Evans v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.

• Citation: 213 Cal.App.3d 1378,262 Cal.Rptr. 416
• Decision Date: 15 September 1989
• Docket Number: No. B033144,B033144
• Parties: , 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2992, 51 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 719, 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,578, 122 Lab.Cas. P 56,916 William David EVANS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 416

262 Cal.Rptr. 416

213 Cal.App.3d 1378, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2992,

51 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 719,

59 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,578,

122 Lab.Cas. P 56,916

William David EVANS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.

No. B033144.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Sept. 15, 1989.

Review Denied Nov. 30, 1989.

Fogel, Feldman, Ostrov, Ringler & Klevens and Richard L. Rosett, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant.

Breidenbach, Swainston, Crispo & Way, Donald A. Way and Richard E. Rico, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent.

LILLIE, Presiding Justice.

Plaintiff, William Evans, appeals from summary judgment entered in favor of defendant,

Southern Pacific Transportation Company, and against plaintiff in an employment discrimination action. Plaintiff also appeals from order denying his motion to tax costs. ¹

FACTS

In June 1980, while employed by defendant as an electrician, plaintiff sustained personal injuries in the course of his employment. In April 1983 plaintiff commenced an action against defendant under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) (45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.) seeking damages for his injuries. (L.A.Super.Ct. case No. C-448486.) In August 1983 plaintiff allegedly had the smell of alcohol on his breath while he was on defendant's premises in the performance of his duties. Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between defendant and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), of which plaintiff was a member, a hearing was held regarding plaintiff's alleged violation of Rule G which prohibits employees of railroads from possessing alcohol or being intoxicated while on duty. ² As a result of the hearing defendant fired plaintiff in September 1983. Plaintiff, represented by the general chairman of the IBEW, appealed his dismissal. The appeal was denied and plaintiff remained dismissed until July 1985 when he was reinstated by defendant on a leniency basis.

In September 1984, pursuant to the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov.Code, § 12900 et seq.), plaintiff sued defendant for employment discrimination. (L.A.Super.Ct. case No. C-514091.) The complaint, which sought damages and injunctive and declaratory relief, alleged that defendant discriminated against plaintiff by firing him because he is black and because he suffers from a physical handicap that resulted from the injuries he sustained in July 1980 due to defendant's negligence. On plaintiff's motion the personal injury action and the employment discrimination action were consolidated.

Defendant moved for summary judgment in the employment discrimination action on the ground said action is preempted by the federal Railway Labor Act (RLA) ( 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.). The motion was granted and summary judgment was entered in favor of defendant and against plaintiff. Plaintiff moved to tax costs claimed by defendant. The motion was denied.

Plaintiff appeals from the judgment and from the order denying his motion to tax costs.

DISCUSSION

I

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT

A

Summary judgment is proper only where "all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Chong v. Fremont Indemnity Co. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1097, 1100, 249 Cal.Rptr. 264.) Inasmuch as the facts here are undisputed the sole issue presented, both in the trial court and on appeal, is one of law. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment when the issue

                on appeal is one of law, the appellate court is not bound by the trial court's determination but is free to draw its own conclusions of law from the undisputed facts.  (Milo Equipment Corp. v. Elsinore Valley Mun. Water Dist.  (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1282, 1285, 253 Cal.Rptr. 126;  Cox Cable San Diego, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 952, 958, 233 Cal.Rptr. 735.)   If the trial court erred in applying the law to the facts the judgment must be reversed.  (See Scroggs v. Coast Community College Dist.  (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1399, 1401, 239 Cal.Rptr. 916.)
                

B

In determining a question of preemption, "[t]he crucial inquiry is whether the exercise of the state authority 'frustrate[s] effective implementation of [an] Act's processes.' " (New York Tel. Co. v. New York Labor Dept. (1979) 440 U.S. 519, 550, 99 S.Ct 1328, 1346, 59 L.Ed.2d 553, 574, conc. opn. of Blackmun, J.) "[I]nflexible application of the [preemption] doctrine is to be avoided, especially where the State has a substantial interest in regulation of the conduct at issue and the State's interest is one that does not threaten undue interference with the federal regulatory scheme." (Farmer v. Carpenters (1977) 430 U.S. 290, 302, 97 S.Ct. 1056, 1064, 51 L.Ed.2d 338, 351.) Courts are reluctant to infer preemption (Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland (1978) 437 U.S. 117, 132, 98 S.Ct. 2207, 2217, 57 L.Ed.2d 91, 104) and it is the burden of the party claiming that Congress intended to preempt state law to prove it. (Ellsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 540, 548 [208 Cal.Rptr. 874, 691 P.2d 630].) " '... It will not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to supersede the exercise of the power of the state unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so. The exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed.' [Citation.]" (New York Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino (1973) 413 U.S. 405, 413, 93 S.Ct. 2507, 2513, 37 L.Ed.2d 688, 695.)

