Evans v. Buchanan, Civ. A. No. 1816-1822.

Decision Date24 April 1959
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 1816-1822.
Citation172 F. Supp. 508
PartiesBrenda EVANS et al., Plaintiffs, v. Madeline BUCHANAN et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Delaware

Louis L. Redding, Wilmington, Del., for plaintiffs.

Januar D. Bove, Jr., Atty. Gen. of State of Delaware, for State Bd. of Education, et al.

James M. Tunnell, Jr., Wilmington, Del., and James H. Hughes, III, Dover, Del., for Milford Sp. School Dist., et al.

Everett F. Warrington, Georgetown, Del., for Milton Sp. School Dist., No. 8.

Max Terry, Dover, Del., for Caesar Rodney Sp. School Dist.

LAYTON, District Judge.

The chronological legal background of these cases is fully set out in Evans v. Buchanan, D.C.Del. July 15, 1957, 152 F.Supp. 886 and Evans v. Buchanan, 3 Cir., July 23, 1958, 256 F.2d 688.

It is sufficient here to say that on May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States declared that racial discrimination in the public school systems was unconstitutional, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873, and on May 31, 1955, by a supplemental opinion, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083, announced that the primary responsibility for solving the many local problems which would inevitably arise from integration must rest upon the local school boards so long as they acted in good faith.

In the cases before me, a group of Negro children, through their guardians, brought class actions for injunctions in this Court to require their admission to the public schools of Delaware on a racially nondiscriminatory basis. The State School Board defended upon the ground that many local boards had refused to follow its directives as to integration and that it was powerless to enforce them upon what it conceived to be autonomous bodies. Judge Leahy granted summary judgment against the defendants holding that the defendant, State Board, had complete authority over the actions of the local boards and directing the former to file a plan of desegregation on a state-wide basis within a stated time. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The time for the filing of the plan having expired pending the appeal, a supplemental order was entered on November 19, 1958, which together with minor amendments thereto, directed that the State Board of Education submit a plan of desegregation to this Court within 112 days, and setting a hearing thereon on Tuesday, March 17, 1959.1

A plan has now been prepared and submitted in accordance with the requirements of the order. In simple terms, it provides for desegregation of the Delaware Public School System on a grade by grade basis over a period of twelve years beginning with all first grades at the Fall term, 1959. A three day hearing was held upon the plan followed by the filing of briefs and oral argument.

In its first opinion in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, briefly mentioned above, the Supreme Court stated that 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 692:

"* * * the plaintiffs * * * are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."

And in its second opinion it was held that 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 756:

"* * * School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles * * *."
"* * * Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity power. At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. To effectuate this interest may call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in making the transition to school systems operated in accordance with the constitutional principles set forth in our May 17, 1954, decision. Courts of equity may properly take into account the public interest in the elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective manner * * *.
"* * * Once such a start has been made, the courts may find that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective manner. The burden rests upon the defendants to establish that such time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date. To that end, the courts may consider problems related to administration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems * * *."

The plan of the State Board is the only one before me for consideration. Neither the plaintiffs nor any other interested party has offered an alternative. The plaintiffs apparently take the position that they are under no duty to offer a plan — rather, that it is the burden of the State Board to prepare a plan which, in all respects, must meet the requirements of the Brown cases. With this I agree. But to the extent that the plaintiffs at times seem to contend that no plan other than one calling for total desegregation is contemplated by the Brown decisions, I disagree. The language of the two opinions plainly permits a more gradual transition if the circumstances require.

Conditions which, if fairly found to exist, would call for something less than full and immediate desegregation are (1) the problem of additional buildings or classrooms and teaching personnel in a given locality due to an increase in enrollment; (2) the difficulties attending the reshuffling of the extensive school transportation system because of the relocation of students in different schools; (3) the closing of some schools entirely and the merging of others into more convenient districts together with the drafting, presentation and passage of legislation without which certain of these objectives cannot be satisfactorily solved; (4) the financial burden occasioned by new buildings and additional personnel which will fall in part upon local taxpayers and in part upon the State; (5) the problem of meshing substantial numbers of Negroes into a hitherto all white school system where the educational achievement level of the former is significantly lower than that of the latter and (6) the impact of integration upon a predominantly Southern society.2 The plaintiffs have objected to this latter consideration as irrelevant. I do not agree. My reasons will appear fully hereafter.

