Evans v. Hebert
| Decision Date | 07 February 1994 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 139083 |
| Citation | 513 N.W.2d 164,203 Mich.App. 392 |
| Parties | Kevin EVANS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William Alford, a Berkley police officer, and Police Officer Champine, a Berkley police officer, Defendants, and Kevin HEBERT, an Oak Park police officer, Keith Graustin, an Oak Park police officer, P.O. Petrides, an Oak Park police officer, Sgt. Cain, an Oak Park police officer, P.O. Heath, an Oak Park police officer, Sgt. Bauer, an Oak Park police officer, P.O. Grindem, an Oak Park police officer, Lt. Rance, an Oak Park police officer, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Ernest L. Jarrett, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.
Gina U. Puzzuoli, Detroit, for defendants.
Before NEFF, P.J., and MARILYN J. KELLY and WHITE, JJ.
Plaintiff Kevin Evans appeals a circuit court order granting defendant Oak Park police officers' motion for summary disposition of plaintiff's claims of tortious conduct and violation of his constitutional rights. The trial court concluded that the action is barred by the statute of limitations, rejecting plaintiff's contention that he is entitled to the benefit of the disability provision of M.C.L. § 600.5851; M.S.A. § 27A.5851, because he was in continuous custody from the time his cause of action arose. The trial court adopted the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals interpretation of the disability provision as set forth in Jones v. Hamtramck, 905 F.2d 908 (CA 6, 1990), and held that the provision does not apply to a person held in pretrial detention. Relying on contrary precedent from other jurisdictions and the asserted policy of the provision, plaintiff seeks reversal.
Plaintiff was arrested by defendant Berkley police officers Alford and Champine on March 16, 1987. Plaintiff alleges that after the officers arrested and handcuffed him, they proceeded to beat and vilify him, causing him to attempt escape out of fear for his life. Although he was briefly successful in escaping, he was apprehended by defendant Oak Park police officers, who had been alerted to his escape. Plaintiff alleges that upon his recapture, he was subjected to a second, more severe beating, which, in tandem with the first beating, resulted in serious and permanent injuries. Following his recapture, plaintiff was booked at a Berkley police station, and then transferred to the Oakland County Jail, where he remained until he pleaded guilty of unarmed robbery. After sentencing, plaintiff was transferred to Ionia State Prison.
On December 27, 1989, plaintiff filed an action in federal court alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under Michigan common law. The complaint named as defendants the City of Berkley, the City of Berkley Police Department, and John Doe and John Roe, City of Berkley police officers. On August 9, 1990, plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint to identify defendants Alford and Champine, and to join the Oak Park defendants, among others. The City of Berkley opposed his motion as barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff argued that the statute had been tolled by his disability of imprisonment under M.C.L. § 600.5851; M.S.A. § 27A.5851. However, bound by Jones, supra, the federal district court denied plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint.
On December 12, 1990, plaintiff filed the instant action in the Oakland Circuit Court, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, deprivation of constitutional rights, and conspiracy to deprive constitutional rights. In response to defendants' motions for summary disposition, the trial court ruled on February 20, 1991, that although it was not bound by federal precedent, it was persuaded by the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Jones, supra. In an order dated March 12, 1991, plaintiff's claims against defendant Oak Park police officers were dismissed. His claims against defendant Berkley police officers were dismissed in a separate order. Plaintiff appeals the March 12 order; he does not seek review with regard to the Berkley officers.
The statute in issue provides:
(1) [I]f the person first entitled to make an entry or bring an action is under 18 years of age, insane, or imprisoned at the time the claim accrues, the person or those claiming under the person shall have 1 year after the disability is removed through death or otherwise, to make the entry or bring the action although the period of limitations has run....
* * * * * *
(3) To be deemed a disability, the infancy, insanity, or imprisonment must exist at the time the claim accrues. If the disability comes into existence after the claim has accrued, the disability shall not be recognized under this section for the purpose of modifying the period of limitations. [M.C.L. § 600.5851; M.S.A. § 27A.5851.]
