Evans v. Mathis Funeral Home, Inc., 92-8856

• Decision Date: 23 July 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-8856,92-8856
• Citation: 996 F.2d 266
• Parties: 39 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 440 Louise EVANS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MATHIS FUNERAL HOME, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 266

996 F.2d 266

39 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 440

Louise EVANS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MATHIS FUNERAL HOME, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 92-8856.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

July 23, 1993.

Samuel S. Olens, Rand & Ezor, Richard Kopelman, Atlanta, GA, for plaintiff-appellant.

Robert R. Gunn, II, Jay C. Traynham, Martin, Snow, Grant & Napier, Macon, GA, for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.

Before FAY, Circuit Judge, JOHNSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and MERHIGE ^*, Senior District Judge.

JOHNSON, Senior Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-appellant Louise Evans appeals from the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Mathis Funeral Home, Inc. (the "Funeral Home"), on her tort claim for negligent construction and maintenance. On appeal Evans raises two issues. First, she argues that the district court abused its discretion by partially excluding her expert's testimony. Second, she argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the Funeral Home. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in partially excluding the expert's testimony. However, we agree with Evans that the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the Funeral Home was error.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On September 3, 1989, sometime between 5:30 and 7:30 p.m., Louise Evans entered the Funeral Home. Several hours later, after it became dark, she left. While attempting to descend the steps leading from the Funeral Home, she slipped, reached for the handrail, and fell. As a result of the fall, Evans sustained a segmented fracture of both bones of her left forearm, requiring the insertion of pins and screws. In addition, Evans suffered injuries to her neck. Evans admits that she does not know what caused her to slip.

The steps down which Evans fell were designed by the owner of the Funeral Home. They are made of brick, and descend from a patio that is also made out of brick. Both the stair risers and the tread depth are inconsistent. Because of the differential from riser to riser, the height of the handrail varies with each riser. In addition, the handrail does not begin until the second step.

On July 8, 1991, Evans filed this lawsuit, alleging that the Funeral Home had been negligent (1) in constructing the steps in a defective or hazardous manner and (2) in allowing the steps to remain in a defective or hazardous condition. At the conclusion of discovery, the Funeral Home filed a motion for summary judgment. On August 13, 1992, the district court granted the Funeral Home's motion. Evans now appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Admission of Expert Testimony

At the pre-trial conference held by the district court following discovery, the parties disputed whether the testimony of Evans' expert was admissible. Evans' witness, who both parties recognized as an expert in the field of architecture and human factors, was prepared to testify as to the applicable standard of care for step risers and handrails, and was also going to offer his opinion concerning the nature and probable cause of Evans' fall. After briefing by both parties, the district court issued an order excluding that portion of the expert's testimony concerning the nature and probable cause of Evans' fall, but permitting testimony regarding the applicable standard of care. On appeal, Evans contends that this partial exclusion was error.

The district court has broad discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude expert testimony, and its decision will be disturbed on appeal only if it is manifestly erroneous. Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35, 82 S.Ct. 1119, 1122, 8 L.Ed.2d 313 (1962); Polston v. Boomershine Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 952 F.2d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir.1992); Perkins v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 596 F.2d 681, 682 (5th Cir.1979). In offering his opinion as to the probable cause of Evans' fall, the expert would have testified as to the effect each of the following factors could have had in causing Evans to fall: (1) the uneven risers and treads, (2) the brick patio and steps, (3) the height of the handrail, and (4) the dim light. In barring the expert's testimony as to the probable effect of each of these factors in causing Evans to fall, the district court first found that the effects of the first three factors (the uneven risers and treads, the brick patio and steps, and the handrail height) were all within the common knowledge of the jurors, and thus the probative value of such testimony was outweighed by the danger of prejudice. See FED.R.EVID. 403. Second, the district court found that the expert's opinion as to the lighting levels was based on assumptions that were not supported by the record. See Garwood v. Int'l Paper Co., 666 F.2d 217, 223 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (not manifest error to exclude expert testimony where expert's testimony based on assumptions unsupported by the record). In light of the reasons offered by the district court, we cannot say that the court's decision to partially exclude the expert's testimony was manifestly erroneous.

B. Grant of Summary Judgment

Our review of the district court's grant of summary judgment is plenary. NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1559 (11th Cir.1990). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). On review, we view the record in the light most favorable to the non- moving party, with all reasonable inferences drawn in that party's favor. NAACP, 891 F.2d at 1560.

In order to recover damages as an invitee under Georgia law, Evans must show (1) fault on the part of the Funeral Home and (2) ignorance of the danger on her part. Hospital Auth. v. Bostic, 198 Ga.App. 500, 402 S.E.2d 103, 103 (1991); Pound v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 158 Ga.App. 166, 279 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1981). Because there is a material issue of fact as to both of these elements, the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the Funeral Home.

1. Fault on the part of the Funeral Home

To establish fault on the part of the Funeral Home, Evans "must do more than prove the existence of an unsafe condition on the premises; ... she must also establish a causal connection between that condition and injuries for which recovery is sought." Boyd v. Garden Center, Inc., 197 Ga.App. 198, 397 S.E.2d 626, 628 (1990). The Funeral Home contends that because Evans testified in her deposition that she had no idea what caused her to fall, she is unable to establish this requirement.

The Funeral Home's argument misreads the law. It is not necessary that Evans herself know what caused her to fall; rather, she need only establish a causal connection between the condition and the injury, and this causal connection may be established from surrounding circumstances. See Bramblett v. Hansel-Scales, Inc., 200 Ga.App. 722, 409 S.E.2d 280, 281 (1991) (where plaintiff did not know what caused fall, evidence of causation may be determined from surrounding circumstances). In her deposition, Evans testified that she fell while she was reaching for the handrail. Evans' expert testified that the handrail was defective because it did not begin until the second step and because it varied in height from step to step. Accordingly, Evans has created a material issue of fact as to the causal connection between the allegedly defective handrail and her fall.

This case is remarkably similar to Spencer v. Little Brownie Properties, Inc., 203 Ga.App. 324, 416 S.E.2d 851 (1992), where the plaintiff was injured after reaching for a handrail that gave way. Like Evans, ...