Evans v. Twin Falls County

• Decision Date: 12 June 1990
• Docket Number: No. 17977,17977
• Citation: 796 P.2d 87,118 Idaho 210
• Parties: John W. EVANS, and the Estate of L. Juanita Evans, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TWIN FALLS COUNTY, a governmental entity; Harold Jensen, Gary Kaufman, and Mark E. Stevens, individuals, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 87

796 P.2d 87

118 Idaho 210

John W. EVANS, and the Estate of L. Juanita Evans, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TWIN FALLS COUNTY, a governmental entity; Harold Jensen, Gary Kaufman, and Mark E. Stevens, individuals, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 17977.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

June 12, 1990.

Dissent on Denial of Petition for

Rehearing Sept. 7, 1990.

Lojek & Gabbert, Chartered, Boise, for plaintiffs-appellants. Donald W. Lojek, argued.

Hamlin & Sasser, Boise, for defendants-respondents. David Sasser, argued.

BAKES, Chief Justice.

John and Juanita Evans brought suit against Twin Falls County and several deputy sheriffs alleging, inter alia, claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of their constitutional rights, assault and battery, false arrest and interference with contract. The Evanses' claim of damages was primarily for emotional distress. Subsequently, Juanita Evans died, and the complaint was amended to substitute "the Estate of L. Juanita Evans," ¹ and to allegedly add a wrongful death claim on behalf of Mr. Evans. ² The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to all theories of liability. Plaintiffs appeal.

The summary judgment record, viewed most favorably to the appellants, discloses that on April 15, 1987, six Twin Falls County deputy sheriffs went to the residence of John and Juanita Evans to execute on a writ of execution issued on a judgment which had previously been entered against the Evanses. Apparently six officers were dispatched because of a letter from the attorney levying the writ which was attached to the writ of execution and which warned the officers to expect resistance.

Three of the deputies--Kaufman, Jensen and Stevens--entered the house. The Evanses claim that only Kaufman was invited in, that Jensen and Stevens were asked to leave and that they refused. The Evanses' complaint alleged that the deputies stood in the doorway with their hands on their guns "very much like Gestapo agents," and on one occasion threatened "to arrest" Mr. Evans. Respondents denied these allegations and further submitted the deposition of Elmer Durraud, a farm implement repairman who was present at the scene, who stated that he did not hear any such threats of arrest.

The Evanses advised the deputies that the farm equipment upon which they wished to execute did not belong to the Evanses. Their complaint further stated that the deputies were "rude, loud, vulgar, threatening and unnecessarily demanding," and made the Evanses feel like prisoners in their own home. However, respondents point out that Mr. Evans admitted in his deposition that none of the deputies used profane language or restricted the Evanses from coming and going. Mrs. Evans tried unsuccessfully to contact her attorney by phone on one occasion and on a second attempt to use the phone it was alleged that Deputy Jensen restrained her from doing so by grabbing her arms and twisting them, forcing her downward, knocking the glasses off her face and causing her immense visible pain. Deputy Jensen stated that Mrs. Evans made disparaging remarks to him and she came at him with raised hands trying to strike him, but he warded her off.

The Evanses stated that the officers refused to accept a personal check for the judgment, while the officers stated that it was the policy of the county not to accept personal checks. The Evanses eventually agreed to satisfy the judgment against them with a cashier's check. The officers followed Mrs. Evans to the bank in town where she obtained a cashier's check, gave it to the officers, who thereupon radioed back to the house and told the remaining officers to leave.

The Evanses aver that this incident left Mrs. Evans profoundly shaken, upset, agitated, and deeply embarrassed and disturbed. Two days after the incident she went to see Dr. Carl Bontrager at Magic Valley Memorial Hospital, who prescribed a sedative and diagnosed her condition as "hyperventilation and acute anxiety." Mrs. Evans also saw Dr. James Spafford on September 22, 1987 (about five months after the incident), as she was complaining of back aches and headaches which she believed were related to the alleged altercation with Deputy Jensen. Dr. Spafford's opinion was that she was experiencing an "agitated depressive reaction, capsulitis of the shoulder, and hyperventilation syndrome."

