Evans v. State, SC05-1974.
| Citation | 946 So.2d 1 |
| Decision Date | 05 October 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. SC05-632.,No. SC05-1974.,SC05-1974.,SC05-632. |
| Parties | Wydell Jody EVANS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Wydell Jody Evans, Petitioner, v. James R. McDonough, etc., Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
John W. Jennings Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Richard E. Kiley, Assistant CCRC, and James V. Viggiano, Staff Attorney, CCRC, Middle Region, Tampa, FL, for Appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and Barbara C. Davis, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, FL, for Appellee.
Wydell Jody Evans was convicted of first-degree murder and subsequently sentenced to death. He was also convicted of kidnapping and aggravated assault. We affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Evans v. State, 838 So.2d 1090 (Fla.2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 846, 124 S.Ct. 121, 157 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003). Evans now appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion for postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. He also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the circuit court's order and deny the habeas petition.
The following facts are taken from this Court's opinion on direct appeal:
On October 21, 1998, two days after being released from prison, Wydell Evans shot and killed his brother's seventeen-year-old girlfriend, Angel Johnson, during an argument over her alleged unfaithfulness to Evans' brother. At the time of the shooting, Evans was in an automobile with Johnson, Erica Foster, Sammy Hogan, and Lino Odenat. At some point during the argument, Johnson laughed, to which Evans responded, Evans then pulled out a gun and shot Johnson in the chest.
After the shooting, Evans directed Hogan to drive to the home of a man called "Big Dick." As they drove, Evans passed the gun to Odenat and told him to dispose of it. When they arrived at Big Dick's house, Evans left the car and talked to Big Dick. While Evans was talking, Odenat decided to get out of the car and let the others take Johnson to the hospital. As Odenat opened the door and stepped out, Evans told him to get back into the car and Odenat obeyed. Within a few minutes, Evans returned and directed Hogan to drive into a nearby parking lot. There, Evans threatened Foster and Hogan not to tell who shot Johnson or he would kill them and their families. After threatening Foster and Hogan, Evans tried to wipe his fingerprints from inside the car and left with Odenat. Once Evans was out of the car, Foster and Hogan rushed Johnson to the hospital where she later died of her wounds.
At the hospital, Foster and Hogan were questioned by the police, at which time they first told police that a white man driving a cream-colored car shot Johnson over a drug deal. They later changed their story and reluctantly identified Evans as the shooter. The police found Evans at a motel the next morning. He was taken into custody, charged, and after a jury trial, convicted of one count of first-degree premeditated murder, one count of kidnaping and one count of aggravated assault.
During the guilt phase of the trial, the defense's theory was that Evans accidentally shot Johnson while trying to hand the gun to her.1 Odenat's trial testimony supported this. There was also evidence presented at trial that Evans had been drinking at the time of the shooting. Hogan testified that he and Evans had been drinking earlier that day, and Evans testified that he was slightly intoxicated but was aware of his surroundings and had a clear recollection of what took place in the car at the time of the shooting.
During the penalty phase, defense counsel presented no mental health mitigation. Instead, defense counsel called several character witnesses including Evans, his mother, Lily Evans, and his aunt, Sandra Evans.2 These witnesses gave positive accounts of Evans, describing him as a generous man, a good father, a loving and obedient son and grandson, a good friend, and someone who counseled children to stay out of trouble by staying in school. In addition, Lily told the jury that Evans had been an obedient child who was good in school, but that her addiction to crack cocaine had affected his behavior. She also told the jury that Evans had been her inspiration in deciding to stop abusing cocaine. Evans also testified that his mother's addiction adversely affected him.
The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of ten to two. The trial judge followed the jury's recommendation, finding two aggravating circumstances: (1) Evans had been convicted of prior violent felonies; and (2) the crime was committed while Evans was on probation. Evans, 838 So.2d at 1097. Although Evans did not request an instruction on any of the statutory mitigators, the trial court considered each statutory mitigator in its sentencing order and found that none applied. The trial court also found several nonstatutory mitigating circumstances based in part on the character evidence presented during the penalty phase. Evans, 838 So.2d at 1093, 1097.3 In addition to his death sentence, Evans was sentenced to life imprisonment on the kidnapping count and to a concurrent sentence of 108.15 months with a three-year mandatory minimum term on the aggravated assault count. Id. at 1092.
In May 2001, Evans filed his direct appeal, and in November 2002, this Court issued its decision affirming Evans' convictions and sentences. Id. at 1099.4 His convictions and sentences became final in 2003. See Evans v. Florida, 540 U.S. 846, 124 S.Ct. 121, 157 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003) (). On February 26, 2004, Evans filed a rule 3.851 motion for postconviction relief in circuit court raising ten claims, several of which centered upon defense counsel's failure to discover that Evans suffered a closed head injury at age three.5 An evidentiary hearing was held on October 19 and 20, 2004, and December 16, 2004. At the evidentiary hearing, Evans presented the testimony of five lay witnesses—Lily Evans, Sandra Evans, Oren Evans, Margaret O'Shaunessy, and Barbara McFadden; the testimony of three mental health experts—Dr. Richard Carpenter, Dr. Harry A. McClaren, and Dr. Henry Dee; and the testimony of defense counsel, Kenneth Studstill. Evans also testified.
On February 15, 2005, the trial court issued an order denying each of Evans' claims. Evans now appeals this order and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.6
Evans raises three ineffective assistance of counsel claims. First, he claims trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase for failing to investigate, prepare, and present the defense of diminished capacity. Second, Evans claims that trial counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase for failing to adequately challenge the State's case. Specifically, Evans claims (a) counsel was ineffective for failing to request the appointment of co-counsel to assist in investigating and presenting a case in mitigation during the penalty phase; and (b) counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate Evans' background and discover available mental health mitigation.7 Finally, Evans claims counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase for failing to request jury instructions on the statutory mental health mitigators based on evidence that Evans was drinking at the time of the murder.8
Because each of Evans' ineffective assistance claims alleges that counsel failed to investigate and present mental health mitigation, we turn first to the testimony and evidence presented at Evans' evidentiary hearing regarding his mental health at the time of the crime. We then address each of Evans' claims of ineffective assistance. Ultimately, we affirm the trial court's denial of these claims.
At the evidentiary hearing, Evans presented evidence of a troubled childhood. He presented his school and medical records, which demonstrated that he was hit by a car and was diagnosed with a closed head injury at the age of three.9 His mother, Lily, and his aunt, Sandra, witnessed the accident and testified that he stopped breathing for at least a minute after it occurred. They also testified that his speech and language patterns changed, and he began to stutter. In addition, Evans' life at home was difficult. His father died when he was young, and he grew up with a mother who was addicted to crack cocaine and a stepfather who was abusive. As a result of his stuttering and difficulties at home, Evans was frequently picked on and beaten up by neighborhood children. He eventually retaliated and started fighting frequently. Lily testified that his temper "became pretty quick." Evans' brother, Oren, testified that Evans was very aggressive and recalled instances of Evans throwing rocks at a police officer.
Evans' school records showed a history of speech and learning disabilities, as well as escalating behavioral problems due to anger and aggression. In elementary school, Evans was placed in a class for children with learning disabilities and received speech therapy. While Evans' IQ tested in the normal range, disparities between his verbal and performance scores on the test indicated severe learning disabilities. Evans received mostly failing grades. In addition to academic problems, Evans was regularly disciplined for being disruptive and, as he got older, was frequently expelled from school for fighting. Evans' violent behavior escalated from being aggressive with other students to being aggressive with a teacher. He was eventually classified as emotionally handicapped and was recommended for the severely emotionally disturbed program in high school,...
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