Evans v. Jeff

Decision Date21 April 1986
Docket NumberNo. 84-1288,84-1288
Citation89 L.Ed.2d 747,106 S.Ct. 1531,475 U.S. 717
PartiesJohn V. EVANS, et al., Petitioners v. JEFF D. et al
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus

The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (Fees Act) provides that "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee" in enumerated civil rights actions. Respondents brought a class action against petitioners (the Governor and other public officials of Idaho responsible for the education and treatment of mentally handicapped children) in Federal District Court on behalf of children who have been or will be placed in petitioners' care. It was alleged that deficiencies in both the educational programs and health care services provided respondents violated the Federal and State Constitutions and various federal and state statutes. Injunctive relief and an award of costs and attorney's fees were sought. Ultimately, the District Court approved a settlement granting the injunctive relief sought conditional on respondents' waiver of any claim for attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals invalidated the fee waiver, left standing the remainder of the settlement, and remanded to the District Court to determine what attorney's fees were reasonable, holding that the historical background of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), which gives a district court power to approve settlements of class actions, and of the Fees Act, compelled the conclusion that a stipulated waiver of attorney's fees obtained solely as a condition for obtaining relief for the class should not be accepted by the court.

Held:

1. The District Court had the power, in its discretion, to approve the waiver of attorney's fees. Pp. 730-738.

(a) The language of the Fees Act, as well as its legislative history, indicates that Congress bestowed on the "prevailing party" a statutory eligibility for a discretionary award of attorney's fees in specified civil rights actions. Neither the statute nor the legislative history suggests that Congress intended to forbid all waivers of attorney's fees. Congress neither bestowed fee awards upon attorneys nor rendered them nonwaivable or nonnegotiable; instead, it added them to the remedies available to combat civil rights violations, a goal not invariably inconsist- ent with conditioning settlement on the merits on a waiver of statutory attorney's fees. Pp. 730-732.

(b) A general proscription against waiver of attorney's fees in exchange for a settlement on the merits would itself impede vindication of civil rights, at least in some cases, by reducing the attractiveness of settlement. It is not implausible to anticipate that parties to a significant number of civil rights cases would refuse to settle if liability for attorney's fees remained open, thereby forcing more cases to trial, unnecessarily burdening the judicial system, and disserving civil rights litigants. Pp. 732-738.

2. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in approving a waiver of attorney's fees that secured broad injunctive relief greater than that which respondents could reasonably have expected to achieve at trial. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Idaho has adopted a statute, policy, or practice insisting on a fee waiver as a condition of settlement in civil rights litigation in conflict with the Fees Act. Nor does the record indicate that petitioners' request to waive fees was a vindicative effort to deter attorneys from representing plaintiffs in civil rights suits against Idaho. Pp. 738-743.

743 F.2d 648 (CA9 1984), reversed.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 743.

James Thomas Jones, Boise, Idaho, for petitioners.

Lawrence G. Wallace, Washington, D.C., for the U.S., as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court, in support of the petitioners.

William T. Coleman, Jr., Washington, D.C., for respondents.

Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (Fees Act) provides that "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee" in enumerated civil rights actions. 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980), we held that fees may be assessed against state officials after a case has been settled by the entry of a consent decree. In this case, we consider the question whether attorney's fees must be assessed when the case has been settled by a consent decree granting prospective relief to the plaintiff class but providing that the defendants shall not pay any part of the prevailing party's fees or costs. We hold that the District Court has the power, in its sound discretion, to refuse to award fees.

I

The petitioners are the Governor and other public officials of the State of Idaho responsible for the education and treatment of children who suffer from emotional and mental handicaps. Respondents are a class of such children who have been or will be placed in petitioners' care.1

On August 4, 1980, respondents commenced this action by filing a complaint against petitioners in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho. The factual allegations in the complaint described deficiencies in both the educational programs and the health care services provided respondents. These deficiencies allegedly violated the United States Constitution, the Idaho Constitution, four federal statutes, and certain provisions of the Idaho Code. The complaint prayed for injunctive relief and for an award of costs and attorney's fees, but it did not seek damages.

On the day the complaint was filed, the District Court entered two orders, one granting the respondents leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and a second appointing Charles Johnson as their next friend for the sole purpose of instituting and prosecuting the action. At that time Johnson was employed by the Idaho Legal Aid Society, Inc., a private, nonprofit corporation that provides free legal services to qualified low-income persons.2 Because the Idaho Legal Aid Society is prohibited from representing clients who are capable of paying their own fees,3 it made no agreement requiring any of the respondents to pay for the costs of litigation or the legal services it provided through Johnson. Moreover, the special character of both the class and its attorney-client relationship with Johnson explains why it did not enter into any agreement covering the various contingencies that might arise during the course of settlement negotiations of a class action of this kind.

Shortly after petitioners filed their answer, and before substantial work had been done on the case, the parties entered into settlement negotiations. They were able to reach agreement concerning that part of the complaint relating to educational services with relative ease and, on October 14, 1981, entered into a stipulation disposing of that part of the case. The stipulation provided that each party would bear its "own attorney's fees and costs thus far incurred." App 54. The District Court promptly entered an order approving the partial settlement.

Negotiations concerning the treatment claims broke down, however, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Although the District Court dismissed several of respondents' claims, it held that the federal constitutional claims raised genuine issues of fact to be resolved at trial. Thereafter, the parties stipulated to the entry of a class certification order, engaged in discovery, and otherwise prepared to try the case in the spring of 1983.

In March 1983, one week before trial, petitioners presented respondents with a new settlement proposal. As respondents themselves characterize it, the proposal "offered virtually all of the injunctive relief [they] had sought in their complaint." Brief for Respondents 5. See App. 89. The Court of Appeals agreed with this characterization, and further noted that the proposed relief was "more than the district court in earlier hearings had indicated it was willing to grant." 743 F.2d 648, 650 (CA9 1984). As was true of the earlier partial settlement, however, petitioners' offer included a provision for a waiver by respondents of any claim to fees or costs.4 Originally, this waiver was unacceptable to the Idaho Legal Aid Society, which had instructed Johnson to reject any settlement offer conditioned upon a waiver of fees, but Johnson ultimately determined that his ethical obligation to his clients mandated acceptance of the proposal. The parties conditioned the waiver on approval by the District Court.5 After the stipulation was signed, Johnson filed a written motion requesting the District Court to approve the settlement "except for the provision on costs and attorney's fees," and to allow respondents to present a bill of costs and fees for consideration by the court. App. 87. At the oral argument on that motion, Johnson contended that petitioners' offer had exploited his ethical duty to his clients—that he was "forced," by an offer giving his clients "the best result [they] could have gotten in this court or any other court," to waive his attorney's fees.6 The District Court, however, evaluated the waiver in the context of the entire settlement and rejected the ethical underpinnings of Johnson's argument. Explaining that although petitioners were "not willing to concede that they were obligated to [make the changes in their practices required by the stipulation], . . . they were willing to do them as long as their costs were outlined and they didn't face additional costs," it concluded that "it doesn't violate any ethical considerations for an attorney to give up his attorney fees in...

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