Evans v. Yankeetown Dock Corp.
| Decision Date | 29 July 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-584A132,4-584A132 |
| Citation | 481 N.E.2d 121 |
| Parties | Marie EVANS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Oscar Evans, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. YANKEETOWN DOCK CORPORATION, Appellee (Defendant Below). |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Rodney H. Grove, Evansville, for appellant.
Gaylon L. Clark, Richard A. Clark, Clark, Statham, McCray, Thomas, & Krohn, Evansville, for appellee.
Marie Evans is the widow of Oscar Evans, a former employee of Yankeetown Dock Corp. (Yankeetown). In her capacity as personal representative of her husband's estate, she brought a wrongful death action against Yankeetown, alleging its negligence--by knowingly employing a mentally ill person who posed a physical threat to fellow employees--was the proximate cause of Oscar's death on Yankeetown's premises where he was fatally shot by such mentally ill co-worker. Yankeetown raised as a defense that Evans's claim was actionable only under the workers' compensation statutes, thereby leaving the trial court without jurisdiction. The trial court agreed and granted Yankeetown's motion for summary judgment based on said defense. We too agree and affirm.
Does the Industrial Board, by reason of Indiana's workers' compensation laws, have exclusive jurisdiction over negligence claims against an employer for the wrongful death of an employee? 1
On June 1, 1977, Harlan Miller shot and killed his co-worker, Oscar Evans, on Yankeetown's premises, just before Oscar was to begin his shift. Psychiatric examinations revealed Miller was suffering a form of alcohol-induced paranoia and, prior to the shooting, was under the hallucinatory delusion that his second wife was in cahoots with Oscar in a scheme to kill him by poisoning. Miller is currently confined in Evansville State Hospital.
Record, p. 19. Evans's prayer for relief requested $1,000,000 in damages.
Yankeetown answered in general denial and later filed a defense, essentially alleging the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over this complaint as it was a workers' compensation claim. Yankeetown then moved for summary judgment on this defense, and there ensued a flurry of affidavits from both sides in support of and in opposition to the motion. Most pertinent to the issue here, Evans presented affidavits that contained the following assertions of Yankeetown's negligence:
1) A dock superintendent knew that Miller had made threats to harm Oscar (Record, p. 207);
2) That same superintendent declared to Oscar's son that "maybe I should have done something to prevent it." (Record, p. 207);
3) Miller's absences from work for personal business and illness increased in the five months immediately preceding the fatal shooting (Record, pp. 151-153);
4) A co-worker had heard that Miller and Oscar had "had trouble in the shower room." (Record, p. 90).
The second summary judgment, finally granted by the court and the object of the appeal here, reads:
"The defendant, Yankeetown Dock Corporation, having filed its motion for summary judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 56 and the Court having considered the pleadings herein, the interrogatories and answers thereto and the affidavits filed herein, and having heard argument by the respective parties herein, now finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact herein as to the defendant, Yankeetown Dock Corporation, and that said defendant, Yankeetown Dock Corporation is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Court finds that on June 1, 1977, Oscar Evans, plaintiff's decedent, and Harlan Miller, were co-employees of the defendant, Yankeetown Dock Corporation, being employed at the Yankeetown Dock facility at Yankeetown, Warrick County, Indiana. That on said date, Oscar Evans was shot and killed by Harlan Miller and that the death of Oscar Evans was the result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment by Yankeetown Dock Corporation.
Based on the above and foregoing, the Court finds that the shooting and resulting death of Oscar Evans on June 1, 1977 was an accident which arose out of and in the course of Oscar Evans employment by Yankeetown Dock Corporation and that the sole and exclusive remedy therefor against Yankeetown Dock Corporation is under and pursuant to the Workmen's Compensation Laws of the State of Indiana pursuant to Indiana Code Section 22-3-2-6.
The Court finds that the motion for summary judgment on behalf of Yankeetown Dock Corporation should be and the same is hereby sustained as to all issues in plaintiff's complaint inasmuch as there is no genuine issue as to said defendant as to any material fact.
The Court further finds that there is no just reason for delay and now in writing, expressly directs entry of a final judgment in this cause in favor of Yankeetown Dock Corporation and against the plaintiff, Marie E. Evans, Personal Representative of the Estate of Oscar Evans.
It is, therefore, now ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court that the motion of the defendant, Yankeetown Dock Corporation, for summary judgment in this cause be and is hereby sustained and that a final judgment in this cause be and is hereby entered in favor of the defendant, Yankeetown Dock Corporation, and against the plaintiff, Marie E. Evans, Personal Representative of the Estate of Oscar Evans, and that the costs of this matter be assessed against the plaintiff."
