Evans v. St. Lucie Cnty. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 05 November 2018
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 2:17-CV-14450-ROSENBERG/REINHART
• Parties: DARIEN X. EVANS, Plaintiff, v. ST. LUCIE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

DARIEN X. EVANS, Plaintiff, v. ST. LUCIE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

CASE NO. 2:17-CV-14450-ROSENBERG/REINHART

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

November 5, 2018

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND CLOSING CASE

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant, St. Lucie County School District's, Motion for Final Summary Judgment, DE 48. The Motion has been fully briefed, and the Court had the benefit of hearing from the parties' counsel at a Motion Hearing held on October 9, 2018, DE 63. The Court has considered Defendant's Motion for Final Summary Judgment, DE 48, Defendant's Statement of Material Facts, DE 58, Plaintiff Darien Evans' Response, DE 52, Defendant's Second Amended Statement of Disputed Facts, DE 59, Defendant's Reply, DE 54, all accompanying exhibits, the arguments heard at the Motion Hearing on October 9, 2018, DE 63, and the record, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Claims Alleged in the Complaint

Plaintiff's Complaint, DE 1, alleges six claims based on the non-renewal of his employment at Lakewood Park Elementary, a subdivision of Defendant. Count I alleges "Racial Discrimination" in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Section 1981), and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) for "permitting and condoning the use of racial slurs by staff." DE 1, ¶ 54. Count II alleges "Racial Discrimination" in violation of Title VII, Section 1981, and the FCRA for "failing to adequately supervise, control or discipline and/or penalize the conduct, acts of failures to act of its agents." DE 1, ¶ 64. Count III alleges "Sexual Harassment" in violation of Title VII and the FCRA for "engag[ing] in co-worker sexual harassment," subjecting Plaintiff to "unwelcome sexual harassment . . . [and] verbal conduct of a sexual nature that had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with his work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment." DE 1, ¶ 68. Count IV alleges a claim of a "Hostile Work Environment" in violation of Title VII and the FCRA for failing to "prevent the harassment from occurring" and "failing to adequately supervise, control or discipline and/or penalize the conduct, acts or failures to act of its agent or staff." DE 1, ¶¶ 76-77. Count V alleges a claim of "Retaliation" in violation of Title VII and the FCRA for subjecting Plaintiff to "intimidation, harassment, heightened scrutiny and criticism, giving him a Letter of Reprimand, not recommending him for reappointment to his position, all based upon his engaging in the legally protected activity of making a discrimination complaint/grievance." DE 1, ¶ 82. Count VI alleges a claim of "Disparate Treatment" in violation of Title VII and the FCRA for subjecting Plaintiff to disparate treatment by removing him from Lakewood Park Elementary during an investigation. DE 1, ¶ 89.

B. Factual Background¹

This case arises out of Plaintiff's employment by Defendant at the Lakewood Park Elementary from August, 2014 through the spring of 2017. DE 1, ¶ 10. Plaintiff was employed as a "School Assessment Support Clerk." DE 53-1, 3. Plaintiff is an African American male. DE 59, ¶ 39.

In the spring of 2016, Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to a hostile and intimidating workplace. See id. ¶¶ 11-26. Specifically, Plaintiff felt pressured by his principal to fabricate a statement against another employee of the school. DE 1, ¶¶ 11-16. In addition, colleagues used racially charged language towards Plaintiff, see DE 58, ¶ 21, and sent offensive text messages to Plaintiff that included profanity, see id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff felt he was "ignored" by colleagues in responding to an incident when a child attempted to leave school grounds. See id. ¶ 35.

As a result of this perceived hostile work environment, Plaintiff filed a "grievance alleging discrimination in the workplace," DE 59, ¶ 50, and he met with the Director of Human Resources Operations, Rivers Lewis, in October of 2016, see DE 1, ¶ 28. Plaintiff was dissatisfied with Defendant's response to his grievance, and filed a formal Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against Defendant in February, 2017. See id. ¶ 36.

During Lakewood Elementary's spring administration of the Florida Standards Assessment (FSA), Plaintiff was tasked with administering the test to six students. DE 58, ¶ 4.During the administration of the test, Defendant alleges, and Plaintiff disputes, that Plaintiff violated several testing procedures, including use of his laptop, failure to circulate around the room to monitor the student, and providing the wrong test to a student. DE 58, ¶ 4. Defendant conducted an investigation of the alleged violations, and found by a preponderance of the evidence that the violations occurred. See DE 53-16, 2. Defendant's IT Department also subsequently ran an analysis of the websites visited by Plaintiff during the testing period, and found extensive online activity. See 53-16, 29-58. Plaintiff disputes some of the evidence of testing violations and whether his conduct constituted a testing violation. Motion Hearing Tr. 30-33.

