Evans v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n
| Decision Date | 31 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action MJM-19-2651 |
| Parties | CODI EVANS, Plaintiff, v. MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARKS & PLANNING COMMISSION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Codi Evans (“Plaintiff) commenced this civil action against his employer, the Maryland-National Capital Parks & Planning Commission (the “MNCPPC” or the “Commission”), as well as Chief Darryl McSwain Captain Michael Murphy, Michael Riley, and Captain Darin Uhrig (collectively, the “Individual Defendants” and, with MNCPPC, “Defendants”) of the Maryland-National Capital Park Police (the “Park Police”).[1] Plaintiff asserts claims of a hostile work environment, retaliation, and due process violations arising from his employment as an officer with the Park Police, as well as common law claims of negligence.
Now pending is Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF 106). Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion (ECF 128, 140), and Defendants filed a reply memorandum (ECF 132). Additionally, with the Court's permission, Plaintiff filed a sur-reply (ECF 138), and Defendants a response to the sur-reply (ECF No. 139). The parties have consented to proceed before a United States magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (ECF 58). The Court has reviewed the record, as well as the pleadings and exhibits, and finds that no hearing is necessary. Loc. R. 105.6. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion will be GRANTED.
Park Police provides law enforcement protective and investigative services at parks, buildings, and other areas in Montgomery County and Prince George's County, Maryland under the jurisdiction of the MNCPPC, a bi-county agency established by the Maryland General Assembly. Riley, a civilian employee, has been the Director of Parks for the Montgomery County Parks Department since 2014. (Riley Dep. 5:4-9; Spencer Aff. ¶ 25). He provides “leadership, oversight and guidance to all functions” “at a high level” of the Montgomery County Parks Department. (Riley Dep.7:2-8:9, 17:15-18:11; Spencer Aff. ¶ 25). The Police Chief of the Park Police, Montgomery County Division, who oversees its day-to-day operations, reports to the Director. (Riley Dep. 18:11; DeVaul Dep. 35:18-36:2). McSwain was appointed Police Chief of the Montgomery County Division in May 2018, replacing Chief Antonio DeVaul, who served as Police Chief from 2012 to February 1, 2018, when he retired. (Spencer Aff. ¶ 27; DeVaul Dep. 24:20-25:13; ECF 133-1 at 4). Uhrig transferred from the Prince George's County Division to the Montgomery County Division in 2012, where he served as one of the captains/ assistant chiefs under DeVaul until his retirement in August 2017.[3] (DeVaul Dep. 45:12-46:10, 48:13-20). Riley and Uhrig are Caucasian, and DeVaul and McSwain are African American. (ECF 132 at 18, 31).
The Montgomery County Division of the Park Police was comprised of several sections, including the Patrol, Special Operations, Community Services, and Investigative Services. (ECF 107-3 at 4). Park Police has both sworn and civilian personnel. (ECF 107-3 at 4). Sworn Park Police personnel with a rank of Sergeant or below are considered “officers.”[4] (ECF 107-3 at 5). Sergeants can be promoted to Lieutenant, and Lieutenants to Captain, following their respective promotional processes. (Manley Aff. ¶ 4). Personnel with a rank of Lieutenant, Captain, and Chief are considered command staff. (ECF 107-3 at 6.) All newly promoted personnel have a probationary period of about twelve months, but there is no limitation on their supervisory powers. (DeVaul Dep. 63:18-65:2). But “[a] higher-ranking officer is not, per se, the supervisor of every lower-ranking officer.” (Manley Aff. ¶ 12). “The authority of a higher-ranking officer to issue orders to lower-ranking officers outside their direct chain of command” applies in limited circumstances, such as when the higher-ranking officer is “the senior ranking officer at a scene.” (Manley Aff. ¶ 15). The authority to issue lawful orders in such a situation does not confer supervisory authority on every higher-ranking officer in day-to-day circumstances.
(Manley Aff. ¶ 17). Furthermore, “[a] higher-ranking officer outside the direct chain of command of a lower-ranking officer has no authority to discipline or otherwise affect the terms of a lower-ranking officer's employment.” (Manley Aff. ¶ 18).
Plaintiff, an African American man, began employment with MNCPPC as a police candidate for Park Police in April 1999. (Evans Dep. 114:8-9). Plaintiff met DeVaul in summer 1999, when DeVaul was Plaintiffs field training officer, and the two became friends. (DeVaul Dep. 16:9-21, 17:9-20). Plaintiff was promoted to the rank of Sergeant in June 2013 and was transferred from the Prince George's County Division to the Montgomery County Division, serving as a patrol supervisor with K-9 duties. (ECF 106-18 at 4). Plaintiff was assigned to the midnight squad supervised by Lieutenant Nicole Adams, an African American female officer serving as the evening and midnight squads' patrol commander at the time. (Adams Dep. 187:20-188:13). Uhrig was Adams' supervisor. (Id.) Before Plaintiff s transfer, Uhrig informed Adams of Plaintiff s friendship with DeVaul and alleged that Plaintiff had a habit of circumventing the chain of command while he was in the Prince George's County Division. (ECF 128-32 at 13). Uhrig advised Adams not to let Plaintiff jump the chain of command.[5] (ECF 128-32 at 13).