Record, pp. 212-13 (Emphasis added).
Marsym Development Corp. v. Winchester Economic Development Commission (1983), Ind.App., 447 N.E.2d 1138, 1141-42; McEntire v. Indiana National Bank (1984), Ind.App., 471 N.E.2d 1216. Our review of the proceedings clearly shows there is no genuine issue as to any fact material to the question raised, and Yankeetown was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
It is apparent from the trial court's judgment that at the hub of its findings and conclusions is a jurisdictional issue. It is also apparent that the trial court's proper conclusion--that it had no jurisdiction over Evans's complaint--was based in part upon improper considerations (as we will discuss later). However, findings of fact are inappropriate in summary judgment because one of the basic elements of such judgment is that there is no genuine issue of material fact present in the case. See Bond v. Peabody Coal Co. (1983), Ind.App., 450 N.E.2d 542; Uhl v. Liter's Quarry of Indiana, Inc. (1979), 179 Ind.App. 178, 384 N.E.2d 1099. Therefore, we may ignore the extraneous findings upon which the trial court based its judgment and address ourselves to the sole problem at issue--jurisdiction. See Havert v. Caldwell (1983), Ind., 452 N.E.2d 154.
Here, Evans's theory of recovery, as pleaded and as argued on appeal, is based upon a claim of negligence, that but for Yankeetown's negligence Harlan Miller (an employee) would not have been on its business premises nor then have shot and killed Evans's husband (a co-employee). In so arguing, Evans also asserts Oscar's death was not an "accident," and did not arise out of or in the course of his employment. Therefore, she argues she has a common law rather than a workers' compensation remedy because the Industrial Board must necessarily deny her claim. Yankeetown, in its defense, contends Oscar's death was an "accident" within the Board's jurisdiction statute and arose out of and in the course of his employment and is perforce within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial Board. We agree with Yankeetown that Evans's claim was cognizable only under workers' compensation laws, but we reach that conclusion in a far different manner than the parties have argued. 2
The statute defining the exclusive jurisdiction of the application of workers' compensation laws is I.C. 22-3-2-6 (1976):
"The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee subject to this act on account of personal injury or death by accident shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representatives, dependents or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury or death."
(Amended 1982 Ind.Acts, P.L. 21 Sec. 50). Assuming for the moment a point which is not challenged here, that an employer and an employee are subject to workers' compensation statutes, the clear wording of I.C. 22-3-2-6 gives to the Industrial Board jurisdiction over, and preempts trial court consideration of, "personal injury or death by accident" when such employee seeks a remedy against such employer. That is it; that is the sole threshold consideration for the Industrial Board's jurisdiction. There is no other qualifying language, as is found in the actual compensation statute, IND.CODE 22-3-2-2 (1976) (amended 1981 Ind.Acts, P.L. 11 Sec. 125), where an...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Fields v. Cummins Employees Federal Credit Union
...Id. at 593-94, 380 N.E.2d at 1265.2 We note the Eddy decision relied in part on this court's decision in Evans v. Yankeetown Dock Corp. (1985), Ind.App., 481 N.E.2d 121, which was later vacated by our supreme court. Evans, 491 N.E.2d 969. At the time of the Eddy decision, Hansen, supra had ......
-
Evans v. Yankeetown Dock Corp.
...This case is presented on appellant's Petition to Transfer. The petition is granted. The opinion of the Court of Appeals reported at 481 N.E.2d 121, is The parties' briefs accepted the following underlying facts. Oscar Evans and Harlan Miller were both employees of Yankeetown Dock Corporati......
-
Haddon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 890501
...tort claim against their employers. National Can Corp. v. Jovanovich, 503 N.E.2d 1224 (Ind.Ct.App.1987); Evans v. Yankeetown Dock Corp., 481 N.E.2d 121 (Ind.Ct.App.1985), vacated, 491 N.E.2d 969 (Ind.1986). Furthermore, Haddon suggests that we should adopt her construction of the Act as a m......
-
Ski World, Inc. v. Fife
...matter jurisdictional test utilized prior to the Fourth District's recent decision in Evans v. Yankeetown Dock Corporation (1985), Ind.App., 481 N.E.2d 121 (Judge Conover concurring in result only). The jurisdictional test utilized prior to Evans, though never specifically articulated, was ......