Evans v. GTE Health Systems Inc., 920641-CA

• Decision Date: 03 August 1993
• Docket Number: No. 920641-CA,920641-CA
• Citation: 857 P.2d 974
• Parties: Edmund Todd EVANS and Lou Anne Ross Evans, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. GTE HEALTH SYSTEMS INCORPORATED, a Delaware corporation, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

Page 974

857 P.2d 974

Edmund Todd EVANS and Lou Anne Ross Evans, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. GTE HEALTH SYSTEMS INCORPORATED, a Delaware corporation,

Defendant and Appellee.

No. 920641-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Aug. 3, 1993.

Roger H. Hoole, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Brian C. Johnson and Roger A. Moffitt, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellee.

Before GARFF, GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ.

GREENWOOD, Judge:

Appellant Edmund Todd Evans (Evans) appeals from the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of GTE Health Systems Incorporated (GTE). ¹ We affirm.

FACTS

Because this is an appeal from a summary judgment, we recite the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Evans, the nonmoving party. Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303, 304 (Utah 1992). GTE develops, produces and sells computer software for medical care application. Some of GTE's software is designed to run on IBM hardware. In the spring of 1989, GTE opted to participate in an "IBM Sales Agent Program" (the IBM program), whereby IBM would compensate GTE for establishing sales agents for IBM's computer products in certain geographical areas.

On June 26, 1989, in conjunction with the IBM program, GTE offered Evans a job as a sales representative in Fort Lauderdale and Miami. His duties included participation in the IBM program. During the interviewing process, Kent Gale, assistant vice president of sales and marketing for GTE, and Ray Moore, supervisor of GTE's southern region, told Evans that in his first year of employment he would be expected to sell his home and relocate to Miami, attend an IBM Sales Agent Training Program, become familiar with GTE products, and begin making contacts and establishing relationships with hospitals that might be interested in GTE products. Gale informed Evans he was not expected to close significant sales until the end of 1990 or early 1991, and that he would not be terminated unless he was unable to close sales by the first or second quarter of 1991. In addition, GTE promised Evans a promotion from Senior Marketing Representative to Consulting Marketing Representative after he sold his first system. Before accepting the offer, Evans made it clear in interviews with both Gale and Moore that he was only interested in a long-term employment relationship. Both men responded that GTE was also interested in a long-term relationship.

After accepting the GTE job offer, Evans put his home on the market, moved his On September 1, 1989, GTE told Evans that it was delaying his house purchasing trip to Florida, scheduled for September 6, 1989, because of problems with the IBM program in Florida. On September 6, 1989, less than two and one-half months after Evans had begun work, GTE notified Evans that it had eliminated his position in Florida. GTE had decided, for unspecified "economic reasons," to discontinue the IBM program, and chose not to continue Evans's employment in another capacity. GTE gave Evans sixty days severance pay. Evans remained unemployed for approximately seven months until he obtained a sales position in Boston.

family in with relatives in preparation for the move to Florida, and began his training program. He also declined another job offer. Evans's wife discontinued her home-based preschool, gave away her supplies, and referred her students to other teachers. In addition, the Evanses sold or gave away items of property they did not intend to move to Florida.

On January 30, 1990, Evans and his wife filed a five count complaint against GTE. Subsequently, the Evanses voluntarily withdrew their tort claims, and Evans abandoned his implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim at oral argument on the summary judgment motion. The only remaining claims at the time of the summary judgment hearing were that, by contract, GTE had covenanted that Evans would be employed for a fixed term, ending sometime in 1991, and that GTE had breached this contract by terminating him earlier without cause.

The trial court noted the strong presumption that employment contracts in Utah are "at-will," and found that Evans had not overcome this presumption. Alternatively, while the court expressed some doubts about whether the economic motive for discharge met the requirements of "cause," the court concluded that the company had the right to act as it did and that Evans's discharge was "proper." ²

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to GTE. The trial court based this decision upon a conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to create an issue of material fact as to the existence of an implied employment contract. ³

"Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 999-1000 (Utah 1991) (citing Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c)). In reviewing a summary judgment, this court must liberally construe the evidence and all inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion. Id. at 1000. "[I]f the evidence presented is such that no reasonable jury could conclude that the parties agreed to limit the employer's right to terminate the employee, it is appropriate for a court to decide the issue as a matter of law." Id. at 1001. As a question of law, this decision is reviewed for correctness. Id. at 1000.

ANALYSIS

Nature of the Employment Contract

There is a presumption in Utah "that any employment contract which has no specified term of duration is an at-will relationship." Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989). In an at-will relationship, both the employer and the employee are free to terminate the relationship at any time. Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 53 (Utah 1991) (citing Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1979)).

A discharged employee may rebut this presumption that an employment contract is "at-will" by a showing that "the parties expressly or impliedly intended a specified term or agreed to terminate the relationship for cause alone." Berube, 771 P.2d at 1044. Evidence of this intention can take the form of "employment manuals, oral agreements, and all circumstances of the relationship which demonstrate the intent to terminate only for cause or to continue employment for a specified period." Id. In determining whether an implied contract has been created, the Utah Supreme Court has stated,

[F]or an implied in fact contract term to exist, it must meet the requirements for an offer of a unilateral contract. There must be a manifestation of the employer's intent that is communicated to the employee and sufficiently definite to operate as a contract provision. Furthermore, the manifestation of the employer's intent must be of such a nature that the employee can reasonably believe that the employer is making an offer of employment other than employment at will.

Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1002 (Utah 1991).

Evans has identified four "manifestations" of GTE's intent that he argues created an implied contract. ⁴ He was told during the interviewing process:

1. During his first year he would need to focus on building client relationships.

2. There would not be pressure to close significant sales his first year due to the length of the sales cycle.

3. He would not be expected to close significant sales until the end of 1990 or early 1991.

4. He could be terminated if he failed to close sales by the end of 1990, unless he had...