Evans v. Department of Transp.
| Decision Date | 09 September 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-92-0528,4-92-0528 |
| Parties | , 190 Ill.Dec. 730 Carolyn EVANS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, John D. Kramer, Not Individually but as Secretary of the Illinois Department of Transportation and P.R. Engleberth, District Engineer of the Illinois Department of Transportation, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Roland W. Burris, Atty. Gen., Chicago, Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Sol. Gen., Jan E. Hughes, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), for defendants-appellants.
John L. Swartz (argued), David A. Herman, Giffin, Winning, Cohen & Bodewes, P.C., Springfield, for plaintiff-appellee.
In March 1992, the circuit court of Champaign County entered an order in favor of plaintiff, Carolyn Evans, and against defendants, the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT), John D. Kramer, Secretary of IDOT, and P.R. Engleberth, IDOT district engineer, pursuant to sections 4-211 and 4-210 of the Illinois Highway Code (Code) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 121, pars. 4-211, 4-210), ordering IDOT to allow plaintiff full enjoyment and use of her property. Defendants appeal, contending (1) the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to determine rights to an easement it holds, and (2) it did not deny reasonable access to plaintiff's property. Because we conclude that the circuit court exceeded its authority by entering the order in question, we reverse.
In 1946, the plaintiff's predecessor in title, Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company, granted an easement "for public highway purposes" to IDOT's predecessor on land the railroad owned in Champaign County, Illinois, for an amount in excess of $4,000. The easement covered a 25-foot-wide strip of land bordering the eastern edge of Route 45 and apparently extended from at least Devonshire Drive on the north to Windsor on the south. The easement was subject to an express condition subsequent providing for reversion to the grantor if the land was abandoned or ceased to be used as a public highway.
In 1979 and in 1980, the railroad deeded the beneficial interest in eight parcels of property fronting on the east side of Route 45, each approximately 75 feet wide, to plaintiff's husband, Bill Evans, and John Frye (owners). All of the parcels were subject to the easement held by IDOT. Sometime after October 1, 1986, Route 45 was widened into a five-lane road and curbing was installed along its eastern edge. Except for the southernmost parcel, the widening project did not utilize any of the easement.
In 1982, as part of the process for obtaining a permit to give the owners access from their property to State highway Route 45, the owners sent IDOT copies of proposed plans to construct two driveways connecting two or more of the northern-most parcels with the highway. The site plans for the development of the property included the erection of a fence and the allocation of parking places within the easement area. On November 23, 1982, IDOT informed the owners it planned to retain its 25-foot permanent easement for highway purposes and that the easement had to be kept free of encroachments. It required (1) elimination of the proposed fencing and parking within the easement, (2) construction of curbing along the entire eastern edge of the easement with catch basins to retain storm-water runoff on the site, and (3) drainage calculations. IDOT also requested submission of driveway specifications and revised site plans. The owners subsequently sent IDOT detailed specifications and dimensions for the proposed driveways, storm sewers, and catch basins, but did not submit a revised site plan or drainage calculations. On April 18, 1983, IDOT advised the owners that it still required drainage calculations and an approved site plan before it could approve highway access to Route 45.
In August 1983, the owners wrote to the Secretary of IDOT, claiming that IDOT's rights to the easement had reverted to the owners because the easement had not been used for highway purposes since its grant in 1946. The owners further informed IDOT that they intended to exercise control over the reverted strip immediately. The State's Attorney of Champaign County then informed the owners that the easement had not reverted and that allowance of any encroachment in the form of access to the highway would require compliance with the Code. In 1984, a meeting was held between the owners and representatives of IDOT during which IDOT again indicated that no use of the easement would be permitted other than for access to the highway.
In October 1986, the owners filed the complaint herein purporting to bring an action pursuant to section 4-211 of the Code. The owners requested an order granting them reasonable ingress to and egress from their property and also access to use the 25-foot easement area. At some point in the proceedings, the owners advised the court that Carolyn Evans had become the sole owner of the property. At the request of Carolyn Evans and the owners, and with the consent of all the parties, Carolyn Evans has been substituted as the sole party plaintiff.
In March 1992, the circuit court entered an order containing the following relevant findings of fact: (1) IDOT obtained an easement in 1946 over the west 25 feet of the eight parcels subsequently purchased by plaintiff's predecessors in title, subject to an express condition subsequent and reverter; (2) when plaintiff's husband and John Frye bought eight parcels of land for $26,500, they were all part of an unimproved ditch with a bottom 15 feet below the highway level, with both sides of the ditch sharply sloping to the center; (3) plaintiff's husband and Frye expended over $50,000 tiling and filling the drainage ditch, which defendant IDOT knew of as early as 1982; (4) the plaintiff served notice upon the defendants regarding reverter of the 25-foot easement area; (5) the reverter was automatic on failure either to use the premises or to cease using the strip for highway purposes; (6) a dispute existed between plaintiff and defendant concerning IDOT's denial of plaintiff's use of the 25-foot easement area for parking and their request for a design that isolates and prevents any use of the easement except to cross it to reach the remainder of plaintiff's property; (7) plaintiff had been denied the opportunity to develop her property because use of the 25-foot strip is critical to such development, and defendant refused to issue entrance permits unless the plaintiff agreed to design the entrances in such a manner that she will not make any use of the 25-foot strip except to cross it; (8) IDOT's denial of access to plaintiff's property and allowance of other property owners immediately north of the plaintiff's property to use the same area "is not reasonable use, ingress and egress"; (9) defendants' refusal to issue driveway permits unless its demands were met prevented reasonable use and improvement of the property in question; (10) denial of access to the property arose not only from IDOT's demand for compliance with the conditions stated in its 1982 letter, but also "the ultimate construction of a curbing the entire length of plaintiff's property[,] which prevents any access to the property"; and (11) IDOT's denial of access to the property arose from its refusal to allow a reasonable access to all of plaintiff's property. Relative to these findings, the court ordered defendants "to allow the plaintiff full enjoyment and use of her property, including the twenty-five (25) foot easement, without a curbing requirement."
IDOT contends that pursuant to section 1 of "An Act in relation to immunity for the State of Illinois" (Immunity Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 127, par. 801), the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the instant cause of action, which plaintiff could bring only in the Court of Claims. With exceptions not relevant here, section 1 of the Immunity Act provides "the State of Illinois shall not be made a defendant or party in any court." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 127, par. 801.) Where the property of the State is involved, the State is directly and adversely affected, and the action will be held to be one against the State. (Sass v. Kramer (1978), 72 Ill.2d 485, 491, 21 Ill.Dec. 528, 530, 381 N.E.2d 975, 977.) In Sass, the supreme court held that the question of whether the State had abandoned an easement necessarily affected an interest in property conveyed to and vested in the State; accordingly, the action could not be maintained in any court except the Court of Claims (see Sass, 72 Ill.2d at 492-93, 21 Ill.Dec. at 530-31, 381 N.E.2d at 977-78; Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 37, pars. 439.1 through 439.24-9). When a case involves the determination of ownership of property in which the State of Illinois claims an interest, the Immunity Act will bar its commencement in the circuit court. Marriott Corp. v. Department of Transportation (1989), 186 Ill.App.3d 167, 170-72, 134 Ill.Dec. 163, 168-70, 542 N.E.2d 163, 164-66 ().
Plaintiff does not contest the principle that suits against the State of Illinois affecting an interest in property must generally be brought in the Court of Claims, but points to sections 4-211 and 4-210 of the Code as an express instance in which the Illinois General Assembly permits the circuit court to review IDOT actions which adversely affect a property owner's access to State highways. Section 4-211 of the Code reads as follows:
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