Evans v. City of Dallas
| Decision Date | 15 December 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-1740,87-1740 |
| Citation | 861 F.2d 846 |
| Parties | 52 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 418, 49 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 38,674, 1 A.D. Cases 1394 Robert R. EVANS, Plaintiff-Appellant Cross-Appellee, v. CITY OF DALLAS, Defendant-Appellee Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
David S. Jones, Baldwin, Gilliland & Jones, Dallas, Tex., for Evans.
Sam Lindsay, Chandra V. Fripp, Asst. City Attys., Dallas, Tex., for City of Dallas.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
Before REAVLEY, JOHNSON, and JONES, Circuit Judges.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Plaintiff Robert R. Evans brought this action against the defendant City of Dallas and three defendant employees of the City, asserting numerous federal and state law claims concerning the termination in 1984 of Evans' employment with the City. The district court granted defendants' summary judgment motion as to all of Evans' federal law claims except a claim for deprivation of property without due process. The district court dismissed even this remaining due process claim as to the individual defendants who were determined to have qualified immunity. The district court then dismissed Evans' pendent state law claims without prejudice.
Evans amended his complaint to assert a claim of deprivation of liberty without due process. The district court later granted the City's summary judgment motion as to the claim of deprivation of liberty without due process.
The sole claim remaining for trial was Evans' claim against the City for deprivation of property without due process. At trial, the district court granted the City's directed verdict motion as to this claim and entered a take-nothing judgment. Both Evans and the City have appealed.
II. Discussion
Evans challenges the district court's directed verdict on the claim of deprivation of property without due process. The district court directed this verdict because, although it concluded that Evans had a property interest that had been deprived, it also concluded that the deprivation had been with due process. The City challenges the district court's conclusion that Evans had a property interest. We turn first to the question of whether Evans had a property interest in his continued employment. 1
Property interests do not spring from the Constitution, but are instead created and defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from independent sources such as state law. 2 "A person's interest in a benefit is a 'property' interest for due process purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing." 3 This Court has noted that such an entitlement may be expressed in a contract, a statute, or through "the existence of rules and understandings, promulgated and fostered by state officials, that may justify his legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment absent sufficient cause." 4 Once a property interest is found to exist, "federal constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level of a 'legitimate claim of entitlement' protected by the Due Process Clause." 5
"The underlying conception of a 'property' interest is 'to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined.' " 6 Case law establishes that a state or local law requirement of good or just cause for termination precludes arbitrary termination and therefore creates a property right in continued employment free from arbitrary termination. 7 In the present case, the City's personnel rules provided that, when discharging probationary employees such as Evans, "valid reasons must exist for such discharge or reduction, and the employee must be advised of these reasons." Evans contends that the requirement of valid reasons, like a requirement of good or just cause, precludes arbitrary termination and therefore creates a property right. The City counters that case law also establishes that a probationary employee such as Evans "has no reasonable expectation of continued employment while in the probationary status" and therefore "no property interest in his or her continued employment sufficient to call forth procedural due process when that employment is terminated." 8
As applied to the present case, the two lines of authority tug in different directions. In deciding whether Evans had a reasonable expectation of continued employment free from arbitrary termination, one might invest more significance in his probationary status (as reinforced by the doctrine of employment at will under Texas law 9 ) and the trial-period purpose that probation typically serves. If so, one might argue that a probationary employee should have understood the requirement of valid reasons as serving a function different from protecting the employee from arbitrary termination--perhaps a procedural function requiring that termination be accompanied by a certain degree of formality. 10 On the other hand, one might argue that the requirement of valid reasons speaks specifically to the matter at hand: whether termination was subject to a requirement of cause thereby precluding arbitrariness.