Just as state statutes of limitation apply to § 1983 personal injury claims, so too does the state's disability provision. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275-276, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1946-1947, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 543, 109 S.Ct. 1998, 2002, 104 L.Ed.2d 582 (1989); Univ. of New York Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980). This statute thus applies to all plaintiff's claims.
In Hawkins v. Justin, 109 Mich.App. 743, 311 N.W.2d 465 (1981), this Court sustained the statute's constitutionality with regard to the disability of imprisonment, and also discussed its purpose:
Our review persuades us that the purpose of the statute in question is to recognize that persons in prison are under a disability in that their freedom has been restricted and their access to the judicial process has been impaired and to provide such persons with additional time to assert their legal rights. There is no question that the Legislature had the power to enact this statute and determine the conditions under which a right may accrue and the period in which a right may be asserted. [Id. at 747, 311 N.W.2d 465.]
The Court then observed
Defendant correctly argues that prisoners today are generally less isolated and less restricted than they were historically. Certainly, the increased right to counsel, the right to have transcripts to trial records, and the access to law libraries have rendered prisoners much less isolated and restricted. This fact alone, however, does not render the statute unconstitutional. The Legislature still could have determined rationally that prisoners are more restricted than ordinary citizens and thus in need of the special protection afforded by the statute. The Legislature reasonably could have found that, notwithstanding the ability of prisoners to obtain legal counsel and have access to the judicial process, they still have restraints imposed by their confinement which places them at a disadvantage compared to ordinary citizens. [Id. at 747-748, 311 N.W.2d 465.]
The Court then held that "the statute should be applied generally to all prisoners" rather than case by case, even where the plaintiff brought suit while still in prison. Id. at 749, 311 N.W.2d 465. Finally, the Court said:
We are persuaded that the language of the statute provides for a disability in favor of all who are incarcerated when a cause of action accrues and does not require a showing of a special disability. [Id.]
Apart from the Hawkins decision, judicial interpretation of the statutory disability of imprisonment appears to have taken place entirely in the federal courts. 1 The issue here was addressed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Jones, supra.
In Jones, the plaintiff, a Michigan prisoner, brought a civil rights action against the City of Hamtramck and three of its police officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deprivation of his constitutional rights during and immediately following an arrest. The suit was filed more than five years after the arrest. The district court dismissed the complaint as untimely and rejected the plaintiff's contention that, under M.C.L. § 600.5851; M.S.A. § 27A.5851, the three-year statute of limitations was tolled by his imprisonment. The issue presented to the appellate court was whether the statutory disability of imprisonment applied to a person who was "merely under arrest" at the time his claim accrued. Jones, supra at 908. The court held that the district court correctly concluded that Jones was not a prisoner when his cause of action accrued. Id. at 909. It distinguished McCune v. Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 907 (CA 6, 1988), in which dicta suggested that the disability of imprisonment under § 5851 applies from the time of the initial arrest where arrest is followed by detention. It concluded:
The Michigan courts have construed the statute "according to its literal language to provide 'a disability in favor of all who are incarcerated when a cause of action accrues.' " Perreault v. Hostetler, 884 F2d 267, 270 (6th Cir 1989) (emphasis in original), quoting Hawkins v. Justin, 109 Mich App 743, 311 NW2d 465, 468 (1981). A pretrial detainee is not a person who has been "imprisoned" within the literal meaning of that term, and we have no reason to doubt the conclusion of the district judge that the Michigan courts would give the statute a literal interpretation. Because Mr. Jones' cause of action accrued before he was imprisoned, the tolling statute simply does not apply. [Jones, supra at 909.]
We agree with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that in Hawkins, supra, this Court construed the disability statute "according to its literal language." We also agree that the language of McCune, supra, suggesting applicability of § 5851 from the time of arrest where that arrest is followed by detention was not essential to the holding in that case, and thus can be regarded as dictum.
However, we also note that in Perreault v. Hostetler, 884 F.2d 267, 270 (CA 6, 1989), cited in the concluding...
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