Evans v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company
Decision Date | 02 May 1958 |
Docket Number | No. 12410-12413.,12410-12413. |
Citation | 255 F.2d 205,70 ALR 2d 158 |
Parties | Jehu P. EVANS et al. v. The PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant. Margaret Elizabeth JESTER, Widow, v. The PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant. Noah Kenneth COLLINS v. The PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant. Leland Kenneth PHILLIPS, v. The PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
James L. Latchum, Wilmington, Del. (Wm. S. Potter, Wilmington, Del., on the brief), for appellant.
James M. Tunnell, Jr., Georgetown, Del., for appellees.
Before KALODNER and HASTIE, Circuit Judges, and LAYTON, District Judge.
These are four appeals by defendant from judgments entered in favor of the plaintiffs by the United States Court for the District of Delaware. They are companion cases arising out of a collision between an automobile in which the plaintiffs were passengers and defendant's train. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship and Delaware law is controlling. The actions were consolidated and tried by the Court. Those appeals were also consolidated and argued together.
Very briefly, the facts are these. On the dark, rainy evening of May 20, 1955, five young men were proceeding southerly on Route 14, Sussex County, Delaware, in a car driven by Daniels.1 Ahead lay the hamlet of Nassau intersected by the railroad crossing of the defendants. The approach of trains from the west (to the right of plaintiffs' machine) is largely concealed by an extensive orchard, buildings and shade trees. As plaintiffs' machine was between 100 ft. to 160 ft. of the tracks, Daniels suddenly perceived defendant's train slowly entering the crossing and slammed on the brakes but was unable to prevent a collision which resulted in death to Jester, terrible injuries to Evans and minor injuries to the others.
The trial judge found that the crossing in question was extremely hazardous because of (1) the large volume of automotive traffic using the highway, (2) the irregular scheduling of trains, (3) the angle at which the track and road meet, (4) obstructions concealing the approach of the trains and (5) the archaic lighting system on defendant's freight trains. Defendant strenuously attacks the bases for each of these findings. However, we deem it unnecessary to examine in detail the reasoning of the trial judge as to why defendant was negligent, for, in the final analysis, if it was negligent in only one respect and that negligence was the, or one of the, proximate causes of the accident, then liability necessarily follows. The answer to this inquiry must lie in an examination of the applicable Delaware law.
Perhaps the leading case in Delaware dealing with this question is Roberts v. Maryland, Delaware and Virginia R. R. Co., frequently referred to as Lofland's Brickyard Crossing Cases, 5 Boyce 150, 28 Del. 150, 91 A. 285, 287. There the Superior Court said:
And, as said by former Chief Justice Lore in Reed v. Queen Anne's R. Co., 4 Pennewill, Del., 413, 57 A. 529, 531:
"If the crossing be in a thickly populated or much frequented locality, or if the view of the crossing be obstructed, or exceptionally dangerous from any cause, it is the duty of the company to exercise greater care and caution, proportioned in every case to the danger, so as reasonably to avoid accident."
The same thought was expressed by former Chief Justice Layton in Leedom v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 3 Terry 186, 42 Del. 186, 29 A.2d 171, 173:
In short, the Delaware law is that all railroad crossings are dangerous, requiring reasonable warning to the motorist of their existence, and the more dangerous the crossing, the greater the degree of warning is demanded.
Now, here, we are dealing with an unconcealed crossing, that is, a crossing the approach to which for some distance is a straight, level road. Thus, the several warning signs2 together with the ringing of bells and the train whistle might well be regarded as sufficient warnings under the circumstances but for one important fact — the approach of the train from plaintiffs' right was virtually concealed. Whether or not this circumstance required additional warning is, under the Delaware decisions, traditionally a question for the jury. In support of this conclusion, we find the following language from Gray v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 3 W.W.Harr. 450, 33 Del. 450, 139 A. 66, 75, particularly apt:
If there existed at the crossing in question, at the time of the accident, unusual dangers to persons approaching on the highway, it was the duty of the company to maintain at the crossing such means and agencies for the avoidance or prevention of injury as were reasonably required by the unusual situation. A railroad crossing, as we have said, is regarded as a place of danger, and particularly so if it is in a city or populous town, where existing conditions may make the crossing unusually dangerous. It is for the jury to say whether the crossing in question was such a crossing. The Court cannot say, as a matter of law, what particular means or agencies the company should employ in such case to notify persons approaching the crossing of the danger there existing, but we say it is the duty of the company to employ such means or agencies as are reasonably necessary to give timely and sufficient notice. What are the particular means or agencies that should be employed, and whether they have been employed, are questions for the jury to determine from all the evidence." (Emphasis added.)
Accordingly, the finding of negligence by the trial judge on this issue will not be disturbed.3
But, by way of further defense, defendant insists that it is not liable because here the train had pre-empted the crossing to a point where the plaintiffs' driver, in the exercise of reasonable care and caution, should have seen it and averted collision. This requires some consideration of another line of Delaware cases also dealing with railroad crossings. In Philadelphia and Reading Ry. Co. v. Dillon, 1921, 1 W.W.Harr. 247, 31 Del. 247, 114 A. 62, 65, 15 A.L.R. 894, an unlighted freight car was left standing across a railroad crossing at night and plaintiff crashed into it with his automobile. The Court held that the defendant was not liable, saying in part:
And in Jones v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 5 Terry 486, 44 Del. 486, 61 A.2d 691, the Delaware Superior Court applied the principle of the Dillon case in denying relief to a plaintiff who drove his car into the side of an unlighted moving freight train at night...
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