Plaintiff was then placed on Temporary Duty Assignment (TDA) on April 17, 2017. DE 59, ¶ 55. On April 26, 2017, Principal Dianne Young also advised Plaintiff that she would not be recommending him for re-appointment to his position for the next school year. DE 59, ¶ 58. Finally, Plaintiff was issued a Letter of Reprimand for his conduct related to the FSA administration, dated April 26, 2017. DE 58, ¶ 7, see also DE 53-4 ("Letter of Reprimand"). Whether or not the conduct detailed in the Letter of Reprimand constituted a testing violation is disputed. DE 59, ¶ 7.

C. Plaintiff Conceded Summary Judgment on Claims I, III, and IV.

At the Motion Hearing on October 9, 2018, Plaintiff conceded summary judgment on three of the counts in the Complaint. Plaintiff conceded summary judgment on Counts III ("Sexual Harassment") and IV ("Hostile Work Environment), because they do not present cognizable claims in the Eleventh Circuit. To begin with, counsel for Plaintiff acknowledged that Count III was based on Plaintiff's sexual orientation. Motion Hearing Tr. 12:23-24 ("MS.MOON: He believes he was sexually harassed as a homosexual male."). Counsel for Plaintiff confirmed that Count IV was based on Plaintiff's sexual orientation as well. Motion Hearing Tr. 16:12-17 ("THE COURT: Are you saying the hostile work environment is based on sexual orientation and sexual orientation only? MS. MOON: Yes, because the use of the racial slur was only one occasion, and so it can't possibly then rise to the level of being severe and pervasive."). Once Plaintiff's counsel established that Counts III and IV were based solely on Plaintiff's sexual orientation, the Court raised the Eleventh Circuit's unpublished opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County Board of Commissioners, in which the court confirmed that there is no cause of action for discrimination based on sexual orientation under Title VII in the Eleventh Circuit. See Motion Hearing Tr. 21:7-21; Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm's., 723 F. App'x 964, 964-65 (citing Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) and Evans v. Ga. Reg'l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 2017)). Plaintiff's counsel did not object that this is the law of the Eleventh Circuit. As a result, Plaintiff's counsel conceded summary judgment on both counts:

THE COURT: So as a matter of law, then, Counts 3 and 4 would not survive.

MS. MOON: That is correct.

Motion Hearing Tr. 22:5-7.

Plaintiff also conceded summary judgment on Count I ("Racial Discrimination"), because the Count was intended to press the Plaintiff's contention that the use of a racial slur by one of Defendant's employees was illegal. At the Motion Hearing, Plaintiff's counsel conceded that the one-time use of a slur was not sufficient to sustain the claim:

THE COURT: [S]o I guess I want to go back to Count 1. . . . It is not a racially hostile work environment claim, so, it is what?

MS. MOON: It is a race discrimination claim based upon the single use of a racial slur.

THE COURT: Okay. But you are conceding that does not give rise to a racially hostile work environment.

MS. MOON: I am. . . .

THE COURT: I'm trying to understand how Count 1 states a cause of action. . . . If it is not a racially hostile work environment, what is Count 1?

MS. MOON: I don't believe that the single use of the racial slur arises to the hostile work environment claim which is why it was made separately. This one was based upon race. . . I don't think Count 1 survives the Court's analysis in any form.

THE COURT: So the Plaintiff would not object to - so, what are you saying with respect to Count 1, it is being -

MS. MOON: I think Count 1 goes the way of Counts 3 and 4 simply because he didn't even hear it himself, which we didn't learn until deposition.

THE COURT: Plaintiff is conceding that the Defendant would prevail on summary judgment as to Count 1, as to Count 3, and as to Count 4?

MS. MOON: Correct, your Honor.

Motion Hearing Tr. 22-24.

As a result of Plaintiff's counsel's concession of summary judgment on Counts I, III, and IV, the remainder of this opinion analyzes only the claims of racial discrimination (Count II), retaliation on the basis of race (Count V), and disparate treatment on the basis of race (Count VI).

D. Additional Procedural Background

The Court notes that the factual record in this case is not a model of clarity. However, the Court will endeavor to elucidate what has transpired in this case.

Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, DE 48, on September 5, 2018. Defendant's Motion improperly incorporated its Statement of Facts into its Motion in violation of Local Rule 56.1. Plaintiff responded on September 19, 2018 at DE 52, and properly filed his Statement of Facts separately at DE 53 on September 20, 2018. Defendan...