Evans v. John Crane, Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 June 2020
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 15-681-MN
• Parties: JOHANNA ELAINE EVANS, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of ICOM HENRY EVANS, Deceased, and on Behalf of All Wrongful Death Beneficiaries, Plaintiff, v. JOHN CRANE, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

JOHANNA ELAINE EVANS, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of ICOM HENRY EVANS,Deceased, and on Behalf of All Wrongful Death Beneficiaries, Plaintiff, v. JOHN CRANE, INC., Defendant.

C.A. No. 15-681-MN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

June 24, 2020

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The trial in this case concluded with a jury verdict for Defendant John Crane, Inc. After the jury was discharged, one of the jurors emailed the trial judge about the conduct of another juror. As a result of that email, Plaintiff Johanna Evans has now moved for new trial or, in the alternative, an evidentiary hearing or permission to interview the jurors. (D.I. 350.) Because Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) restricts the kinds of evidence that can be considered on a motion for a new trial after a jury verdict, and because the evidence the Court can consider is insufficient to warrant a new trial or an evidentiary hearing, I recommend that Plaintiff's motion be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

This is a personal injury case that was removed to federal court from Delaware Superior Court. Plaintiff Johanna Evans ("Plaintiff") sued multiple defendants asserting several claims related to her husband's exposure to asbestos. (D.I. 1, Ex. A; D.I. 235.) By the time the case got to trial in 2019, the only defendant remaining was John Crane, Inc. ("Defendant" or "John Crane").

Jury selection began on October 28, 2019. During voir dire, Judge Noreika asked the venire a number of questions proposed by the parties, including "Question Two":

Two. This is a personal injury and wrongful death case. The Plaintiff is Johanna Elaine Evans, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Icom Henry Evans. I will refer to her as Ms. Evans or Plaintiff. Ms. Evans has sued the Defendant, John Crane, Inc. I will call it Defendant or John Crane. Ms. Evans contends that John Crane is liable for wrongful death and personal injury of her husband, Icom Henry Evans, as a result of exposure to asbestos products that were manufactured and sold by John Crane. Defendant denies those claims. Have any of you heard or read anything about this case?

(Trial Tr. 10/28/2019 at 4:12-5:1; D.I. 330 at 2.)

One prospective juror, Juror 22, answered "yes" to Question Two. Judge Noreika then questioned Juror 22 outside of the presence of the rest of the venire:

THE COURT: We already knew that you answered yes to [question] number two because I saw you raise your hand.

JUROR 22: Sorry about that.

THE COURT: That's okay. So we just wanted to explore a little bit more what you heard about the case.

JUROR 22: Well, I got notified about the jury duty. I just looked at -- on the calendar, and I went online, and I just read a little bit about it. So I saw it was the only jury trial for today, so I just figured that was the case.

THE COURT: Did you read anything about the substance of the case?

JUROR 22: Just a little bit about the -- what the claim was as far as how the plaintiff or the police officer's wife is claiming how her husband got cancer.

THE COURT: And can you tell us what you recall about that?

JUROR 22: Something to do with the -- what he was working on, the piece of equipment. It was some type of piping.

THE COURT: And do you think that having looked into that, that that would affect your ability to be impartial in this case?

JUROR 22: No, I don't think it would affect it.

(Trial Tr. 10/28/2019 at 33:22-34:21.)

Judge Noreika allowed the parties' attorneys to ask Juror 22 additional questions (while still outside the presence of the rest of the venire). Plaintiff's counsel asked the following:

MR. WATHEN: Sir, do you recall what document or source documents you may have read online in connection with the case?

JUROR 22: They were just motions. And I read the motion that got it transferred from state to federal.

(Id. at 36:24-37:4.) Plaintiff's attorneys did not ask if Juror 22 had done other online research or any other follow-up questions. (Id. at 37:18-19.) Defendant's counsel did not ask Juror 22 any questions. Neither side moved to strike Juror 22 for cause. (Id. at 37:23-25.) Neither side used their peremptory challenges to strike Juror 22. (Id. at 63:5-64:12.) Juror 22 was subsequently sworn in as a member of the jury. (Id. at 64:18-65:4.) None of the other jury members had answered "yes" to Question Two.

