Evans v. State of Conn., CV B-90-027(CBM).
| Decision Date | 17 June 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. CV B-90-027(CBM).,CV B-90-027(CBM). |
| Citation | 967 F.Supp. 673 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | Harold F. EVANS, Jr., Plaintiff, v. STATE OF CONNECTICUT, State Police Division of Public Safety & Nicholas Cioffi, Defendants. |
Laviano Law Offices, P.C. by William M. Laviano, Ridgefield, CT, for plaintiff.
Richard Blumenthal, Atty. Gen. of the State of Connecticut by Margaret Quilter Chapple, Asst. Atty. Gen., Stamford, CT, for defendants.
Amended Findings on Liability and Damages
Plaintiff, a former Connecticut State Police Trooper Trainee, brought this employment discrimination action against his employer, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"). This court, after a trial on the merits, rendered a decision on July 11, 1996 finding defendants liable for firing plaintiff because of his race. Evans v. Connecticut, 935 F.Supp. 145 (D.Conn.1996). The court now amends its opinion on liability, which included its findings of facts, to include the fact that Evans graduated 17th out of his Connecticut Police Academy class of 55. (see Transcript Hearing on Damages, dated October 10, 1996, 204).
In accordance with a ruling during trial,1 issues of back pay and reinstatement were considered after the finding of liability. On July 15, 1996, plaintiff moved for a hearing on remedy, limited discovery and designation of an expert to assess back pay damages and the plausibility of reinstatement, which was granted. 168 F.R.D. 118 (D.Conn.1996). The court also ruled that Evans' request, pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 37"), for default judgment and attorney's fees for defendants' failure to produce relevant records throughout this case would be taken up at the damages phase of the case. See, Evans, 935 F.Supp. at 159 n. 23.2 A hearing was set for October 10, 1996.
After the court granted the hearing on damages, both parties submitted a plethora of pleadings and motions alleging that the other was not complying with discovery. On August 20, 1996, defendants requested leave to depose plaintiff and his expert. Defendants also noted that plaintiff had not fully complied with their first set of interrogatories and production requests, dated April 20, 1990. Defendants moved the court to compel plaintiff to supplement his previous responses to the interrogatories and production requests by September 15, 1996. On September 5, 1996, the court granted defendants' request to take the depositions and ordered plaintiff to supplement his response to defendants' requests by September 20, 1996.
On September 23, 1996, by a faxed motion, plaintiff moved to compel defendants to adhere to their noticed deposition dates of Evans and Woundy on September 24, 1996 and September 26, 1996, respectively. Additionally, plaintiff moved the court to order defendants to confirm plaintiff's 30(b)(6) deposition of defendants, noticed for September 30, 1996. In an effort to give defendants an opportunity to respond to plaintiff's motion, the court waited two hours and then, by faxed order, granted plaintiff's motion directing defendants to adhere to the deposition dates.3 Shortly thereafter, defendants faxed a reply to plaintiff's motion and the court's order, asserting that plaintiff had not complied with the court's September 5th Order and that plaintiff had been informed that defendants would not confirm the deposition dates until he supplemented the interrogatories.
Defendants also moved to vacate the court's order arguing that they would be prejudiced if forced to proceed with the deposition without having had an opportunity to review the documents requested from the plaintiff. In opposition to defendants' motion, plaintiff argued and proved that he did not violate the court's order because he had been instructed by the defendants to bring the documents with him to his deposition (see Defendants' Notice of Deposition, dated August 20, 1996), which he was intending to do. During Evans' deposition, plaintiff's counsel called chambers requesting a ruling on Rule 30(c).4 Defendants argued that the rule did not permit plaintiff to raise evidentiary objections but only objections as to form while plaintiff argued otherwise. By faxed order, the court notified the parties that objections to form or substance may be noted although the witness still had to answer and that all objections would be ruled on by the court at a later date.
