Evans v. Michigan

• Decision Date: 20 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11–1327.,11–1327.
• Citation: 568 U.S. 313,133 S.Ct. 1069,185 L.Ed.2d 124
• Parties: Lamar EVANS, Petitioner v. MICHIGAN.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

568 U.S. 313

133 S.Ct. 1069

185 L.Ed.2d 124

Lamar EVANS, Petitioner

v.MICHIGAN.

No. 11–1327.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Nov. 6, 2012.

Decided Feb. 20, 2013.

David A. Moran, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Petitioner.

Timothy A. Baughman, Detroit, Michigan, for Respondent.

Curtis E. Gannon, for United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Respondent.

David A. Moran, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Jonathan B.D. Simon, Birmingham, Michigan, Richard D. Friedman, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Timothy P. O'Toole, Miller & Chevalier, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Kym L. Worthy, Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Detroit, Michigan, for Respondent.

Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

When the State of Michigan rested its case at petitioner Lamar Evans' arson trial, the court entered a directed verdict of acquittal, based upon its view that the State had not provided sufficient evidence of a particular element of the offense. It turns out that the unproven "element" was not actually a required element at all. We must decide whether an erroneous acquittal such as this nevertheless constitutes an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes, which would mean that Evans could not be retried. This Court has previously held that a judicial acquittal premised upon a "misconstruction" of a criminal statute is an "acquittal on the merits ... [that] bars retrial." Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 211, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984). Seeing no meaningful constitutional distinction between a trial court's "misconstruction" of a statute and its erroneous addition of a statutory element, we hold that a midtrial acquittal in these circumstances is an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes as well.

I

The State charged Evans with burning "other real property," a violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.73 (1981). The State's evidence at trial suggested that Evans had burned down an unoccupied house. At the close of the State's case, however, Evans moved for a directed verdict of acquittal. He pointed the court to the applicable Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions, which listed as the "Fourth" element of the offense "that the building was not a dwelling house." 3 Mich. Crim. Jury Instr. § 31.3, p. 31–7 (2d ed., Supp. 2006/2007). And the commentary to the Instructions emphasized, "an essential element is that the structure burned is not a dwelling house." Id., at 31–8. Evans argued that Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.72 criminalizes common-law arson, which requires that the structure burned be a dwelling, while the provision under which he was charged, § 750.73, covers all other real property.¹ Persuaded, the trial court granted the motion. 491 Mich. 1, 8, 810 N.W.2d 535, 539 (2012). The court explained that the " ‘testimony [of the homeowner] was this was a dwelling house,’ " so the nondwelling requirement of § 750.73 was not met. Ibid.

On the State's appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. 288 Mich.App. 410, 794 N.W.2d 848 (2010). Evans had conceded, and the court held, that under controlling precedent, burning "other real property" is a lesser included offense under Michigan law, and disproving the greater offense is not required. Id., at 416, 794 N.W.2d, at 852 (citing People v. Antonelli, 66 Mich.App. 138, 140, 238 N.W.2d 551, 552 (1975) (on rehearing)).² The court thus explained it was "undisputed that the trial court misperceivedthe elements of the offense with which [Evans] was charged and erred by directing a verdict." 288 Mich.App., at 416, 794 N.W.2d, at 852. But the court rejected Evans' argument that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial. Id., at 421–422, 794 N.W.2d, at 856.

In a divided decision, the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed. It held that "when a trial court grants a defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the basis of an error of law that did not resolve any factual element of the charged offense, the trial court's ruling does not constitute an acquittal for the purposes of double jeopardy and retrial is therefore not barred." 491 Mich., at 4, 810 N.W.2d, at 536–537.

We granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement among state and federal courts on the question whether retrial is barred when a trial court grants an acquittal because the prosecution had failed to prove an "element" of the offense that, in actuality, it did not have to prove.³ 567 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2753, 183 L.Ed.2d 614 (2012). We now reverse.

