Evans v. State

• Court: Indiana Appellate Court
• Writing for the Court: Mathias, Judge.
• Citation: Evans v. State, 171 N.E.3d 630(Table) (Ind. App. 2021)
• Decision Date: 07 May 2021
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-PC-1888
• Parties: Bruce Angelo EVANS, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.

171 N.E.3d 630 (Table)

Bruce Angelo EVANS, Appellant-Petitioner,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.

Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-PC-1888

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

FILED May 7, 2021

Attorneys for Appellant: Amy E. Karozos, Public Defender of Indiana, Kristin M. Eichel, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Jodi K. Stein, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Mathias, Judge.

[1] In 2009, Bruce Evans pleaded guilty in Hendricks Superior Court to Class D felony possession of a controlled substance and admitted to a probation violation. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State dismissed two other Class D felony counts, and the court imposed a minimum 180-day sentence, which was time served. Years later, Evans was subsequently found—in proceedings unrelated to this appeal—to be a habitual offender based in part on the 2009 conviction. In 2018, Evans filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking the 2009 conviction, claiming that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (2) his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The post-conviction court denied the petition.

[2] On appeal, Evans argues that the court clearly erred in denying relief on both claims. Because we conclude Evans has failed to establish that the evidence unmistakably leads to conclusions opposite those reached by the post-conviction court, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On April 23, 2009, Jeremy Wyncoop was driving a "lowered" black Dodge Ram "with chrome rims," and Evans was riding in the passenger seat. Ex. Vol. at 3. Officer Teare, who was driving a police vehicle, saw the truck at an intersection and recognized that it "matched the description of a vehicle in a previous broadcast that dispatch had sent ... approximately 2 weeks prior." Id. The previous broadcast advised law enforcement of "an anonymous tip that [Wyncoop] was dealing marijuana and was known" to drive a black Dodge Ram "that was lowered and had chrome rims." Id. Officer Teare began following the truck.

[4] At 3:26 p.m., after noticing that the truck's "windows were very darkly tinted," Officer Teare initiated a traffic stop. Id. at 3, 45. Wyncoop handed his driver's license to the officer, but he did not have the vehicle's registration with him. At 3:28 p.m., while "writing [Wyncoop] a citation for his window tint and a written warning for failure to carry registration," Officer Teare requested a canine unit. Id. Officer Schaeffer responded to the request, indicating that "he was nearby and would respond to assist." Id. at 3. The officer arrived with his canine at 3:45 p.m. Id. at 45.

[5] In the intervening nineteen minutes—or shortly after Officer Schaeffer arrived—the following events transpired in some order: Officer Teare issued a handwritten citation to Wyncoop for the window-tint violation and a handwritten warning for failure to carry registration in the vehicle; two other officers arrived on scene; law enforcement ordered Wyncoop and Evans to exit the truck, patted the two men down, and had them sit in the grass several feet from the vehicle; one of the officers confiscated a set of keys from Evans's hands and placed the keys on the ground nearby.

[6] Once Officer Schaeffer arrived and deployed the canine, the dog "immediately indicated" on several areas of the truck. Id. at 3. Inside, officers recovered "a purple ‘one hitter’ pipe" from a compartment on the driver's side door, a "glass pipe between the two front seats," and a "purple bong" from the backseat. Id. The dog also alerted on Evans's set of keys, which had a red vial attached to it. One of the officers opened the vial and discovered cocaine inside. Later, at the police department, officers recovered from Evans's boxer shorts a white beanie that was filled with nearly ninety grams of marijuana, a pill bottle containing morphine and clonazepam, a digital scale, and about $400 in cash.

[7] The State charged Evans with Class D felony possession of more than thirty grams of marijuana and two of counts of Class D felony possession of a controlled substance—for the morphine and clonazepam respectively. At the time, Evans was serving probation in two counties for separate, recent felony convictions. The State and Evans's counsel entered into plea negotiations.

