Evans v. BOARD OF COUNTY COM'RS

• Decision Date: 29 July 2004
• Docket Number: No. 20020689-CA.,20020689-CA.
• Citation: 2004 UT App 256,97 P.3d 697
• Parties: Jamie EVANS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF UTAH COUNTY, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

97 P.3d 697

2004 UT App 256

Jamie EVANS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF UTAH COUNTY, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 20020689-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

July 29, 2004.

Samuel D. McVey, Kirton & McConkie, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.

Craig V. Wentz and Barton H. Kunz II, Christensen & Jensen PC, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

Before Judges GREENWOOD, ORME, and THORNE.

OPINION

THORNE, Judge:

¶ 1 Jamie Evans appeals from the trial court's grant of the Board of County Commissioners' (the Board) motion for summary judgment. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In 1926, Knight Investment Company (Knight), with the knowledge and permission of Utah County and Provo City, subdivided land it owned south of Provo. Knight divided the property into several lots and platted a network of roads, including Pine Street, which Knight then dedicated for public use. Knight titled the area the "Ironton Plat." At a later date, the R.L. Bird Company (Bird) purchased several pieces of property in and around the Ironton Plat. The property included: Several platted lots within the Ironton Plat (the Lots), a strip of land abutting the southeast boundary of the Ironton Plat (the Strip) — when used in conjunction we will address the Strip and the Lots as "the Property" — and an expanse of land surrounding the southeast corner of the Ironton Plat and connected to the Strip (the Corner Property). Both the Strip and the Lots abut Pine Street. There is a conflict as to whether the Corner Property abuts Pine street at its terminus.

¶ 3 Barring certain improvements not material to this case, neither Knight, nor its assigns, ever developed the Ironton Plat as intended.

¶ 4 In 1983, Bird quit-claimed its interests in the Lots and the Strip to Utah County (the County), reserving to itself and the Corner Property an easement and right-of-way over the Strip and Pine Street. The reservation allowed Bird to access the State highway from the Corner Property. Specifically, the reservation read:

Reserving to the grantor the public use and right-of-way over and into Pine Street from the State Highway and a 56' wide right-of-way over and across the last parcel of land [included in the quit claim deed (the Strip)], from Pine Street to connect with grantor's remaining property over which Utah County agrees to build a good gravel road within 90 days of the date of this instrument, to provide access to grantor's remaining land.

¶ 5 The County accepted the deed as written and, subsequently, the County built a Public Works Facility upon some of the land. The facility currently includes a public works building, a service station, and a parking lot. In the course of construction, the County removed a large amount of earth from areas in and around Pine street as platted. In 1995, Bird conveyed its interest in the Corner Property, including its easement and right-of-way, to Jamie and Terry Evans (Evans). The easement language in the corrected deed closely tracked the language from Bird's 1983 quit-claim deed to the County.¹

¶ 6 In 1996, the County vacated several of the platted and dedicated Ironton Plat streets, but left Pine Street as a dedicated street. Evans subsequently filed suit challenging the vacation order and seeking to enforce his easement.² In July 2002, following the cessation of settlement talks, the trial court entertained argument on the County's summary judgment motion. Although the court's order contained several dispositive rulings, Evans challenges only that portion dealing with his easement right. The court ruled that Evans's easement was invalid because (1) Pine Street had no physical existence or historical use, (2) the easement area, as described, contained no existing fixtures to which an easement could attach, and (3) the easement language was fatally vague. Evans appeals. We reverse and remand.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7 Evans appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment. "We affirm summary judgment only when `there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.'" Arnold Indus. v. Love, 2002 UT 133, ¶ 11, 63 P.3d 721 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)) (ellipsis in original). "We grant the trial court's legal conclusions no deference, reviewing them for correctness. Furthermore, in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. (quotations and citations omitted).

The ultimate determination of whether an easement exists is a conclusion of law, which we review for correctness. However, the existence of an easement is also a highly fact-dependent question; therefore, we accord the trial judge a measure of discretion when applying the correct legal standard to the facts, and overturn a ruling concerning the existence of an easement only if the judge exceeded the discretion granted.