Evans points to Bueno v. City of Donna, 11 to support his argument that prior panel precedent resolves this conflict in his favor. This reliance, however, is misplaced. In Bueno, the defendant City of Donna argued that the plaintiff employees had no "property right in their employment sufficient to trigger due process protection." 12 The Bueno Court rejected this argument:
The personnel policies in effect in the City of Donna during the relevant time period provided that "department heads may, for just cause, terminate the services of any employee under their supervision." The policies further provided that a probationary employee could be dismissed when "in the judgment of the department head or supervisor, his work record is not of a quality to merit continuation in the city's employment." Under this policy, any employee, including a probationary employee, was entitled to continued employment until there arose "just cause" for his dismissal. Consequently, it is clear that the plaintiffs who were fired possessed a constitutionally protected property interest in their continued employment and were entitled to minimum due process considerations before they could be deprived of that interest. 13
The situation in Bueno may be distinguished from the case before us today. As the Bueno Court noted, the personnel policies in effect at the time of the discharge provided that any employee could be terminated for just cause. This language took precedence over the general rule that probationary employees have no property interest in continued employment. 14
The Court in Bueno recognized that the existence of a property interest is not precluded by the mere use of the "probationary" label. Rather, the Court considered whether "rules and understandings" existed that gave rise to a proprietary right or interest in the plaintiff. 15 As we noted earlier, the law is well-settled that where state or local regulations indicate that an employee may be terminated only for cause, that employee has a property interest in his continued employment. 16 In Bueno, this rule of law supplemented and expanded the presumption against the existence of a property interest which accompanies the probationary status.
Evans, pointing to Bueno, suggests that the "valid reasons" language set out in the personnel policies is reflective of a contract mandating that he not be terminated except for just cause. We cannot agree. Taking the relevant language of the personnel manual as a whole, we determine that the requirement of valid reasons merely establishes a procedure through which termination must be accomplished. 17
Although we agree that the language Evans relies on--"valid reasons must exist for such discharge or reduction, and the employee must be advised of these reasons"--could, taken at face value, be read as a guarantee of continued employment absent a good cause for termination, this language does not exist in a vacuum.
The personnel manual's section on the probationary period reads as follows:
1.49 Chapter XVI, Sec. 10 of the City Charter establishes the period of probation:
1.50 Nevertheless, valid reasons must exist for such discharge or reduction, and the employee must be advised of these reasons. The purpose of the probationary period is to determine that the employee can and will perform satisfactorily. It provides a period of training wherein the supervisor may help the employee succeed. [emphasis added]
Additionally, the Charter of the City of Dallas provides that this discharge during the probationary period is "without right of appeal." 18 Evans argues that the charter should not go into the calculus of considerations governing the question of whether he has a legitimate claim of entitlement. He observes that the personnel rules failed to quote the no-appeals provision, and argues that such provision is therefore not part of his mutually explicit understanding with the City.
We disagree. As this Court noted in Henderson, any personnel policy manual provision must "be construed in accordance with the Charter and may not grant a right inconsistent with the Charter." 19 Consequently, Evans' urgings that we ignore the charter provisions must go unheeded. However, even without the no-appeal provision set out in the charter, we must ultimately determine that no property interest in continued employment...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hernandez v. City of Hartford
...impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact." 29 C.F.R.App. § 1630.2(j). See Evans v. City of Dallas, 861 F.2d 846, 852 (5th Cir.1988). Plaintiff's impairment existed throughout her pregnancy. She controlled it only through the use of medication. Arguably ......
-
Little v. Lycoming County
...to the degree that they constitute disabling impairments.'" (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 App., § 1630.2(j))).4 In Evans v. City of Dallas, 861 F.2d 846, 852-53 (5th Cir.1988), for example, the plaintiff was discharged after excessive absenteeism attributable to a knee injury that required su......
-
Farias v. Bexar County Bd. of Trustees for Mental Health Mental Retardation Services
...false and the claimant must show that damage to his reputation and employment opportunities has in fact occurred. Evans v. City of Dallas, 861 F.2d 846, 851 (5th Cir.1988). The only possible stigmatizing statement made by Heard was that Farias had been fired because of his performance. As p......
-
Williamson v. American National Insurance Company
...781 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir.1986), citing Stevens v. Stubbs, 576 F.Supp. 1409, 1414 (N.D.Ga.1983). See also Evans v. City of Dallas, 861 F.2d 846, 852 (5th Cir.1988) (the Act "contemplates an impairment of a continuing nature."); Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't. of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 ......
-
Constitutional wish granting and the property rights genie.
...entitlements without regard to other language of statute and common understanding of licensing framework); Evans v. City of Dallas, 861 F.2d 846,850 (5th Cir. 1988) (interpreting language in personnel manual indicating that probationary employees may be discharged at any time but that "[n]e......