Mr. Evans stated that in the months following the incident Mrs. Evans was a "changed woman," that she cried frequently, talked of the incident constantly, was extremely nervous and depressed, and that the condition persisted up until her death from a heart attack on March 23, 1988 (some eleven months after the incident).

The Evanses filed a complaint against Twin Falls County and the three deputy sheriffs on December 23, 1987, three months before Mrs. Evans' death. The complaint alleged claims for assault and battery, unlawful arrest and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, interference with the work of a contract mechanic, ³ and sought general damages for emotional distress, punitive damages, and special damages for medical expenses and lost mechanic's wages. On July 5, 1988, Mr. Evans filed an amended complaint allegedly adding a count for wrongful death, and asserting that Mrs. Evans' death was due to the incident in the house on April 15, 1987.

On February 15, 1989, District Judge Daniel B. Meehl entered a memorandum opinion granting respondents' motion for summary judgment and dismissing appellants' complaint with prejudice in its entirety. As to Mrs. Evans' assault and battery claims and the consequent physical and emotional injury and pain, the district court ruled that this kind of injury was personal to Mrs. Evans and therefore did not survive her death. Regarding the wrongful death claim, the district court relied upon the medical testimony of both the treating and examining doctors who found no connection between the death of Mrs. Evans and the incidents on April 15, 1987. The district court dismissed the affidavit testimony by Mr. Evans, who claimed there was a causal connection between these events, as "inadmissible evidence" because it was "not valid medical testimony."

The district court also ruled that the Evanses' claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, interference with contract and assault and battery were barred under I.C. § 6-904, and further held that there was no factual support for a claim for false arrest or false imprisonment at any rate.

As to the constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court found that "Mr. Evans has not stated any actions taken by the deputies that may have violated his constitutional rights." This was based upon Mr. Evans' deposition which admitted that none of the deputies had physically restricted Mr. Evans' free movement or his coming or going; that none of the deputies had told him that he could not leave the house. The trial court further observed that, even if Mr. Evans' complaint could be construed as containing a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, it failed under the decision in Gill v. Brown, 107 Idaho 1137, 695 P.2d 1276 (Ct.App.1985), because there was no physical contact or injury to Mr. Evans. Likewise, the district court found that the record did not support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress based on Davis v. Gage, 106 Idaho 735, 682 P.2d 1282 (Ct.App.1984). As to Mrs. Evans' claim of a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court ruled that the incidents of April 15th do not "shock the conscience of the court," and therefore the constitutional threshold had not been met by the plaintiffs. We will analyze these various claims separately.

I THE WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIM

Assuming that Mr. Evans' complaint alleges a wrongful death claim, we first address the issue of whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the deputies on any alleged wrongful death claim. Mr. Evans contends that the alleged grabbing and shaking of Mrs. Evans on April 15, 1987, had an ongoing deleterious effect that resulted in her ultimate death from cardiac arrest on March 23, 1988. The district court held that the alleged incidents of April 15, 1987, were not the proximate cause of Mrs. Evans' death, relying on the testimony of Dr. Stott, an expert in cardiovascular disease, and the testimony of Drs. Bontrager and Spafford, who had both examined and treated Mrs. Evans. In Dr. Stott's opinion there was "no causal relationship whatsoever between any of the events that had occurred at the Evans home on April 15, 1987, and Mrs. Evans' death as a result of cardiac arrest on March 23, 1988." The treating physicians agreed. The district court also ruled that the Evanses produced no admissible evidence as to causation, the only evidence being the affidavit of Mr. Evans in which he states his belief that his wife's death was proximately caused by the incidents of April 15th. The district court characterized the affidavit as "not valid medical testimony." We agree with the district court.

Under Rule 56(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the affidavits supporting and opposing summary judgment "shall be made on personal knowledge, and shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence...." The district court held that Mr. Evans's affidavit containing his lay opinion that the events on April 15, 1987, caused Mrs. Evans' death eleven months later was not admissible evidence.

Under the Idaho Rules of Evidence Rules 701 and 702, and the decisions of this Court, the trial court has discretion in determining whether to allow a lay witness to express an opinion relating to causation.

The relevant Idaho Rules of Evidence are:

Rule 701. Opinion testimony by lay witness.--If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear...