Evans v. Evans, Nos. 12CA5

CourtUnited States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
Writing for the CourtMcFARLAND, J.
Citation20 N.E.3d 1139
PartiesRandall L. EVANS and Deborah E. Crabtree, Successor Co-Trustees of the David W. Evans and Carol M. Evans Trust, Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. David W. EVANS, et al., Defendants–Appellants.
Decision Date02 October 2014
Docket Number12CA6.,Nos. 12CA5

20 N.E.3d 1139

Randall L. EVANS and Deborah E. Crabtree, Successor Co-Trustees of the David W. Evans and Carol M. Evans Trust, Plaintiffs–Appellees
v.
David W. EVANS, et al., Defendants–Appellants.

Nos. 12CA5
12CA6.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Jackson County.

Oct. 2, 2014.


20 N.E.3d 1143

Richard M. Lewis, Christen N. Finley, and Suzanna T. King, The Law Firm of Richard M. Lewis, LLC, Jackson, Ohio, for Appellants David W. Evans and David A. Kelly, Guardian of the Estate of David W. Evans, Sr.

Eric. J. Wittenberg, Jennifer L. Routte, and Treisa L. Fox, Wittenberg Law Group, Reynoldsburg, Ohio, for Appellants Randall L. Evans, Deborah E. Crabtree, David W. Evans, Jr., and Ellen McCabe, individually.

Steven D. Rowe and Erica Ann Probst, Kemp, Schaeffer & Rowe Co., LPA, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees Randall L. Evans and Deborah E. Crabtree, Successor Co–Trustees of the David W. Evans and Carol M. Evans Trust.

Russell N. Cunningham and Troy A. Callicoat, Barrett, Easterday, Cunningham & Eselgroth LLP, Dublin, Ohio, and Lorene G. Johnston, Jackson, Ohio, Co-counsel for Appellee Carl Michael Evans.

Opinion

20 N.E.3d 1144

McFARLAND, J.

{¶ 1} This consolidated appeal arises from the decision of the Jackson County Common Pleas Court, Probate Division, dated May 3, 2012, regarding the interpretation of a revocable trust established in 2003. The trust is known as the “David W. Evans and Carol M. Evans Trust.” The court's entry decided Counts One, Two, Three, Four, Five, Seven, Eight, and Nine of Plaintiff's amended complaint for declaratory judgment. Defendants–Appellants David W. Evans, Sr., and David A. Kelly, Guardian of the Estate of David W. Evans, Sr., appealed the decision and were assigned appellate case number 12CA5. Appellants Randall L. Evans, Deborah E. Crabtree, Ellen E. McCabe, and David W. Evans, Jr., individually, also appeal the same decision, and were assigned appellate case number 12CA6. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and overrule all assignments of error.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} David W. Evans, Sr., (David) and Carol M. Evans (Carol) were first married in 1952. The couple had five children: Deborah Crabtree, David W. Evans, Jr., Carl Michael Evans, Randall L. Evans, and Ellen McCabe. Over the course of their relationship, David and Carol divorced twice and remarried a third time in October of 1996.

{¶ 3} Mr. and Mrs. Evans acquired vast real and personal property during the course of their lives together. David purchased and developed property throughout Jackson County. Carol was a school teacher and administrator. David also purchased cattle and farming equipment. The farm was worked and managed by the couple's son, Carl Michael (Carl), and his son Michael. In 2002, Carl was severely injured while working on the farm.

{¶ 4} On July 31, 2003, Mr. and Mrs. Evans executed the “David W. Evans and Carol M. Evans Trust,” (hereinafter Trust). In 2006, David suffered a stroke. He had a lengthy hospitalization and nursing home stay. When David recovered he began socializing with unsavory individuals in the Jackson County area and giving away large amounts of money to some of these individuals.

{¶ 5} On March 26, 2008, Carol was murdered by Terry Vance.1 After Carol's death, David signed amendments to the Trust and resigned as trustee. Randall L. Evans and Deborah E. Crabtree became the co-trustees of the Trust. On January 20, 2010, David was found guilty of various charges relating to Carol's murder, including murder and conspiracy. His criminal conviction was upheld on appeal.

{¶ 6} Plaintiffs Randall L. Evans and Deborah E. Crabtree, as co-trustees of the Trust filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and instructions on October 30, 2009, seeking guidance as to the interpretation and administration of the Trust. Their father and the five Evans children were named as defendants. On November 25, 2009, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. All parties filed timely answers to the amended complaint. By entry dated May 6, 2010, David A. Kelly, Guardian of the Estate of David W. Evans, Sr., was substituted as a party defendant in the declaratory judgment action.

{¶ 7} The trial court conducted hearings on the various claims set forth in the amended complaint. These claims for relief are summarized as follows:

20 N.E.3d 1145
Count 1: Was the trust valid?
Count 2: Did the trust provisions require arbitration, or could it be waived?
Count 3: Was David's amendment to the original trust valid?
Count 4: Did application of R.C. 2105.19 prohibit plaintiffs from distributing income from the trust towards defense costs on behalf of David and did the statute operate to foreclose David as to any rights to income and principal of the trust, for any purpose?
Count 5: Was Carl entitled to trust notices and annual reports?
Count 6: Was Carl required to account for income associated with his operation of Franklin Valley Farms?
Count 7: Who was the proper payee of the obligation associated with the purchase of the Evans Center from the trust?
Count 8: What were the rights and responsibilities of the defendants in connection with the original trust as amended?
Count 9: Were the assets of David and Carol to be treated as separate property, pursuant to Article VII(C) of the trust?
Count 10: Should a constructive trust be imposed and an accounting required over any trust property under the control of Carl?

{¶ 8} In his answer, Carl Evans filed various counterclaims. He alleged that the co-trustees/plaintiffs had used trust funds to pay for the criminal defense of their father. Carl also alleged that plaintiffs had trespassed on his property and destroyed his hay crop. Carl requested the following relief: (1) that the court interpret the trust; (2) that the court remove the successor co-trustees, and appoint a special fiduciary; and (3) that he be awarded treble damages for his lost hay crop.

{¶ 9} Eventually, the parties entered into various stipulations of fact. In resolution of counts 1 and 2, the parties stipulated the trust was valid and waived arbitration. On October 21 and 22, 2010, the trial court heard evidence and arguments on counts 3, 7, and 9. On March 21, August 23, 24, and 25, 2011, the trial court heard testimony and argument on counts 4, 5, 6, 8, and 10. Also on March 21, the parties agreed that all parties would receive trust notices, effectively resolving count 5. On May 3, 2012, the trial court issued its final decision/order/entry. This timely appeal followed.

{¶ 10} Appellate case number 12CA5 was filed by David A. Kelly, as Guardian of the Estate of David W. Evans, Sr. Hereinafter, Appellant in this case shall be referred to as “Guardian.”