II

A

In answering this question, we do not write on a clean slate. Quite the opposite. It has been half a century since we first recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial following a court-decreed acquittal, even if the acquittal is "based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation." Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143, 82 S.Ct. 671, 7 L.Ed.2d 629 (1962) (per curiam ). A mistaken acquittal is an acquittal nonetheless, and we have long held that "[a] verdict of acquittal ... could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting [a defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution." United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896).

Our cases have applied Fong Foo 's principle broadly. An acquittal is unreviewable whether a judge directs a jury to return a verdict of acquittal, e.g., Fong Foo, 369 U.S., at 143, 82 S.Ct. 671, or forgoes that formality by entering a judgment of acquittal herself. See Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467–468, 125 S.Ct. 1129, 160 L.Ed.2d 914 (2005) (collecting cases). And an acquittal precludes retrial even if it is premised upon an erroneous decision to exclude evidence, Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 68–69, 78, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978) ; a mistaken understanding of what evidence would suffice to sustain a conviction, Smith, 543 U.S., at 473, 125 S.Ct. 1129; or a "misconstruction of the statute" defining the requirements to convict, Rumsey, 467 U.S., at 203, 211, 104 S.Ct. 2305; cf. Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 144–145, n. 7, 106 S.Ct. 1745, 90 L.Ed.2d 116 (1986). In all these circumstances, "the fact that the acquittal may result from erroneous evidentiary rulings or erroneous interpretations of governing legal principles affects the accuracy of that determination, but it does not alter its essential character." United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Most relevant here, our cases have defined an acquittal to encompass any ruling that the prosecution's proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense. See ibid., and n. 11; Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 10, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) ; United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977). Thus an "acquittal" includes "a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict," a "factual finding [that] necessarily establish[es] the criminal defendant's lack of criminal culpability," and any other "rulin[g] which relate[s] to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence." Scott, 437 U.S., at 91, 98, and n. 11, 98 S.Ct. 2187 (internal quotation marks omitted). These sorts of substantive rulings stand apart from procedural rulings that may also terminate a case midtrial, which we generally refer to as dismissals or mistrials. Procedural dismissals include rulings on questions that "are unrelated to factual guilt or innocence," but "which serve other purposes," including "a legal judgment that a defendant, although criminally culpable, may not be punished" because of some problem like an error with the indictment. Id., at 98, and n. 11, 98 S.Ct. 2187.

Both procedural dismissals and substantive rulings result in an early end to trial, but we explained in Scott that the double jeopardy consequences of each differ. "[T]he law attaches particular significance to an acquittal," so a merits-related ruling concludes proceedings absolutely. Id., at 91, 98 S.Ct. 2187. This is because "[t]o permit a second trial after an acquittal, however mistaken the acquittal may have been, would present an unacceptably high risk that the Government, with its vastly superior resources, might wear down the defendant so that ‘even though innocent he may be found guilty,’ " ibid. (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) ). And retrial following an acquittal would upset a defendant's expectation of repose, for it would subject him to additional "embarrassment, expense and ordeal" while "compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity." Id., at 187, 78 S.Ct. 221. In contrast, a "termination of the proceedings against [a defendant] on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offense of which he is accused," 437 U.S., at 98–99, 98 S.Ct. 2187,i.e., some procedural ground, does not pose the same concerns, because no expectation of finality attaches to a properly granted mistrial.

Here, "it is plain that the [trial court] ... evaluated the [State's] evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction." Martin Linen, 430 U.S., at 572, 97 S.Ct. 1349. The trial court granted Evans' motion under a rule that requires the court to "direct a verdict of acquittal on any charged offense as to which the evidence is insufficient to support conviction." Mich. Rule Crim. Proc. 6.419(A) (2012). And the court's oral ruling leaves no doubt that it made its determination on the basis of " ‘[t]he testimony’ " that the State had presented. 491 Mich., at 8, 810 N.W.2d, at 539. This ruling was not a dismissal on a procedural ground "unrelated to factual guilt or innocence," like the question of "preindictment delay" in Scott, but rather a determination that the State had failed to prove its case. 437 U.S., at 98, 99, 98 S.Ct. 2187. Under our precedents, then, Evans was acquitted.

There is no question the trial court's ruling was...