On September 27, 1996, plaintiff faxed a motion requesting the court to compel defendants to produce a witness with knowledge for the 30(b)(6) deposition, scheduled for September 30, 1996. Plaintiff's counsel alleged that at Evans' and Woundy's depositions, defendants voiced confusion as to the scope of the 30(b)(6) deposition and were informed on both days of what was expected. Plaintiff further alleges that after faxing a follow up letter on September 26, 1996,5 indicating that the scope of the deposition would include assumptions or errors made in Woundy's report and issues concerning state trooper salaries, benefits, pension plans and availability of overtime beginning in 1986 (the year plaintiff was terminated), defendants failed to confirm the production of a witness with knowledge on these matters. Defendants' counsel allegedly asserted that if such a witness could only be found at the state Comptroller's office, he was not required to produce such a witness because the Comptroller's office was a different state agency.
Plaintiff moved the court to preclude defendants from questioning or asserting any factual matters on back pay, reinstatement or front pay if defendants failed to provide a witness with knowledge for the court ordered deposition. In response, defendants stated that they would attend the deposition and produce a witness that could answer questions regarding payroll records, benefits, and other data that were given to plaintiff. Defendants argued, however, that plaintiff was asking the court to order the production of a witness to address purely legal questions on the calculation of back pay, front pay and reinstatement which were to be determined by the court at the hearing. Furthermore, defendants argued that plaintiff sought a witness to address the Woundy report, a subject matter not designated in his notice of deposition.6
On September 30, 1996, following the deposition of defendants' witness, Judith Hess, a payroll supervisor, plaintiff informed the court, by fax, that Hess could not answer questions regarding benefits, the assumptions or errors in Woundy's report, or reinstatement. Plaintiff maintained that he was not asking defendants to calculate back pay but was asking defendants to disclose the state's method in calculating back pay based on it's policies and procedures, including the figures and assumptions involved in it's calculation, which could affect the expert's assumptions made, based on the information or the lack of information provided to him. Plaintiff argued that these issues fell clearly within the scope of discovery in a damages case. (see Transcript of Hess Deposition, dated September 30, 1996, 80-82) (Tr. Dep. Hess). Plaintiff also noted for the record that he would move to preclude any evidence defendants attempted to introduce at the hearing that was not disclosed by Hess during discovery, (Tr. Dep.Hess, 78), and that Woundy would be recalculating his numbers based on the new information disclosed by Hess. (Tr. Dep.Hess, 51).
The night before the hearing, defendants informed plaintiff, by a faxed letter, that Hess would testify at the hearing on Woundy's calculation of income and that Sue Fabian from the Comptroller's Office would testify regarding the state's calculation of pension benefits and the conditions under which an employee was reimbursed for the cost of health benefits. The next day at the hearing, plaintiff moved to preclude any examination or proffering of evidence relating to false assumptions, errors in compensation rates, raises, overtime or pension compensation which were not disclosed to plaintiff at the 30(b)(6) deposition of defendants. (see Plaintiffs Motion in Limine and Transcript of Damages Hearing, dated October 10, 1996, 27-30) ("Tr.").
The court granted the motion and prevented defendants from submitting evidence contrary to the assumptions made in the Woundy report, particularly in regards to overtime (Tr., 51-53, 58-59, 142-144) and pension and benefits (Tr., 150-158). The court pointed out that defendants could not introduce the factors the state would have considered in determining plaintiff's speculated overtime, nor could they now produce a witness from the Comptroller's office to testify on pension and benefits calculations. (Tr., 43-44).
The court also barred defendants from recalling Hess to testify about any information she did not disclose at the 30(b)(6) deposition. (Tr., 238). Plaintiff maintained that when Hess was asked if she knew of benefits, overtime and the figures in Woundy's report she said no. Plaintiff offered the transcript of the deposition into evidence without objection. Plaintiff cited, from the transcript, several examples of Hess' lack of knowledge. (Tr., 214, 220). The following are excerpts from defendants' 30(b)(6) deposition;
Q. So it would be fair to say that, subsequent to the Notice of Deposition and the areas upon which you were to testify, you have done nothing to familiarize yourself or prepare yourself to testify here today?
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay. Are you familiar with the calculation of pension benefits and the awarding of pension benefits to state troopers?
A. No.
Q. Would it be fair to say that you, as opposed to the Controller's Office, are totally unfamiliar with pension plan and pension benefits?
A. Basically, all we do is look for the information as to salaries. We send it over to the controllers and they take...
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