At the start of the trial, the Court instructed the jury members that "[a]nything [they] see or hear outside the courtroom is not evidence and must be disregarded" and that they were "to decide this case solely on the evidence presented here in the courtroom." (Id. at 68:7-10; D.I. 331 at 4.) On October 31, 2019, the parties finished their closing arguments, and the Court charged the jury. In accordance with the Third Circuit's model jury instructions, the Court instructed the jury to "make [its] decision based only on the evidence that [it] saw and heard in court" and to "not let rumors, suspicions, or anything outside of court influence [its] decision in any way." (D.I.342 at 3.) Later that afternoon, the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of Defendant. (D.I. 345; D.I. 346.) The Court excused the jury.

The next day, one of the jurors ("Juror X") sent an email to Judge Noreika. (D.I. 350, Ex. A; D.I. 351, Ex. A.) The email read as follows:

Dear Judge Noreika,

I was juror [redacted] who attended the Crane case.

I thought you did a great job. Congratulations!

This was the first court case I have ever attended. [Juror X discusses a state court case in which he/she was not selected as a juror.]

I think the myriad of attorneys who tried this case were good. I thought the plaintiff's attorneys "cherry picked" much of the data and had an uphill challenge. I thought the self proclaimed expert witness, who bills out at $830/hour, was an arrogant idiot. Most of the other experts were smart. I thought the expert witness on Wednesday afternoon was well organized, had easy to understand charts, and was very good.

I [sic] my opinion, I suspect that one of the jurors may have been tainted. Through publicly available information, he knew Monday morning what the case was all about, had done research about other prior Crane cases, and had made up his mind well before he walked into the courtroom. Furthermore, he was not shy about expressing his findings or opinions to the other jurors.

In my case, I knew nothing about the Crane situation. I think the six other jurors had not either. My 48 pages of notes, which I tore up upon leaving the jury room, pretty much mirrored the summary that you had distributed. And, in the jury room on Thursday afternoon, questions were raised and opinions were voiced. I think all eight of us had reached their individual conclusions based upon the facts.

I also think that it is important that going forward, judges should question potential jurors about information they had researched or otherwise were exposed to prior to going into court. This would probably alleviate any sort of bias.

In closing, it was a good experience and one that I enjoyed.

Thanks again for the opportunity.

(Id.) The Court promptly shared the email with the parties' counsel.

On November 11, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, for an evidentiary hearing or permission to interview the jurors. (D.I. 350.) Defendant filed an answering brief on November 22, 2019. (D.I. 351.) Plaintiff did not file a reply brief. The motion was referred to me on April 1, 2020. (D.I. 352.) I held oral argument on June 17, 2020. ("Tr.")

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, "[t]he court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues . . . after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). Among the reasons that may warrant a new trial are that a juror was dishonest during voir dire or that the jury was exposed to extraneous information. The rationale for granting a new trial under those circumstances is that the parties are entitled to an "impartial trier of fact": if a juror lies about information relevant to his biases during voir dire or is exposed to extraneous prejudicial information, there is a risk that the jury will not decide the case solely on the evidence before it. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984); United States v. Lloyd, 269 F.3d 228, 237 (3d Cir. 2001).

A party seeking a new trial on the basis of juror dishonesty during voir dire "must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause." McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556; United States v. Claxton, 766 F.3d 280, 301 (3d Cir. 2014).

A party seeking to obtain a new trial on the basis that the jury was exposed to extraneous information must show that the party "likely suffered substantial prejudice" as a result of theexposure.¹ Lloyd, 269 F.3d at 238; United States v. Gilsenan, 949 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1991). To examine for prejudice, the court should conduct "an objective analysis by considering the probable effect of the allegedly prejudicial information on a hypothetical average juror." Gilsenan, 949 F.2d at 95. Factors relevant to that analysis may include "(1) whether the extraneous information relates to an element of the case decided against the moving party; (2) the extent of the jury's exposure to the extraneous information; (3) the time at which the jury receives the extraneous information; (4) the length of the jury's deliberations and the structure of its verdict; (5) whether the district court properly instructed the jury to consider only evidence presented at trial; and (6) [in a criminal case,] whether there is a heavy volume of incriminating evidence." United States v. Fumo, 639 F. Supp. 2d 544, 554 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (citing United States v. Flemming, 223 F. App'x 117, 124 (3d Cir. 2007...