Evans v. United States

• Decision Date: 22 October 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11-676L,No. 10-536L,10-536L,11-676L
• Parties: DELARICK EVANS, In Re The Estate of Lorraine Ruth Williams also known as ESTATE of LORRAINE RUTH WILLIAMS; DELARICK EVANS, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Claims Court

DELARICK EVANS, In Re The Estate of Lorraine Ruth Williams also knownas ESTATE of LORRAINE RUTH WILLIAMS; DELARICK EVANS, Plaintiff,

v.UNITED STATES, Defendant.

No. 10-536L

No. 11-676L

United States Court of Federal Claims

Filed: October 22, 2012

Pro Se Plaintiff; Motion to

Dismiss; Lack of Subject-

Matter Jurisdiction; Failure to

State a Claim; Statute of

Limitations; Declaratory

Judgment.

Delarick Evans, Lansing, Kansas, pro se.

Daniel G. Steele, Department of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources Division, Natural Resources Section, Washington, D.C., for the defendant. With him were Ignacia S. Moreno, Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice. Roger L. Hudson, Attorney Advisor, United States Department of the Interior, Alaska Regional Office, Anchorage, Alaska, of counsel.

OPINION

HORN, J.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Before the court are two consolidated suits, originally filed separately, by the same pro se plaintiff, Delarick Evans, in the United States Court of Federal Claims.¹ In both cases currently before this court, plaintiff asserts that he failed to inherit trust, land, and stock upon the death of his biological mother, an Alaska Native.²

The complaints currently before this court indicate that plaintiff was born to Lorraine Ruth Williams, an Alaska Native, on September 30, 1975, and was adopted by another family on February 24, 1981. On December 31, 1981, plaintiff's biological mother was listed on the roll of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971(ANCSA), Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629h). According to several exhibits accompanying plaintiff's complaints, including a Certificate of Death, plaintiff's biological mother was murdered in the State of Washington in 1984. Plaintiff filed several other documents with this court, including documents alleged to be from the United States Department of the Interior and a Native American tribal association. The documents include a 1975 letter to Ms. Williams from the Department of the Interior advising her that she is enrolled in Doyon Limited, but may seek enrollment in a newly established Thirteenth Region for non-resident Alaska Natives, a letter to plaintiff declaring his membership in the Nenana Native Council, a letter from the Tanana Chiefs Conference to plaintiff stating that Ms. Williams was enrolled in the Thirteenth Regional Corporation, although her shares could not be located, and an undated, incomplete stock certificate issued to plaintiff's mother, Ms. Williams by an unnamed source.

Plaintiff's complaint in Case No. 10-536L, which he titled an Application for Heirship, is very short, barely over one page long, and is comprised of only eight paragraphs, including the following factual information:

In December 31, 1981, the deceased was added to the roll under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. (In support and incorporated herein is movant's Certificate of Indian Blood (Descendant) identified as exhibit "1".

In 1984, while in the State of Washington, in Snohomish - County, the biological mother of movant was murdered. (See in support and incorporated herein as exhibits [sic] "2", five (5) pages, of Arlington Times).

Movant assert [sic] respectfully that he is 1/4 or more Eskimo-Indian under the definitions of federal law. 43 USC 1602. (In support to show heirship to the deceased is a copy of original birth certificate identified as 115-75-26525. It is identified as exhibit "3".)

Petitioner also shows the court a lawfull [sic] decress [sic] of adoption within The County of Wyandotte, Kansas. The case identified as 80 A 0168. A copy is attached and incorporated herein identified as exhibit "4".

In Case No. 10-536L, plaintiff seeks "an order of decree allowing any interest of trust and land of deceased to be passed to her biological child (son) who is half-blood [Eskimo Indian] under federal law(s)." Defendant responds by filing a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, asserting that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in Case No. 10-536L because plaintiff seeks only declaratory relief.