The California FEHA establishes that freedom from job discrimination on specified grounds, including race and physical handicap, is a civil right (Gov.Code, § 12921); it declares that such discrimination is against public policy (id., § 12920) and is an unlawful employment practice (id., § 12940). ³ (Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 213, 185 Cal.Rptr. 270, 649 P.2d 912.) "The policy that promotes the right to seek and hold employment free of prejudice is fundamental. Job discrimination 'foments domestic strife and unrest, deprives the state of the fullest utilization of its capacities for development and advance, and substantially and adversely affects the interest of employees, employers, and the public in general.' (§ 12920.) The statute's aim is to provide effective remedies against the evil." (Id., at p. 220, 185 Cal.Rptr. 270, 649 P.2d 912; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 485, 208 Cal.Rptr. 724, 691 P.2d 272.)

Congress enacted the RLA in order to promote stability in the railroad industry and to provide for prompt and efficient resolution of labor-management disputes arising out of railroad collective bargaining agreements. (Lewy v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co. (9th Cir.1986) 799 F.2d 1281, 1289.) The RLA provides a comprehensive framework for resolution of disputes in the railroad industry. All "disputes between ... [railroad] employees and ... carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions" are minor disputes. (45 U.S.C. § 153, First (i); Lewy v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., supra, 799 F.2d at p. 1289.) A discharge grievance, a minor dispute, is While the RLA remedy for the resolution of minor disputes is "at least in some situations" exclusive (Andrews, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 325, 92 S.Ct. at p. 1565, 32 L.Ed.2d at p. 100), the RLA "is not basically a fair employment practice act nor has it been utilized as such." (Norman v. Missouri Pacific R.R. (8th Cir.1969) 414 F.2d 73, 82.) Accordingly, the RLA does not preclude a court's jurisdiction over claims based on federal civil rights statutes (42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq.). (Coppinger v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. (2d Cir.1988) 861 F.2d 33; McAlester v. United Air Lines, Inc., supra, 851 F.2d 1249.)

subject to the internal grievance process and if not settled, is submitted to the National Railroad Adjustment Board established under the RLA. (Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. (1972) 406 U.S. 320, 322, 92 S.Ct. 1562, 1564, 32 L.Ed.2d 95, 98; McAlester v. United Air Lines, Inc. (10th Cir.1988) 851 F.2d 1249, 1252.)

In Coppinger v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., supra, 861 F.2d 33, the court reasoned that the plaintiff's statutory civil rights claim had an origin legally independent of his contractual right to pursue his grievance under the RLA and thus the arbitration of the grievance did not foreclose his civil rights action. In reaching this conclusion the court relied on the following language in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (1974) 415 U.S. 36, 49-50, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1020-1021, 39 L.Ed.2d 147, 159: " 'In submitting his grievance to arbitration, an employee seeks to vindicate his contractual right under a collective-bargaining agreement. By contrast, in filing a lawsuit under [Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964], an employee asserts independent statutory rights accorded by Congress. The distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the same factual occurrence. And certainly no inconsistency results from permitting both rights to be [enforced] in their respectively appropriate forums.' " (Coppinger, supra, 861 F.2d at p. 36.) The Coppinger court further noted that in Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Buell (1987) 480 U.S. 557, 107 S.Ct. 1410, 94 L.Ed.2d 563, the Supreme Court held that the RLA's binding arbitration provisions did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to hear an employee's claim against his employer for personal injuries arising under the FELA. The Supreme Court "noted that the RLA did not preempt other federal statutes that provide rights outside the scope of those covered by the RLA. Buell, 107 S.Ct. at 1415. Notwithstanding the deference normally accorded the RLA's arbitration system, the...