Evans v. City of Newark, Civ. No. 14-00120 (KM) (MAH)

• Decision Date: 10 May 2016
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 14-00120 (KM) (MAH)
• Parties: LEE EVANS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEWARK, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

LEE EVANS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEWARK, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 14-00120 (KM) (MAH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

May 10, 2016

OPINION

MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.

:

In August 1978, five young Newark men vanished. They were never seen again, and no bodies were found. Over thirty-one years later, in March 2010, Lee Evans was arrested and charged with their murder. In October-November 2011, Evans was tried before a jury and acquitted. Now Evans has brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights and seeking money damages from the police officers, the prosecutors, and supervisory personnel. Also named as defendants are the Essex County Prosecutor's Office, the City of Newark, the former Mayor of Newark, and its former Police Director. Evans's complaint alleges that the arrest warrant was procured without probable cause; that evidence was fabricated; that material exculpatory evidence was not presented to the grand jury; and that he was improperly singled out for prosecution for reasons of personal ambition and political calculation.

Now before the Court are the defendants' motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 33) (I will refer to it as the "Complaint", and cite is as "AC".) For the reasons set forth below, the motions are granted in part and denied in part. I dismiss certain defective claims—for example, those barred by the statute of limitations or brought against parties that are immune. The remainder of the Complaint will go forward.

In so holding, the Court is not endorsing the theory of the Complaint. The defendants, too, have a story to tell: in their version, they possessed an eyewitness account of a heinous mass murder, which they were then obligated to prosecute, and that it was for a jury to decide whether the charges were established beyond a reasonable doubt. But now is not the time to weigh the defendants' contentions against those of the plaintiff. The only issue before the Court now is whether the Complaint, if we assume its allegations are true, states a legal claim. Whether the allegations are true can be determined only after the parties exchange discovery and the case is decided, either by summary judgment or trial.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Allegations of the Complaint

The factual allegations of Evans's Complaint may be summarized briefly as follows.

On August 20, 1978, five teenaged boys¹ went missing in Newark, New Jersey. The case was investigated for thirty years, without success. A break came in 2008, when Evans's cousin Philander Hampton² confessed to participating in murdering the boys. While admitting guilt, Hampton portrayed Evans as the more culpable party. According to Hampton, Evans was angry over the theft of some marijuana, which he blamed on the boys. Evans allegedly transported the boys to 256 Camden Street in Newark, confined them to a closet, and set fire to the building. After Hampton made his statement, the police used sonar equipment to search the site for human remains, but found nothing.

On March 22, 2010, Lee Evans was arrested pursuant to a warrant obtained by Newark Police Detective Louis Carrega. Evans was charged withfive counts of first degree arson and five counts of first degree murder. (AC ¶¶ 17, 21) Evans was detained at the Hudson County Correctional Center for five months, until August 20, 2010, when he was released on bail. (Id. ¶ 24)

Within that five month period, Essex County Assistant Prosecutors Peter Guarino and Cheryl Cucinello submitted the case to a grand jury three times, on May 13, June 11, and July 9, 2010. (Id. ¶¶ 35-37) After two unsuccessful attempts, the prosecutors obtained an indictment on their third try. Evans alleges that evidence was misrepresented to the grand jurors, and that exculpatory evidence was withheld from them.

At some undisclosed time before trial, Evans alleges, former Mayor Cory Booker and former Newark Police Director Garry McCarthy held press conferences announcing that the thirty-year-old case had been solved. They and County Prosecutor Laurino allegedly "vilified" Evans in the media. (Id. ¶¶ 58, 59, 72)

On November 23, 2011, after a jury trial, Evans was acquitted of all charges. (Id. ¶ 25)

The Complaint asserts the following causes of action:

First Count - Abuse of Process³

Second Count - Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress/42 U.S.C. § 1983 Emotional Distress

Third Count -Violation of 4^th Amendment (Malicious Prosecution Based Upon Prior Criminal Proceedings)⁴

Fourth Count - New Jersey Civil Rights Act N.J.S.A. 10:62 et seq.

Fifth Count - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Violations: Suppression of Material Exculpatory Evidence in Violation of Brady v. Maryland, Fabrication ofInculpatory Evidence, Malicious Prosecution, Deliberate Failure to Investigate Exculpatory Evidence and Witness Coercion

Sixth Count - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Supervisory Liability

Seventh Count - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Monell Claim Unconstitutional Official Policy, Practice and Failure to Supervise and Train

Eighth Count - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Conspiracy

B. Procedural History/Amended Complaint

On November 21, 2013, Evans filed this civil suit in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Essex County. (Dkt. No. 1) On January 9, 2014, with the consent of all defendants, the action was removed to this federal court. (Id.)

While motions to dismiss the original complaint were pending, Evans filed a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) for leave to amend the complaint. That motion, filed on November 15, 2014, attached a proposed Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 33) This Court administratively terminated the original motions to dismiss, directed the defendants to reformulate their arguments in reference to the Amended Complaint, and requested that they state whether they consented to amendment. (Dkt. Nos. 36, 37) Defendants Essex County Prosecutor's Office, Laurino, Dow, Guarino, Cucinello, Carrega, Smith, Recktenwald, Eutsey, Jones, and DeFrancisci (collectively, "ECPO Defendants"), filed an opposition to Evans's motion to amend the complaint. (Dkt. No. 44) Defendants City of Newark, Booker, McCarthy, Hadley, Sheppard, Sabur, Ramos and Henry (collectively, "Newark Defendants") and Defendants New Jersey State Police and Det. Sgt. Tietjen (collectively, "State Police Defendants") moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint, incorporating arguments they had previously asserted against the original complaint. (Dkt. Nos. 45, 46)⁵

Motions to amend a complaint are "freely" granted, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). I therefore grant the motion and accept the Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 33-1) for filing. The oppositions to plaintiff's motion employ a motion-to-dismiss standard in arguing that amendment would be futile. They are thus the functional equivalent of motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint, and I will treat them as such. (See text orders, Dkt. Nos. 36, 37)

C. Legal Standard on Motion to Dismiss

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must take all allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975); Trump Hotels &Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) does not require that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations. Nevertheless, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007). Thus, the factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a plaintiff's right to relief above a speculative level, such that it is "plausible on its face." See id. at 570; see also Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Serv., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008). A claim has "facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While "[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement' ... it asks for more than a sheer possibility." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explicated the Twombly/Iqbal standard on several occasions. See, e.g., Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 70-73 (3d Cir. 2011); Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129-30 (3d Cir. 2010). In doing so, it has provided a three-step process for analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion:

To determine whether a complaint meets the pleading standard, our analysis unfolds in three steps. First, we outline the elements a plaintiff must plead to a state a claim for relief. See [Iqbal, 556 U.S.] at 675; Argueta, 643 F.3d at 73. Next, we peel away those allegations that are no more than conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Argueta, 643 F.3d at 73. Finally, we look for well-pled factual allegations, assume their veracity, and then "determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Argueta, 643 F.3d at 73. This last step is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012).

II. THRESHOLD GROUNDS

Sections II and III of this Opinion focus on Counts 1-5, which assert direct liability. In Section II, I consider certain...