Plaintiff's complaint in Case No. 11-676L is somewhat longer than the complaint he filed in Case No. 10-536L, although no more clear regarding the nature of his claims. In Case No. 11-676L, plaintiff states, "Delarick Evans, is a federally recognized Native,by the Bureau of Indian Affairs," and, "[y]our applicant received a copy from BIA [Bureau of Indian Affairs], (Alaska Region), signed by, Donna Carroll, dated 07/12/11, his Certificate of - Indian Blood (Descendant)." According to plaintiff:

Pursuant to, 43 U.S.C. 1604(b)(1)(2)(3)(4), your applicant's natural mother was on the roll prepared by the Secretary, and enrolled according to their [sic] region, village, or other place she resided on the date of the 1970 census enumeration. As your applicant's exhibit "D" reveal [sic], your applicant's biological mother was enrolled in, Doyon, Limited.

Plaintiff also contends that:

Contrary to, 43 U.S.C.S. 1604(c), your applicant was not afforded his right (or privilege), because he was not enrolled-in enrolled in [sic], Doyon, Limited, in accordance with the election of his biological mother, Lorraine Ruth Williams. (Exhibit D). At the time your applicant's mother [sic] election was honored by the Secretary, all dependants [sic] members of her household who are less [sic] eighteen years of age.

Plaintiff further argues that:

From the time your applicant's mother, Lorraine Ruth-Williams, was put on the roll as prepared by the Secretary, in accordance with, 43 U.S.C.S. 1604(b)(1)(2)(3)(4), your applicant, has not been provided his stock certificate - in accordance with, 43 U.S.C.S. 1606(g)(B)(i)(I). As pointed out in exhibit "H" and "I", your applicant was still a member of, Lorraine Ruth Williams' household until, August 3, 1976. Since your applicant was under eighteen and a member of her household in accordance with 43 U.S.C.S. 1604(c), he was, and still is, entitled to a stock certificate, from, Doyon, Limited.

Finally, plaintiff maintains that "[p]ursuant to, 43 U.S.C.S. 1606(i)(j)(m), your applicant is entitled to receive shares and interest from the revenues, net-income from the date entitled, until the present date. See also, 43 U.S.C. 1606(h)(i)(ii)(iii). [sic]"

As stated by plaintiff, he seeks:

(1) $3,000,000.00 (Three Million Dollars) from the Judgment Fund, 25 U.S.C.S. 1401 through 1407, plus interest.

(2) Equal-share distribution of stock authorized by the, Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act [ANCSA], 43 U.S.C.S. 1601 et. seq.,

(3) All records/files of the BIA, be corrected and reflect such information/data, as intented [sic] by U.S. Congress, Plaintiff enrolled in Doyon.

(4) Plaintiff be afforded all trust responsibility by the Secretary of the Interior, as authorized in 25 U.S.C.S. 162a(d).

(5) All further relief, from trust of defendant, pursuant to, 25 USCS 406, 25 USCS 407, and 25 USCS 466: $ 3,000,000.00.

Defendant filed an answer to plaintiff's complaint in Case No. 11-676L, and raises three affirmative defenses: that plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, that plaintiff's claims are barred for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and that plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

In both of the above captioned, consolidated cases, plaintiff filed Motions for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. The Judge originally assigned to Case No. 10-536L, granted plaintiff's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, prior to transferring that case to the undersigned Judge. In Case No. 11-676L, the court grants plaintiff's motion for the purposes of the case.

DISCUSSION

When determining whether a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff is sufficient to invoke review by a court, pro se plaintiffs are entitled to liberal construction of their pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (requiring that allegations contained in a pro se complaint be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"), reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977). "However, '"[t]here is no duty on the part of the trial court to create a claim which [the plaintiff] has not spelled out in his [or her] pleading."'" Lengen v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 317, 328 (2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Scogin v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 285, 293 (1995) (quoting Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))); see also Bussie v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 89, 94, aff'd, 443 F. App'x 542 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 249, 253 (2007). "While a pro se plaintiff is held to a less stringent standard than that of a plaintiff represented by an attorney, the pro se plaintiff, nevertheless, bears the burden of establishing the Court's jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." Riles v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. at 9 and Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("Plaintiff bears the burden of showing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence."), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2002)).

It is well established that "'subject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court's power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.'" Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)). "[F]ederal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to press." Hendersonex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011); see also Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1193...