Evans v. Breeden, 1--774A106
| Decision Date | 23 June 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 1--774A106,1--774A106 |
| Citation | 164 Ind.App. 558,330 N.E.2d 116 |
| Parties | Allen A. EVANS, as next friend of Robert A. Evans and Allen A. Evans, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Pauline N. BREEDEN, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Joseph F. Quill, Indianapolis, Melville E. Watson, Greenfield, John G. McNutt, Indianapolis, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Howard J. DeTrude, Jr., John N. Thompson, Indianapolis, Stephen Free, Greenfield, for defendant-appellee; Knightlinger, Young, Gray & DeTrude, Indianapolis, Ging, Free & Brand, Greenfield, of counsel.
Plaintiff-appellant, Evans, appeals from a negative judgment rendered in his suit for damages against defendant-appellee, Breeden, arising out of an intersectional collision.
The issues raised upon appeal concern the collateral source rule, instructions to the jury, and whether the jurdgment is contrary to law.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
The case arose out of an intersectional collision between Robert Evans and Pauline Breeden which occurred at the intersection of East Washington Street and Irvington Plaza Shopping Center in Indianapolis. A review of the facts most favorable to the judgment reveals that Evans was proceeding east on Washington Street upon his motorcycle and Breeden was heading north from the shopping center parking lot in her automobile. Although the posted speed limit was 35 m.p.h., Evans was proceeding at 40 m.p.h. He saw the light change but decided he could not stop and attempted to drive on through the intersection. Mrs. Breeden, after stopping at the light, saw it turn green and started into the intersection. Upon seeing Evans she stopped immediately but her car was struck by Evans on the right front. The collision resulted in bodily injuries to Evans that required surgery and hospitalization.
Evans's father brought suit against Breeden, alleging that his son's injuries were caused by Breeden's negligence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Breeden and the Court rendered judgment accordingly. Evans brings this appeal.
The facts pertinent to this issue are as follows:
Prior to trial, Evans filed a motion in limine, seeking to prevent any reference at trial to the fact that insurance proceeds had paid part of the medical expenses resulting from the collision. The trial judge granted the motion, but advised the parties that the motion could be relaxed during trial if circumstances warranted.
On direct examination Evans's father testified that he had 'caused to be paid' certain medical bills incurred during his son's treatment and then introduced twelve checks, totalling $358.00, drawn on his personal checking account and made out to the hospital.
Out of the presence of the jury, Breeden's counsel asked that the motion in limine be relaxed to allow him to remove the false impression left by the father's testimony that the medical bills had been paid out of the family savings. The court granted the request.
It was then established on cross-examination, over Evans's objection, that a portion of the medical bills were paid by insurance.
On appeal, Evans contends that the trial court erred in permitting the cross-examination of Evans's father to extend to the subject of benefits from a collateral source.
The collateral source rule is stated as follows:
'Compensation for the loss received by plaintiff from a collateral source, independent of the wrongdoer, as from insurance, cannot be set up by the wrongdoer in mitigation of damages.' 9 I.L.E. Damages § 86, p. 253-Insurance or other Collateral Compensation.
The rule has been generally followed in Indiana. Powers v. Eillis (1952), 231 Ind. 273, 108 N.E.2d 132; Cox v. Winklepeck (1971), 149 Ind.App. 319, 271 N.E.2d 737.
It is held that admission of evidence of benefits from a collateral source tends to prejudice the jury and influence their verdict, not only as to damages, but also as to liability. Brindle v. Harter (1965), 138 Ind.App. 692, 211 N.E.2d 513.
However, it is not every violation of the strict language of the collateral source rule that constitutes reversible error. It is well-established that error in the admission or exclusion of testimony on cross-examination will not be grounds for reversal unless the complaining party is actually prejudiced thereby. Jameson v. McCaffry (1973), Ind.App., 300 N.E.2d 889.
As stated in Brindle v. Harter (1965), 138 Ind.App. 692, 211 N.E.2d 513:
'. . . there must appear the possibility that in view of all evidence presented the erroneously admitted evidence could have affected the final verdict.' 138 Ind.App. at 699, 211 N.E.2d at 517.
In the present case, we are inclined to believe that the admission of insurance benefits was erroneous. However, in view of the evidence as a whole, we are not convinced that Evans was actually harmed by the admission of the testimony such that the evidence could have affected the final verdict.
The error, if any, in the cross-examination of Evans's father was harmless error. Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 61.
Evans next contends that the trial court erred in giving an instruction tendered by Breeden which read as follows:
'If you find that Robert A. Evans exceeded, without justification, the posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour in the operation of his motorcycle, at the time of and immediately preceding the accident in question, this would constitute negligence on the part of Robert A. Evans.'
Evans argues that the instruction was an erroneous statement of the law in that it directed that any speed in excess of the posted speed limit would constitute negligence whereas only an unreasonable or imprudent speed under the circumstances would properly constitute negligence. He also adds that the instruction failed to state that the excess speed must contribute in some manner to a plaintiff's injuries before it would legally bar his recovery.
Instructions must be read as a whole. No single instruction must contain all the law applicable to a given case. LaNoux v. Hagar (1974), Ind.App., 308 N.E.2d 873.
Other instructions informed the jury that only unreasonable and imprudent conduct constituted negligence and that such negligence must be the proximate cause of the injuries complained of. with whom she collided, in time to have instruction.
Evans next contends that the court erred in...
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