Carrier v. Lindquist, 2001 UT 105, ¶ 11, 37 P.3d 1112 (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. Statute of Frauds, Vagueness, and Unfixed Location

¶ 8 The County argues that Bird's reservation violated the statute of frauds, that it was too vague to create a cognizable easement, and that the absence of a fixed location, under these circumstances, renders the reservation invalid. We address each assertion in turn.

a. Statute of Frauds

¶ 9 Express easements involve real property interests. See Green v. Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117, 122 (Utah Ct.App.1994). As such, to survive, an express easement must satisfy the statute of frauds. See Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 899 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah Ct.App.1995). "[T]he preferred way to transfer an interest in land and meet the requirements of the statute of frauds is by deed." Id. However, "`[a]ll that is required is that the interest be granted or declared by a writing subscribed by the party to be charged.'" Smith v. Osguthorpe, 2002 UT App 361, ¶ 24, 58 P.3d 854 (citation omitted). "Words that `clearly show intention to grant an easement are sufficient, provided the language is certain and definite in its term[s].'" Warburton, 899 P.2d at 782 (quoting Martinez v. Martinez, 93 N.M. 673, 604 P.2d 366, 368 (1979)). "While conveyances of land must contain a description of the land sufficient to locate it without recourse to oral testimony, easements need only encumber a specific servient estate." Benis v. Shoreridge Water Coop., 1998 WL 466665, *3, 1998 Wash.App. LEXIS 1172, at **8-9 (Wash.Ct.App. Aug. 10, 1998). "Besides describing the area subject to the easement, the conveyance granting or reserving an easement should also refer to its purpose." Id. at *3, 1998 Wash.App. LEXIS 1172 at *9. However, "[t]he failure of an easement description to specify details, such as the exact location ... does not render the easement excessively vague or unenforceable." Egidi v. Libertyville, 251 Ill.App.3d 224, 190 Ill.Dec. 443, 621 N.E.2d 615, 622 (1993). Finally, when an easement arises through a deed reservation, the absence of the grantee's signature does not, necessarily, violate the statute of frauds. See Chase v. Nelson, 507 N.E.2d 640, 644 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (stating "the covenant which ran with the land was not invalid for the grantee's omitted signature on the deed"); Jon W. Bruce and James W. Ely, Jr., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND-EASEMENT GRANT OR RESERVATION, § 3.1 (Thompson West 2004) ("However, in the case of the creation of an easement by deed reservation, the grantee's signature is not required."). ¶ 10 In 1983, Bird quit-claimed its interest in the Property to the County. However, in the quit-claim deed Bird included the following language:

Reserving to the grantor [Bird] the public use and right-of way over and into Pine Street from the State Highway and a 56' wide right-of-way over and across the last parcel of land [the Strip], from Pine Street to connect with the grantor's remaining property.

Thus, Bird transferred its interest in the Property, and reserved an easement or an exception through the deed. The deed noted both the dominant and the servient estate, established the purpose of the easement or exception,³ and clearly indicated Bird's intent to reserve an easement when it conveyed the property. Moreover, the County accepted and recorded Bird's quit-claim deed as written; consequently, the County is "charged with knowledge of its contents," and cannot now claim ignorance or lack of agreement. Chase, 507 N.E.2d at 644. Accordingly, Bird's easement, which was transferred to Evans, does not violate the statute of frauds, and to the extent that the trial court concluded that it did, we reverse its conclusion.⁴

b. Vagueness

¶ 11 The County, relying on Potter v. Chadez, 1999 UT App 95, 977 P.2d 533, argues that the language Bird utilized in its deed to the County is fatal to Evans's present easement claim. We disagree.

¶ 12 The trial court concluded that the reservation as a whole was void because the reservation language was vague, the easement location was not fixed by the deed, and no fixtures existed from which the court could fix the easement location. "A right of way founded on a deed or grant is limited to the uses and extent fixed by the instrument." Labrum v. Rickenbach, 711 P.2d 225, 227 (Utah 1985) (footnote omitted). "It is also established in this state that a deed should be construed so as to effectuate the intentions of and desires of the parties, as manifested by the language made use of in the deed." Wood v. Ashby, 122 Utah 580, 253 P.2d 351, 353 (1952).⁵ "Further, when [a] deed creates an easement the circumstances attending the transaction, the situation of the parties, and the object to be attained are also to be considered." Id.; see also Hancock v. Planned Dev. Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah 1990) ("The paramount rule of construction of deeds is to give effect to the intent of the parties as expressed in the deed as a...