[8] At a July 2009 hearing, Evans's counsel rejected the State's plea offer. About a month later, however, Evans pleaded guilty to the Class D felony possession of marijuana charge and admitted to a probation violation. In exchange, the State agreed to a minimum 180-day sentence, which was time served, and dismissed the two remaining felony charges. During the guilty-plea hearing, Evans acknowledged that he understood the agreement, he wanted to plead guilty, and he was satisfied with his attorneys’ representation. See Ex. Vol. at 11–16. The court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Evans accordingly.

[9] Five years later, in 2014, Evans was sentenced to twenty years in the Department of Correction after he was convicted of Class B felony dealing in a narcotic drug and found to be a habitual substance offender.¹ The habitual-offender determination, which required two prior unrelated substance-offense convictions, was based in part on Evans's 2009 conviction.

[10] In 2018, Evans filed a petition for post-conviction relief from the 2009 conviction. In the petition, which was later amended by counsel, Evans raised two claims: (1) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress the evidence seized resulting from the traffic stop; and (2) he did not enter into his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because he did not realize that the evidence should have been suppressed. See Appellant's App. pp. 41–46. The court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition in July 2020. Several witnesses testified, including three of the officers involved in the 2009 traffic stop, Evans's trial counsel,² Wyncoop, and Evans. The post-conviction court subsequently issued an order denying the petition.

[11] Evans now appeals.

Standard or Review

[12] When appealing from the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner proceeds from a negative judgment. See, e.g. , Walker v. State , 903 N.E.2d 1022, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. As such, the petitioner must convince the reviewing court that the evidence unmistakably and unerringly leads to a conclusion opposite the one reached by the post-conviction court. Id. In making this determination, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the post-conviction court's judgment. Shepherd v. State , 924 N.E.2d 1274, 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. When a defendant fails to meet this "rigorous standard of review," we will affirm the court's denial of relief. Id.

[13] The post-conviction court here entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(6). Though we do not defer to the court's legal conclusions, we review the factual findings for clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. State v. Cozart , 897 N.E.2d 478, 482 (Ind. 2008) (quotation omitted). We observe, however, that the post-conviction court here adopted verbatim the State's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law; the court did not alter the State's submission in any way, including an abundance of errors.³

[14] Our supreme court has recognized that the practice of adopting a party's proposed findings and conclusions verbatim helps trial courts deal with "an enormous volume of cases" and "keep the docket moving," and thus declined to prohibit the practice for practical reasons. Prowell v. State , 741 N.E.2d 704, 708–09 (Ind. 2001). But the court also recognized that "when this occurs, there is an inevitable erosion of the confidence of an appellate court that the findings reflect the considered judgment of the trial court." Id. at 709. We therefore "do not encourage trial courts to engage in this practice." Dallas v. Cessna , 968 N.E.2d 291, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Carpenter v. Carpenter , 891 N.E.2d 587, 592 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) ). So, while we must take the findings and conclusions as the post-conviction court's own, we approach them with "cautious appellate scrutiny." Stevens v. State , 770 N.E.2d 739, 762 (Ind. 2002).

Discussion and Decision

[15] Evans contends the post-conviction court clearly erred in denying his claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. His ineffective-assistance claim is premised on trial counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress "the evidence obtained in violation of ... the federal and state constitutions," and he maintains that he "would not have pleaded guilty" because a "suppression motion would have been successful if filed." Appellant's Br. at 21. In this way, both of Evans's claims hinge on a threshold question: whether the post-conviction court clearly erred in concluding that a motion to suppress would not have been successful. We therefore address that issue first and explain why Evans has failed to establish that he is entitled to relief.⁴

I. The post-conviction court did not clearly err in concluding that a suppression motion would not have been successful.

[16] Evans argues that a motion to suppress would have been granted because "the unreasonably prolonged traffic stop" and the "warrantless search of the vial" violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Appellant's Br. at 23. The post-conviction court concluded that a "motion to suppress could not have suppressed literally anything," and "counsel did not file a motion to suppress as it would...