Evans v. Slagle

• Docket Number: CIVIL 1:23-cv-00026-MR
• Decision Date: 25 May 2023
• Parties: GEORGE REYNOLD EVANS, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL SLAGLE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina

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GEORGE REYNOLD EVANS, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL SLAGLE, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL No. 1:23-cv-00026-MR

United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Asheville Division

May 25, 2023

ORDER

MARTIN REIDINGER, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the pro se Complaint [Doc. 1-1] and Supplemental Complaint [Doc 9].^[1] Also pending are the Plaintiff's “Request for Entry of Default” [Doc. 19]; Motion for a Discovery Scheduling Order [Doc. 20]; Motion for Default Judgment [Doc 21]; and “Motion to Set Case for Inquest Hearing” [Doc. 23].

I. BACKGROUND

The pro se Plaintiff, a prisoner in the North Carolina Department of Adult Corrections (NCDAC),^[2] filed the Complaint in Wake County Superior Court in June 2022, addressing incidents that allegedly occurred at the Mountain View Correctional Institution (MVCI).^[3] He names as Defendants: NCDPS; Eddie Buffaloe, Jr., the secretary of NCDPS; Todd Ishee, the NCDPS director of prisons; and Mike Slagle, the warden of MVCI. He asserts that the Defendants violated the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments when MVCI repeatedly failed to deliver publications he ordered from the Prisoner Revolutionary Literature Fund (PRLF) and the Human Rights Defense Center (HRDF), and failing to provide notice and the opportunity to appeal this “censorship” to the Plaintiff, PRLF, and HRDF. As injury, the Plaintiff claims that he has suffered serious and irreparable harm including “suppression of its political message, being denied to have a mind or think critical.” [Doc. 1-1 at 19-20]. He seeks a declaratory judgment; preliminary and permanent injunctive relief; compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages; costs; attorney's fees;^[4] a jury trial; and any other relief the Court deems just and appropriate. [Id. at 22-23].

The Defendants removed the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367, 1441, and 1446, and paid the filing fee.^[5] [Doc. 1 (Notice of Removal)].

The Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend and/or Supplement in which he sought to adds a claim that Defendant Slagle retaliated against him in August 2022, which the Eastern District granted. [Docs. 8, 9, 16]. The Eastern District also granted the Defendants' Motion seeking an extension of time to respond to the Complaint [Doc. 3]; denied the Plaintiff's Motions for entry of default [Doc. 6], for default judgment [Doc. 10], and for a discovery scheduling order [Doc. 15]; and transferred the case to this Court. [Doc. 16].

Upon receiving the case, this Court stayed the Eastern District's deadline for the Defendants to respond to the Complaint until the case was reviewed for frivolity. [Jan 30, 2023 Text-Only Order].

The Plaintiff again seeks the entry of default, default judgment, and for a hearing on the same [Docs. 19, 21, 23], and for the entry of a discovery scheduling order [Doc. 20].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, under § 1915A the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether a complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4^th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was “deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).

The Plaintiff attempts to name NCDPS as a Defendant. However, “neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Therefore, NCDPS is not a “person” under § 1983. See Fox v. Harwood, 2009 WL 1117890, at *1 (W.D. N.C. April 24, 2009). Plaintiff's claims against NCDPS are, therefore, dismissed with prejudice.

It appears that the Plaintiff is attempting to assert claims on behalf of himself as well as on behalf of PRLF and HRDF. [See, e.g., Doc. 1-1 at 11 (asserting that a publisher must receive notice and the opportunity to challenge restrictions on a prisoner's receipt of mail)]. As a pro se inmate, the Plaintiff is not qualified to prosecute a class action or assert a claim on behalf of others. See Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Schls., 418 F.3d 395, 400 (4^th Cir. 2005) (“An individual unquestionably has the right to litigate his own claims in federal court....The right to litigate for oneself, however, does not create a coordinate right to litigate for others”); Hummer v. Dalton, 657 F.2d 621, 625 (4^th Cir. 1981) (prisoner's suit is “confined to redress for violations of his own personal rights and not one by him as knight-errant for all prisoners”); Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4^th Cir. 1975) (“[I]t is plain error to permit [an] imprisoned litigant who is unassisted by counsel to represent his fellow inmates in a class action.”). Accordingly, to the extent that the Plaintiff is attempting to assert claims on behalf of others, they are dismissed.

A state official can be sued in a § 1983 suit in three ways: in his personal capacity, his official capacity, or in a more limited way, his supervisory capacity. King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 223-24 (4^th Cir. 2016). For personal liability, “it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). In an official-capacity suit, however, “[m]ore is required”: the suit is “treated as a suit against the entity,” which must then be a “‘moving force' behind the deprivation,” King, 825 F.3d at 223 (quoting Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981)); thus, the entity's “‘policy or custom' must have played a part in the violation of federal law,” Id. (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). Meanwhile, a supervisor can be liable where (1) he knew that his subordinate “was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury;” (2) his response showed “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices;” and (3) that there was an “affirmative causal link” between his inaction and the constitutional injury.” Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791,799 (4^thCir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Plaintiff claims that the Defendants implemented practices, and failed to enforce prison policies, that resulted in the withholding and censorship of publications without any penological justification. As a general matter, prisoners have the right to both send and receive mail. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,408 (1989); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). Restrictions on this right are valid if they are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see Haze v. Harrison, 961 F.3d 654, 658 (4^th Cir. 2020) (noting that Turner applies to both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees).

Accepting the factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiff's favor, his mail censorship claims will be allowed to pass initial review against Defendants Buffaloe, Ishee, and Slagle.

The Plaintiff claims that the Defendants have implemented practices, and have failed to adhere to prison policy, and that these actions have deprived him of notice and the opportunity to appeal their mail censorship decisions. To prevail on a procedural due process claim, an inmate must first demonstrate that he was deprived of “life, liberty, or property” by governmental action. Bevrati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 502 (4^th Cir. 1997). Although prisoners are afforded some due process rights while incarcerated, those liberty interests are limited to “the freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).

Accepting the factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiff's favor, his due process claims will be allowed to pass initial review against Defendants Buffaloe, Ishee, and Slagle.

The Plaintiff also claims that the Defendants' actions with regard to his mailed publications violate the Eighth Amendment. The Plaintiff's claims about the alleged mail censorship and due process violations related to such are more appropriately addressed under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, which specifically addresses free speech and procedural due process,...