As a new Sergeant in his probationary period, Plaintiff s primary responsibility was patrol, and his secondary responsibility was overseeing the K-9 program, which only comprised of Plaintiff and one other K-9 officer. (ECF 128-32 at 21). At the time, the department was in the process of expanding the K-9 program, and DeVaul intended to create a standalone K-9 unit. (Adams Dep. 118:2-11; ECF 128-32 at 20, 21). Adams initially understood that Plaintiff was intended to serve as the supervisor of the K-9 program, but Uhrig told her that Plaintiff “would be a member of the [K-9] team, not the supervisor.”[6] (Adams Dep. 20:8-21:19).
On July 10, 2017, Plaintiff requested that “center caps” he purchased be installed on his assigned police cruiser, and Uhrig denied the request via email two days later.[7] (ECF 129-7). DeVaul also denied the request at his higher level of review. (DeVaul Dep. 151:4- 10). According to Adams, Uhrig raised additional issues regarding Plaintiff. (ECF 128-32 at 13). For instance, Plaintiff requested to have the front windows on his cruiser tinted. Although the request was eventually approved, Adams recalled that Uhrig wanted justification for the request, and there was “a lot of back and forth for that approval.”[8] (Adams Dep. 40:7-41:18). According to Adams, she also supervised two Sergeants, who were Caucasian, but whenever she met with Uhrig, “more issues were brought up in regards to [Plaintiff]” compared to any other Sergeant she had under her command. (ECF 128-10; ECF 128-32 at 13).
After Adams was transferred to a different section, Plaintiff was supervised by Lieutenant Bill Kellogg from September 1, 2013, to October 13, 2013. (ECF 128-10; ECF 128-32 at 21). Uhrig continued to serve as Plaintiffs second line supervisor.[9] Uhrig spoke to Kellogg about Plaintiffs friendship with DeVaul and advised Kellogg to make sure that Plaintiff followed the chain of command. (ECF 128-32 at 14). Kellogg was under the impression that Plaintiff was the K-9 supervisor, but Uhrig informed him that Plaintiff was not the K-9 supervisor. (ECF 128-32 at 14). Kellogg requested Plaintiffs assistance when tasked with conducting home visits and interviews of family members of K-9 handler candidates, but Uhrig denied that request. (ECF 128-32 at 14). According to Kellogg, Uhrig “overly questioned] everything pertaining to K-9.” (ECF 128-32 at 14).
On October 20, 2013, Uhrig was transferred to the Special Operations section, moving out of Plaintiff s chain of command, and Captain Linus Louketis was assigned to supervise Kellogg and serve as Plaintiff s second line supervisor. (ECF 128-32 at 19). From Louketis's perspective, Plaintiffs “duties and responsibilities were first as a patrol Sergeant supervising the midnight squad” with “additional responsibilities of supervising, managing, or assisting with the management of the K-9 functions.” (ECF 128-32 at 19). Plaintiff was afforded the ability to make decisions on K-9 related matters under Louketis.
(ECF 128-32 at 19). During this time frame, new dogs and handlers were added to the K-9 program. (ECF 128-32 at 14).
On June 20, 2014, the K-9 group was reformatted into a unit and moved from the Patrol section to the Special Operations section. (ECF 128-32 at 7). Plaintiff, who had been released from probation and was no longer supervising the midnight patrol squad, became the first K-9 Sergeant, exclusively overseeing the unit, which had a total of five members. (DeVaul Dep. 58:17-63:17; ECF 128-32 at 7; ECF 129-2 at 4). Lieutenant Shibu Philipose,[10] who is of Indian descent, became Plaintiffs first line supervisor, and Uhrig became Plaintiffs second line supervisor again. During a meeting with Philipose, Uhrig mentioned Plaintiffs friendship with DeVaul and advised Philipose to make sure that Plaintiff followed the chain of command.
Uhrig also discussed Plaintiffs schedule with Philipose. Uhrig wanted Plaintiff to work a schedule that included both evening and day shifts, but Plaintiff wanted to work evenings or midnights solely. (Evans Dep. 91:13-92:2; Philipose Dep 20:20-21:7). Plaintiffs schedule became a controversial...
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