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS MAY 3, 2012 ENTRY BY APPLYING THE “SLAYER STATUTE,” R.C. 2105.19, TO VESTED PROPERTY RIGHTS APPELLANT DAVID W. EVANS HAD BEFORE CAROL M. EVANS' DEATH, WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE SLAYER STATUTE AND IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS MAY 3, 2012 ENTRY BY ENTERING JUDGMENT ON COUNTS 3, 4, 7, 8, AND 9, AND LOOKING BEYOND THE FOUR CORNERS OF THE TRUST TO INTERPRET, DEFINE AND IDENTIFY “SEPARATE” AND “COMMONLY OWNED” PROPERTY IN A WAY THAT CONTRADICTS
20 N.E.3d 1146
ARTICLES III AND VII OF THE TRUST.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT ON COUNTS 3, 4, 7, 8, AND 9, BY FINDING THAT THE “SLAYER STATUTE” APPLIES TO CAUSE APPELLANT DAVID W. EVANS TO FORFEIT ANY RIGHTS HE HAD TO THE ORCHARD LOTS, TRAGO STREET, AND THE NOTE RECEIVABLE AND PAYMENTS THEREUNDER FROM THE SALE OF THE EVANS CENTER, BECAUSE IT FOUND SUCH PROPERTY TO CONSTITUTE “COMMONLY OWNED” PROPERTY.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT ON COUNTS 3, 4, 7, 8, AND 9, BY APPLYING THE “SLAYER STATUTE” TO DIVEST APPELLANT DAVID W. EVANS OF ASSETS WHICH IT DETERMINED TO BE “COMMONLY OWNED” TRUST ASSETS, AND BY ORDERING THE TRUSTEES TO REPLACE FROM APPELLANT'S SEPARATE PROPERTY ASSETS ANY DISTRIBUTIONS THAT WERE MADE FROM ASSETS OTHER THAN THOSE THAT WERE HIS SEPARATE PROPERTY, AS DETERMINED BY THE COURT.
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT ON COUNTS 3, 4, 7, 8, AND 9, BY FINDING THAT THE “SLAYER STATUTE” TERMINATED APPELLANT DAVID W. EVANS' RIGHT TO AMEND THE TRUST AS TO HIS VESTED PROPERTY RIGHTS.
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT ON COUNTS 3, 4, 7, 8, AND 9, FINDING THAT THE TRUST OPERATED LIKE A JOINT AND SURVIVORSHIP BANK ACCOUNT.

{¶ 11} Appellate case number 12CA6 was filed by Appellants Randall L. Evans, Deborah E. Crabtree, Ellen E. McCabe, and David W. Evans, Jr. Hereinafter, these...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 practice notes
  • Stewart v. Martin, 3:21-cv-89
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio
    • 8 Marzo 2023
    ...of the trust itself, and extrinsic evidence is not admissible to interpret the trust provisions.” Evans v. Evans, 2014-Ohio-4450, ¶ 23, 20 N.E.3d 1139, 1151 (4th Dist. 2014) (citing McDonald v. Alzheimer's Disease Assoc., 140 Ohio App.3d 358, 363, 747 N.E.2d 843, 847 (1st Dist. 2000)). The ......
  • In re Mellott, 19 BE 0004
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
    • 29 Junio 2020
    ...itself, and extrinsic evidence is not admissible to interpret the trust provisions." Evans v. Evans, 4th Dist. Jackson, 2014-Ohio-4450, 20 N.E.3d 1139, ¶ 23. The court may consider evidence outside the language of the document when a situation arises "that was not specifically provided for ......
  • Wyper v. Dufour, Court of Appeals No. WD-18-050
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
    • 22 Marzo 2019
    ...as they existed at his death "does not justify altering the manifest meaning of the [trust]." Evans v. Evans, 2014-Ohio-4450, 20 N.E.3d 1139, ¶ 94 (4th Dist.), citing Summers v. Summers, 121 Ohio App.3d 263, 699 N.E.2d 958 (4th Dist.1996). {¶ 20} Given our conclusion that the language emplo......
2 cases
  • In re Mellott, No. 19 BE 0004
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
    • 29 Junio 2020
    ...and extrinsic evidence is not admissible to interpret the trust provisions." Evans v. Evans, 4th Dist. Jackson, 2014-Ohio-4450, 20 N.E.3d 1139, ¶ 23. The court may consider evidence outside the language of the document when a situation arises "that was not specifically provided fo......
  • Wyper v. Dufour, Court of Appeals No. WD-18-050
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
    • 22 Marzo 2019
    ...as they existed at his death "does not justify altering the manifest meaning of the [trust]." Evans v. Evans, 2014-Ohio-4450, 20 N.E.3d 1139, ¶ 94 (4th Dist.), citing Summers v. Summers, 121 Ohio App.3d 263, 699 N.E.2d 958 (4th Dist.1996). {¶ 20} Given our conclusion that the lang......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT