Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel

• Decision Date: 12 September 1974
• Docket Number: Nos. 73-1342,73-1442,s. 73-1342
• Citation: 164 U.S.App.D.C. 86,503 F.2d 177
• Parties: 8 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 705, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9661, 164 U.S.App.D.C. 86 Lorraine EVANS, Appellant, v. SHERATON PARK HOTEL et al. Lorraine EVANS v. SHERATON PARK HOTEL et al., Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 177

503 F.2d 177

8 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 705, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec.

P 9661,

164 U.S.App.D.C. 86

Lorraine EVANS, Appellant, v. SHERATON PARK HOTEL et al.

Lorraine EVANS v. SHERATON PARK HOTEL et al., Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union, Appellant.

Nos. 73-1342, 73-1442.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Jan. 17, 1974.

Decided Sept. 12, 1974.

Whitworth Stokes, Washington, D.C., for appellant in No. 73-1342 and appellee in No. 73-1442.

Jonas Ben Katz, Cincinnati, Ohio, with whom Benjamin Gettler, Cincinnati, Ohio, and Samuel Levine were on the brief for appellant in No. 73-1442 and appellee, Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union in No. 73-1342. Louis Ginberg, Mark H. Grunewald and Ronald I. Tish, Washington, D.c., entered appearances for appellant in No. 73-1442. Ronald I. Tish, Washington, D.C., also entered an appearance for appellee Sheraton Park Hotel.

Before McGOWAN and ROBB, Circuit Judges, and MATTHEWS, ^* Senior District Judge for the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

MATTHEWS, Senior District Judge.

Appellant Lorraine Evans, a regular banquet waitress employed at the Sheraton Park Hotel (Hotel) and a member of Local 507, Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union (Waitresses Local 507), brought this action under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., against the Hotel, Waitresses Local 507, the Joint Executive Board, Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union (Joint Board), the Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union (International), and Local 781 Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union (Waiters Local 781) seeking injunctive relief, back pay and damages.

After extensive pretrial proceedings, the District Court held that maintenance of the two sex-segregated Locals constituted a per se violation of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(c), and, no bona fide occupational qualifications having been shown by defendants, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) and (c) had been violated. The District Court awarded Mrs. Evans (1) $1,100 as a result of the discrimination in assignments to receptions (all defendants being jointly and severally liable); (2) $500 for harassment (against the hotel only); and (3) her costs and nominal attorney's fee of $1,000.

In No. 73-1342, Mrs. Evans has appealed the amounts awarded as not being adequate or proper.

International, appellant in No. 73-1442, ¹ raises three issues: (1) whether the International may be joined in a civil action brought by an aggrieved party under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e) where the International was not named as a respondent in the charge filed by the aggrieved party with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC); (2) whether the mere existence of Waiters Local 781 and Waitresses Local 507 within the International Union constituted a per se violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq.; and (3) whether the awards of $1,100 damages and $1,000 attorney's fee for which all defendants are jointly and severally liable were clearly inadequate and an abuse of discretion by the District Court.

I JOINDER OF INTERNATIONAL

After the original complaint was filed in District Court against the Hotel, Joint Board, and Waitresses Local 507, the Hotel filed a motion to dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties, namely, the International and Waiters Local 781. The District Court granted the motion, without prejudice, but thereafter vacated its order and allowed appellant Evans to file an amended complaint naming the two unions as parties defendant. International then proceeded with a motion for summary judgment (as to it), asserting the lack of a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a civil action against International in that International was not a party named or charged in the complaint filed with the EEOC. The EEOC, having been permitted earlier to participate as Amicus Curiae in this case, filed a brief opposing International's motion.

In a Memorandum and Order dated March 22, 1972, the District Court denied the motion. Having already held the International to be an indispensable party, the Court believed summary judgment to International would mean that the entire case would be stopped in its tracks. Noting that several courts had allowed additional defendants to be brought into a case despite the fact that the defendant was not named as a respondent in the administrative proceeding before the EEOC, the District Court reasoned:

'Charges of discrimination filed with the EEOC are frequently initiated by complainants, without aid of counsel, who have no way of ascertaining the identities of all the parties who may become parties to the subsequent litigation. Even if the complainant were represented by counsel, it is unrealistic to expect that the complainant could accurately anticipate all potential parties to the subsequent litigation arising out of the claim. This is particularly true where, as in the instant case, one of the parties, the chartering International, is not highly visible, and it required court action to determine whether or not the International was an indispensable party. Title VII is a broad and humanitarian Act which seeks to encourage parties to attempt conciliation before they resort to court action but it does not seek to foreclose claimants from their legal remedies because of technical pleading requirements at the administrative stage.'

Appendix, p. 14, 4 EPD PP 7727.

We think International, in the present case, meets the conditions of Rule 19(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:

'A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties * * *.'

In accordance with its constitution, International had chartered Waiters Local 781 and Waitresses Local 507, and by its constitution, only International had the power to alter, suspend or terminate operation of these locals. Although neither the by-baws of Waiters Local 781 nor Waitresses Local 507 specifically prohibited membership to persons of the opposite sex, as a matter of practice and as their respective names imply, only men were admitted to Waiters Local 781 and only women were admitted to Waitresses Local 507.

Plaintiff's complaint sought general injunctive relief against sex discrimination in her employment opportunities and specific relief against maintenance of sexually segregated locals. It becomes readily apparent that specific injunctive relief against maintenance of sexually segregated locals necessitated International's presence. Further, any general injunctive relief granted to plaintiff against the Sheraton Hotel and Waitresses Local 507 only for the purpose of eliminating sex discrimination in her employment opportunities would be akin to rather ineffective symptomatic relief, leaving the root (sexually segregated locals) to continue. While money damages was an available remedy to compensate for any past illegal discrimination, we conclude that without International complete relief could not be accorded appellant Evans by way of injunctive relief necessary to prevent future discrimination.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, speaking through Judge Carswell, said in Schutten v. Shell Oil Company, 421 F.2d 869, 873 (1970):

'Subdivision (a) of Rule 19 categorizes those persons whose joinder is desirable from the standpoint of complete adjudication and elimination of relitigation. If there are no procedural or jurisdictional bars to joining such a party, Rule 19 requires that he be joined.'

We turn then to the question of whether failure to charge International before the EEOC is a jurisdictional bar to its joinder.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e) (1970) provides that if after a charge of discrimination is filed, the EEOC is unable to achieve compliance with the Act, within a specified time 'a civil action may * * * be brought against the respondent in the charge.' Courts have generally interpreted this provision to mean that a charge must be filed against a party with the EEOC before court action can be commenced against the party. Mickel v. South Carolina State Employment Service, 377 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1967); Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Company, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Cox v. United States Gypsum Company, 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969); Marlowe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 6 FEP Cases 1083 (6th Cir. 1973); Norman v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 414 F.2d 73 (8th Cir. 1969). ²

The rule was circumvented in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Wks. of Internat'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub nom. United Order American Bricklayers v. Waters, 400 U.S. 911, where in a civil action alleging racial discrimination based for jurisdictional purposes on the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981 as well as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-15, plaintiffs' complaint included a local union as party defendant which had not been a party charged before the EEOC. ³ Plaintiffs were allowed to sue the local union directly under 1981, having shown a reasonable excuse for failure to exhaust EEOC remedies, and the Seventh Circuit did not consider the district court's ruling concerning the applicability of Rule 19, Fed.R.Civ.P. However, recently in LeBeau v. Libby-Owens-Ford Company, 484 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1973), where a Title VII action had been dismissed on the ground that the International union was a Rule 19 indispensable party, which could not be joined because it was not a party charged before the EEOC, the Seventh Circuit...