Evans v. Carlock

• Decision Date: 28 December 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:18-cv-00440-DAD-BAM
• Parties: RICHARD EVANS, Plaintiffs v. LISA CARLOCK, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

RICHARD EVANS, Plaintiffs v. LISA CARLOCK, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:18-cv-00440-DAD-BAM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

December 28, 2018

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS ACTION FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

(ECF No. 1)

FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Richard Evans ("Plaintiff") is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff's complaint, filed on April 2, 2018, is currently pending before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 1.)

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences." Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II. Plaintiff Allegations

Plaintiff is currently housed at the Substance Abuse Treatment Facility in Corcoran, California. Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) Officer Lisa Carlock, (2) Officer Stephen Brown, (3) Officer Bryan Hamilton (police officers with the Suisun Police Department); (4) Solano County Prosecutor Llana Jacobs, (5) Solano County Public Defender Sara Johnson, (6) Solano County Judge Jeffrey Tauber; (7) Solano County Judge Wendy Getty, (8) Solano County Appellate Attorney John Schuck; and (9) the First District Court of Appeal.

Plaintiff alleges that the Suisun Police Officers Carlock, Brown, and Hamilton committed perjury and falsified evidence during his July 26, 2016 preliminary hearing by planting images and videos on his laptop and altering his interrogation transcript which resulted in his wrongful conviction. Plaintiff alleges that his criminal case would have been dismissed at the preliminary hearing but for defendants' actions. (ECF No. 1 at 5.)

Plaintiff further alleges that county prosecutor Jacobs falsified evidence, suppressed exculpatory evidence, and submitted tampered evidence prior to his trial. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) Public Defender Johnson further concealed exculpatory evidence from the state court during his preliminary hearing and during his interrogation. Plaintiff also alleges that Defender Johnson provided insufficient legal counsel by failing to challenge the prosecutions' Brady v. Maryland violations. (ECF No. 1 at 7.)

Plaintiff also challenges various rulings made by Judges Tauber and Getty during his preliminary hearing and trial. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) Lastly, Plaintiff challenges the assistance provided by his court appointed attorney on appeal and the rulings made by the First DistrictCourt of Appeals. (ECF No. 1 at 11.)

A review of the Solano County Superior Court records indicate that Plaintiff was convicted of a felony in People v. Evans, Case No. FCR319582, on April 1, 2017. Further, the records from the First District Court of Appeals indicate that Plaintiff's appeal of that conviction is currently pending. See The People v. Evans, Case No. A154841.¹

As relief, Plaintiff asks this Court to reverse his conviction, expunge his record, and award monetary damages in the amount of $5,000,000. (ECF No. 1 at 12.)

III. Discussion

1. Abstention

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that abstention is appropriate and therefore will recommend against exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff's action.

"Younger abstention is a common law equitable doctrine holding that a federal court generally should refrain from interfering with a pending state court proceeding." Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 669 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Younger abstention is required if (1) state proceedings are ongoing; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to raise federal questions. Wiener v. County of San Diego, 23 F.3d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1994).

Plaintiff's state court proceedings are ongoing, as the appeal of the conviction is pending. That proceeding implicates important state interests and also provides an adequate opportunity for Plaintiff to raise federal questions. See Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1983) ("When . . . an appeal of a state criminal conviction is pending, a would-be petitioner must await the outcome of his appeal before his state remedies are exhausted."). However, even if the Court did not abstain under Younger, Plaintiff's complaint would fail for the reasons set forth below.

2. Claims Against Officers Carlock, Brown and Hamilton are Duplicative

In his first claim for relief, Plaintiff alleges that officers Carlock, Brown, and Hamilton misrepresented and falsified evidence during Plaintiff's July 26, 2016, preliminary hearing. OnSeptember 11, 2017, Plaintiff filed Evans v. Suisun Police Department, et al., No. 2:17-cv-01889-KJM-CMK ("Evans I"). The complaint filed in Evans I also complains that Defendants Carlock, Brown, and Hamilton "misrepresented and falsified evidence" during Plaintiff's July 26, 2016 preliminary hearing. Evans I resulted in dismissal for Plaintiff's failure to state a claim (2:17-cv-01889, ECF Nos. 13, 16).

Because court records indicate that Plaintiff sued Defendants Carlock, Brown, and Hamilton in an earlier-filed action for "concealing, misrepresenting, and falsifying evidence as testifying officers at [his] preliminary hearing," Plaintiff may not bring this duplicative suit against Defendants Carlock, Brown, and Hamilton. Duplicative lawsuits filed by a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis are subject to dismissal as either frivolous or malicious under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). "Plaintiffs generally have 'no right to maintain two separate actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same court and against the same defendant.'" Adams v. Cal. Dept. Of Health Services, 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1977) (overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008)).

Accordingly, the Court recommends dismissing Defendants Carlock, Brown, and Hamilton with prejudice based on the duplicative nature of the allegations. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); see also Adams v. California, 487 F.3d 684, 692-93 (9th Cir. 2007) (dismissal of a duplicative lawsuit "promotes judicial economy and the comprehensive disposition of litigation" finding that a plaintiff is required to bring all claims that relate to the same transaction or event at one time), overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n. 2 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that a complaint that "merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims" may be dismissed as frivolous under the authority of then-numbered 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)).

3. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

To the extent that Plaintiff's complaint can be interpreted as a request that the Court review the state court proceeding, this Court lacks jurisdiction to do so. Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review or modify state court judgments under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. SeeRooker v. Fidelity Trust Company, 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1983). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on Title 28 of the United States Code section 1257 which grants the United States Supreme Court jurisdiction to review decisions of the highest state courts for compliance with the federal Constitution. See Rooker, 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 362; Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303. The doctrine provides that "lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review a case litigated and decided in state court; only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to correct state court judgments." Gottfried v. Medical Planning Services, 142 F.3d 326, 330 (6th Cir. 1998). "This is equally true in constitutional cases brought under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983, since federal courts must give 'full faith and credit' to the judicial proceedings of state courts.'" Gottfried, 142 F.3d at 330 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738).

"Federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review such final adjudications or to exclude constitutional claims that are 'inextricably intertwined with the state court's [decision] in a judicial proceeding.'" Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 296 (3rd Cir. 1992) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483, n. 16). This rule applies to '...