Evans v. Cal. Comm'n On Peace Officers Standards
| Decision Date | 21 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:15-CV-01951-MCE-DB,2:15-CV-01951-MCE-DB |
| Parties | TAMARA EVANS, Plaintiff, v. CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON PEACE OFFICERS STANDARDS AND TRANING; EDMUND PECINOVSKY; ANNE BREWER and DOES 1-25, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Plaintiff Tamara Evans ("Plaintiff") seeks redress from her former employer, California Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training ("POST") and her supervisors, Edmund Pecinovsky ("Pecinovsky") and Anne Brewer ("Brewer"), (referred to collectively as "Defendants") for violations of, among other things, the United States' Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., and California's Family Rights Act ("CFRA"), California Government Code § 12945.1.1 Plaintiff initially filed her complaint in state court, but Defendants removed the action to this Court pursuant to28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Presently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 45) on the issue of liability only under the FMLA and the CFRA. For the following reasons, that Motion is DENIED.2
Plaintiff worked for POST from June 2004 to March 2013. In October 2009, Plaintiff informed her supervisor, Frank Decker ("Decker"), that she was helping take care of her mother. Plaintiff explained that she was helping her mother with mobility, household chores, errands, meal preparation, basic hygiene, and doctor visits. She did not specifically state that she needed or intended to take a leave, nor did she request leave.
Plaintiff was apparently aware, however, that she was potentially going to be transferred to a different assignment, which would require her to take more time away from her mother, and she asked Decker what could be done about the transfer. Decker indicated he did not know and suggested that Plaintiff prepare a memorandum to his attention that he would forward to his supervisor, Alan Deal ("Deal").
Plaintiff prepared the memorandum, in which she asked to be assigned less travel so that she could attend to her mother's medical conditions. As with the original conversation with Decker, Plaintiff did not explicitly state in the memorandum that she needed or intended to take leave. Plaintiff also had a conversation about her mother's medical condition with Deal, who allegedly quizzed her on the specifics of her mother's physical capabilities and noted that "[i]t's always the oldest." Plaintiff understood this latter comment to mean that the responsibility of caring for a parent generally falls on the oldest child. At the conversation's conclusion, Deal told Plaintiff he would let her know ifhe changed her assignment. Although Plaintiff's request was granted and she was not transferred, Defendants did not notify Plaintiff of her potential eligibility for FMLA leave or how to apply. Plaintiff claims that she would have requested such leave if she had been properly informed.
In March 2010, Plaintiff injured her knee, and, a few months later in June, she had her anterior cruciate ligament surgically repaired. After the surgery, she received continuous rehabilitation and treatment in Reno, preventing her from performing the travel functions of her job at POST. On July 30, 2010, Plaintiff provided Defendants Post and Pecinovsky with a work release and continued orders for physical therapy. In addition, Defendants contend, and Plaintiff does not appear to dispute, that POST's FMLA Officer, Marylyn Heald, mailed Plaintiff a letter informing her of her rights while she was out recovering from the knee surgery. Plaintiff nonetheless contends she was not aware of her eligibility for FMLA leave and that if she had been notified, she would have requested it.
Sometime in early 2013, Plaintiff became the subject of a disciplinary investigation and was placed on paid administrative leave. On March 1, 2013, as part of that investigation, Plaintiff had an internal investigatory interview with supervisors Brewer and Stephanie Scofield ("Scofield"). In that interview, Plaintiff allegedly informed Brewer and Scofield that she needed leave to provide assistance to her mother for medical reasons. Defendants dispute this fact, and offer competing evidence that Plaintiff did not in fact make such a request at that time. Whatever the case, on March 15, 2013, Plaintiff submitted an FMLA/CFRA certification form that indicated she would need leave for four hours a day, one or two days a week. On March 26, 2013, POST terminated Plaintiff's employment.
On February 28, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint with California's Department of Fair Employment and Housing, and on June 4, 2014, she initiated this action. Plaintiff now moves for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability as to the alleged FMLA and CFRA violations. Defendants oppose that Motion on four bases: (1) Plaintiff'smotion is untimely; (2) employees of public agencies cannot be held individually liable under the FMLA or CFRA;4 (3) Plaintiff's' claims are time-barred; and (4) regardless, Plaintiff has not shown she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the merits of the foregoing claims. Although the Court rejects Defendant's arguments with respect to the timing of Plaintiff's Motion and individual liability under the FMLA, Plaintiff's motion is nonetheless DENIED because Defendants have established that triable issues of material fact preclude granting judgment in her favor.5
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). One of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary judgment on part of a claim or defense, known as partial summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp. 374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995). The standard that applies to a motion for partial summary judgment is the same as that which applies to a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); State of Cal. ex rel. Cal. Dep't of Toxic Substances Control v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998) ().
In a summary judgment motion, the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying the portions in the record "which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968).
In attempting to establish the existence or non-existence of a genuine factual dispute, the party must support its assertion by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits[,] or declarations . . . or other materials; or showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of W. Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). The opposing party must also demonstrate that the dispute about a material fact "is 'genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In other words, the judge needs to answer the preliminary question before the evidence is left to the jury of "not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871)) (emphasis in original). As the Supreme Court explained, "[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule [56(a)], its opponent must do more than simply show that there is somemetaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Therefore, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Id. 87.
In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
Pecinovsky and Brewer ask that this Court deny Plaintiff's FMLA claims against them on the basis that the statute does not impose individual liability on employees of public agencies. Although there is some support for their position in some out-of-circuit cases, this Court finds the authority to the...
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