Before considering the plan itself, it is appropriate to state that, in my judgment, any thought of a total and immediate integration of the Delaware School System is out of the question. I agree fully with the testimony of the witnesses in this respect.

The question may then well be asked why consideration should not be given to the immediate desegregation of some large segment of the System, such as the elementary or secondary grades.3 In this connection, it can be fairly said that the present high school situation in the lower Counties is particularly open to criticism insofar as concerns segregation because in Sussex County, for instance, there is but one colored high school located in Georgetown in the central part of the County with the result that large numbers of colored students daily are transported by bus long distances (up to 25 miles) to school only to have to face the same long return trip at the day's end. And, in so doing, many of them may pass a white high school close to their own homes. Even so, there are convincing reasons why total desegregation of the high schools should not be attempted now. From testimony of Dr. Miller, supplemented by an exhibit introduced by the State Board, it is possible to present a fair picture of some of the problems which arise as the result of such a plan.

                                   High Schools Including Junior High
                                Present            Additional                Per Cent         Can Handle
                                  White                Negroes                   Increase               More  
                Caesar Rodney     877                 85         10% (very crowded now)            No
                Smyrna            544                134         25%                               No
                Milford           853                163         18% (very crowded now)            No
                Harrington        333                 37          9%                               Yes
                Dover             995                252         25% (crowded now)                 No
                Seaford           812                194         25% (crowded)                     No
                Rehoboth          227                 33          7%                               Yes
                Lewes             393                103         26%                               No
                Laurel            629                151         26%                               No
                Georgetown        483                126         25%                             Possible
                Millsboro         306                128         42%                               No
                Selbyville        250                 80         32%                               No
                

Overcrowding is clearly indicated, but that is only one of the problems. Overcrowding creates the need for additional rooms, additional teaching personnel and additional facilities of many other sorts. While only a few estimates are given,4 the increased cost for the construction and operations budgets would obviously be very substantial. The cost of the former would fall on an unwilling citizenry and of the latter on a state rapidly approaching a bad financial crisis.

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8 cases
  • Evans v. Buchanan
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Delaware
    • May 19, 1976
    ...1218; 207 F.Supp. 820 (D.Del.1962); 195 F.Supp. 321 (D.Del.1961); 281 F.2d 385 (3rd Cir. 1960); 173 F.Supp. 891 (D.Del.1959); 172 F.Supp. 508 (D.Del.1959); 256 F.2d 688 (3rd Cir. 1958); 152 F.Supp. 886 (D.Del.1957); 149 F.Supp. 376 (D.Del.1957); 145 F.Supp. 873 In this sense, Delaware has m......
  • Evans v. Buchanan
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Delaware
    • July 12, 1974
    ...neutral attendance zones having the probable result of continuing the dual school system are impermissible. See Evans v. Buchanan, 172 F. Supp. 508, 516 (1959); 173 F.Supp. 891 (1959), 207 F.Supp. 820, 825 (1962). 1 See page 1232 infra. 2 The State Board of Education was between Brown I and......
  • Evans v. Buchanan
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Delaware
    • December 27, 1976
    ...376 (D.Del.1957); Evans v. Buchanan, 152 F.Supp. 886 (D.Del.1957); Evans v. Buchanan, 256 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1958); Evans v. Buchanan, 172 F.Supp. 508 (D.Del.1959); Evans v. Buchanan, 173 F.Supp. 891 (D.Del.1959); Evans v. Ennis, 281 F.2d 385 (3d Cir. 1960); Evans v. Buchanan, 195 F.Supp. 32......
  • Evans v. Ennis
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • July 19, 1960
    ...to submit to it a plan of desegregation. A proposed plan was submitted and was approved with certain modifications. See Evans v. Buchanan, D.C., 172 F.Supp. 508, and D.C., 173 F.Supp. 891. On July 6, 1959, the court below entered a final order approving the plan. This is the order appealed ......
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