Evans v. E. Tex. Family Med.

Decision Date25 April 2023
Docket NumberCivil Action 6:22-CV-00374-JDK
PartiesCHENETRAL EVANS, Plaintiff, v. EAST TEXAS FAMILY MEDICINE, PA, MD DEAN FRENCH, MD ALLEN MILLS, MD JOHN M. KLIEN, DO SIDNEY CHADWELL, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

JOHN D. LOVE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the court is Defendants Dean French, MD and East Texas Family Medicine, PA's (Defendants) motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 19.) Plaintiff Chenetral Evans has filed a response. (Doc. No. 21.) Upon consideration of the parties' arguments, the court RECOMMENDS that Defendants' motion (Doc No. 19) be DENIED as set forth herein.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants on September 23, 2022. (Doc. No. 1.) Thereafter, on December 5, 2022, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint, alleging claims of race discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C §§ 2000e-(2)(a), -3(a) (Title VII) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Doc. No. 8.) Defendants Dean French, MD, Allen Mills, MD, John M, Klien, MD, and Sidney Chadwell, DO (“Individual Defendants) and East Texas Family Medicine, PA, filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's race discrimination and retaliation claims against East Texas Family Medicine and all claims against the Individual Defendants for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 10, at 2.) The court granted Defendants' motion finding that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for race discrimination and retaliation against East Texas Family Medicine and failed to state a claim for race discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment against the Individual Defendants. (Doc. Nos. 14; 17.) The court also granted Plaintiff's request for leave to file a second amended complaint with respect to all claims except the Title VII claims against the Individual Defendants. Id. On March 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint against East Texas Family Medicine and Dr Dean French, MD,[1] which is the live complaint in this action. (Doc. No. 18.)

Plaintiff's second amended complaint alleges that she is an African American female who was formerly employed by East Texas Family Medicine for eighteen years in various positions ranging from medical assistant to charge nurse under the supervision of Dr. French. Id. at ¶ 7. She maintains that she was terminated for advocating for Black Lives Matter (“BLM”) on her personal social media page outside of work. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9. Plaintiff alleges that after observing her posts concerning BLM, Dr. French asked Plaintiff to refrain from posting about BLM as he was concerned it would offend some of his patients and negatively affect his business. Id. at ¶ 12. Plaintiff contends that Dr. French told her that BLM was stupid and a waste of time, white men were also killed by black police, George Floyd's death was no different, and President Barack Obama ruined America. Id. at ¶ 15. He then informed her that racism did not exist and asked if Plaintiff thought he was racist. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that after this conversation, Dr. French stopped all verbal communication with Plaintiff and communicated via sticky notes or through third persons. Id. at ¶ 16. She further alleges that Dr. French requested she arrive ten minutes before her scheduled shift but did not alter the arrival time of white employees in the same position. Id. at ¶ 13. Plaintiff also asserts that Dr. French scolded her for being four minutes late to work, when he has never reprimanded her for similar behavior in the past and did not reprimand similarly situated white employees for being late. Id. at ¶ 16. Plaintiff maintains that she tried to explain to Dr. French and other supervisors how Dr. French's behavior made her feel, but they declined to do anything about it because Dr. French was in charge. Id. at ¶¶ 18-20. Plaintiff also maintains that Dr. French's behavior caused other employees to ignore her, which made her feel unwelcome in her workplace. Id. at ¶ 18. Plaintiff alleges that after her supervisors refused to stop Dr. French's unfair treatment, she informed Dr. French that she wanted to retire, but he refused to accept her retirement, which forced her to resign. Id. at ¶¶ 20, 25. Plaintiff contends that she was wrongfully terminated because she was an African American woman advocating for BLM. Id. at ¶ 21. She also asserts that white employees who advocated for BLM on and off the job did not experience the same unfair treatment from Dr. French. Id.

Plaintiff brings claims against Defendants for race discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment under Title VII and Section 1981. Id. at ¶ 23. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's race discrimination and retaliation claims against East Texas Family Medicine and all claims against Dr. French. (Doc. No. 19, at 3.) Defendants also request an extension of time to answer Plaintiff's second amended complaint on the remaining claims. Id. at 10. Plaintiff requests leave to amend her complaint if the court finds that she failed to state a claim on any of the challenged claims. (Doc. No. 21, at 3.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim “are viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted.” Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2005); Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009). The court utilizes a “two-pronged approach” in considering a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). First, the court identifies and excludes legal conclusions that “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. Second, the court considers the remaining “well-pleaded factual allegations.” Id. The court must accept as true all facts alleged in a plaintiff's complaint, and the court views the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). A plaintiff's complaint survives a defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if it includes facts sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted).

In other words, the court must consider whether a plaintiff has pleaded “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). [D]etailed factual allegations' are not required. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Nevertheless, a complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.' Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This determination is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.

DISCUSSION
A. Race Discrimination Claim Against East Texas Family Medicine

Defendants contend that Plaintiff's race discrimination claim under Title VII and Section 1981 should be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to allege that East Texas Family Medicine discriminated against her because of her race. (Doc. No. 19, at 4.) Defendants also argue that Plaintiff's associational discrimination claim should be dismissed because she fails to allege that she was terminated because of her own race. Id. at 7.

Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). There are two theories of liability for discrimination under Title VII: disparate impact and disparate treatment. Plaintiff's claims proceed under the disparate treatment theory. (Doc. No. 18, at ¶¶ 13, 20.) To state a claim under the disparate treatment theory, a plaintiff must show that her employer intentionally treated her unfairly because of her race. Frazier v. Garrison I.S.D., 980 F.2d 1514, 1523 (5th Cir. 1993); Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 2019). Thus, Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support a claim that she suffered adverse employment action because of her race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 1981 guarantees that all persons in the United States have the same contractual rights as white citizens. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). The statute only applies to race discrimination and race-based retaliation claims. Bobo v. ITT, Cont'l Baking Co., 662 F.2d 340, 344 (5th Cir. 1981); Foley v. Univ. of Hous. Sys., 355 F.3d 333, 339 (5th Cir. 2003). Like Title VII, to state a claim under Section 1981, the plaintiff must show that she suffered adverse employment action because of her race. LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 448 n.2 (5th Cir. 1996); Thompson v. City of Waco, Tex., 764 F.3d 500, 502-03 (5th Cir. 2014).

The Fifth Circuit has also recognized associational race discrimination claims under Title VII and Section 1981. See Floyd v. Amite Cnty. Sch. Dist., 581 F.3d 244 249 (5th Cir. 2009). Associational race discrimination claims are predicated on an employer's racial animus towards an employee because of her association with persons of a certain race. Id. at 250; see, e.g., Deffenbaugh-Williams v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 588-89, (5th Cir. 1998), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated sub nom. Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 169 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 1999),...

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