Evans v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 08 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. 07-1014.,07-1014.
• Citation: 518 F.3d 1
• Parties: Jimmy EVANS, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Michael A. THOMPSON, Superintendent of MCI Shirley, Respondent, Appellee, United States of America, Intervenor.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

518 F.3d 1

Jimmy EVANS, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Michael A. THOMPSON, Superintendent of MCI Shirley, Respondent, Appellee, United States of America, Intervenor.

No. 07-1014.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard January 8, 2008.

Decided February 8, 2008.

Michael R. Schneider with whom Salsberg & Schneider were on brief for appellant.

John M. Thompson and Thompson & Thompson, P.C., on brief for the Committee for Public Counsel Services, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the Criminal Justice Institute, amici curiae.

Susanne G. Reardon, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Martha Coakley, Attorney General, was on brief for appellee.

Michael A. Rotker, Attorney, Department of Justice, with whom Alice S. Fisher, Assistant Attorney General, was on brief for intervenor.

Before LYNCH, Circuit Judge, SELYA and SILER^*, Senior Circuit Judges.

LYNCH, Circuit Judge.

Jimmy Evans seeks federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his Massachusetts state trial for murder. He also challenges the constitutionality of limitations imposed by § 2254(d)(1), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Evans argues that the revised statute violates Article III, the separation of powers, and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution because it restricts the capacity of federal judges to reach independent decisions and limits the sources of law on which they may rely; he also argues that AEDPA so narrows the availability of habeas relief for state prisoners as to effectively suspend habeas in violation of the Suspension Clause.

Similar constitutional challenges to the AEDPA amendments have been rejected by majority opinions in the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, at times over spirited dissents. Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir.2007), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 508 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 2007); Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865 (4th Cir.1998), abrogated in part by Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir.1996) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). We also reject Evans's constitutional arguments, and we affirm the district court's denial of his habeas petition.

I.

The facts underlying this case have been described at greater length by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC"), Commonwealth v. Evans, 439 Mass. 184, 786 N.E.2d 375, 381 (2003), and the district court, Evans v. Thompson, 465 F.Supp.2d 62, 64-65 (D.Mass.2006), as well as by this court in reviewing a habeas petition brought by Evans's brother and co-defendant, Evans v. Verdini, 466 F.3d 141, 143 (1st Cir.2006). We briefly summarize the facts as described by the SJC. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (in federal habeas proceedings, "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct").

In the early morning of January 25, 1995, Lyle Jackson was shot three times inside a small and crowded fast food restaurant, Walaikum's, in Dorchester, Massachusetts. Petitioner Evans, his brother John, and their friends Robert Brown and Ronald Tinsley had arrived at Walaikum's shortly before the shooting. They had previously been at a nightclub, where John had fired a gun at a group of people in the presence of Jackson and his friend. According to eyewitnesses at Walaikum's, Brown identified Jackson to Evans, who then pulled out a silver handgun with a black handle. Jackson backed away, falling over some tables and chairs and crawling into a corner, where he begged Evans for his life. Evans shot at him multiple times. John, who also had a gun, then fired a shot at Jackson. Evans, John, Brown, and Tinsley fled the scene in a gold Lexus automobile. In the police chase that ensued, two guns were thrown out of the car and were later retrieved by the police. The four men were apprehended after they abandoned the car and tried to flee on foot. Evans, 786 N.E.2d at 381.

Shell casings from both guns were recovered at the crime scene, both inside and outside Walaikum's. There was no gun powder residue on Jackson's clothes, suggesting that he had been shot from a distance of at least three feet. Id. A bloody bullet fragment found inside Walaikum's was linked to the silver-and-black handgun. Id. at 390. The police were unable to identify any fingerprints off either gun. Id. at 381.

Jackson died from his wounds. The four men were indicted and tried together on a theory of murder by joint venture. Evans and his brother John were both found guilty, while Brown and Tinsley were acquitted. Id. at 382. Evans moved for a new trial as well as for funds to conduct post-conviction forensic investigations. His motions were denied, and his appeal of that denial was consolidated with his direct appeal to the SJC. The SJC affirmed his conviction and upheld the denial of his post-conviction motions. Id. at 393. The Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari. Evans v. Massachusetts, 540 U.S. 973, 124 S.Ct. 445, 157 L.Ed.2d 322 (2003).

Evans then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the District of Massachusetts, challenging the constitutionality of § 2254 as amended by AEDPA and asserting, inter alia, that his counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to conduct independent forensic investigations. The district court denied his petition. Evans, 465 F.Supp.2d at 84. After the court granted Evans a certificate of appealability on both issues, he timely appealed.

II.

The statute at issue, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), as amended by AEDPA, provides that:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States....

Petitioner's arguments are based not so much on the statutory text of § 2254(d) as on the Supreme Court's binding interpretation of that text in Williams v. Taylor as to the meaning of three key terms in the statute: "clearly established," "contrary to," and "unreasonable application." As interpreted by the Supreme Court, "clearly established" law refers to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495. A state court decision is "contrary to" that clearly established law if "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Id. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495. A state court decision is an "unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent if it "identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. It is not enough that a state court decision erroneously apply clearly established law; its application must be not only wrong, but unreasonably so. Id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495.

III.

Evans's constitutional arguments fall into three general categories: (1) that by prohibiting the granting of habeas relief unless a state court decision was not merely wrong but was also an "unreasonable application" of federal law, § 2254(d)(1) violates Article III, the separation of powers, and the Supremacy Clause; (2) that by limiting judges to federal law as "clearly established" by the Supreme Court, § 2254(d)(1) unconstitutionally constrains independent judicial decisionmaking, violating Article III and the separation of powers; and (3) that § 2254(d), as amended, so restricts the granting of federal habeas relief for state prisoners as to effectively suspend habeas in violation of the Suspension Clause. We consider each argument in turn, and begin with some fundamental principles about the constitutional structure of our government.

A.

First, the Constitution recognizes that state court judges may interpret the Constitution and binds them to compliance with the Constitution, notwithstanding contrary state law. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."). The U.S. Constitution does not displace state judicial systems, nor does it subject state judicial decisions to direct review by the lower federal courts. Rather, "from the beginning we have had in this country two essentially separate legal systems. Each system proceeds independently of the other with ultimate review in [the Supreme] Court of the federal questions raised in either system." Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970) (emphasis added). Under this dual system, "federal and state `courts [are] equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution.'" Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982) (alteration in original) (quoting Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251, 6 S.Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886)). Congress expects such fealty from the state courts, and the Constitution requires it.

Based on this expectation, Congress did not grant federal question jurisdiction to the lower federal courts for roughly the first century of our country's history, instead counting on the state courts to...