were intentional and wilful, this does not prevent his injuries from coming within the exclusionary provisions of the Act. See Southern Wire, etc., Inc. v. Fowler, 217 Ga. 727, 124 S.E.2d 738 (1962); see also Synalloy Corp. v. Newton, 254 Ga. 174, 175 (1), 326...