Evans v. York

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Bennick
• Citation: Evans v. York, 216 S.W.2d 124 (Mo. App. 1948)
• Decision Date: 21 December 1948
• Docket Number: No. 27454.,27454.
• Parties: EVANS v. YORK.

216 S.W.2d 124

EVANS v. YORK.

No. 27454.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

December 21, 1948.

Rehearing Denied January 21, 1949.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; David J. Murphy, Judge.

"Not to be reported in State Reports."

Claim by Anne M. Evans against Ben F. York, administrator c. t. a. of the estate of William M. Valentin, deceased. From a judgment for defendant, the plaintiff appeals and the respondent moves to dismiss the appeal.

Motion to dismiss overruled and judgment affirmed.

Anne M. Evans, of St. Louis, pro se.

G. L. Seegers, of St. Louis, for respondent.

BENNICK, Commissioner.

This is a proceeding originating in the Probate Court of the City of St. Louis upon a demand presented by Anne M. Evans, an attorney, against the estate of one William M. Valentin, an insane person. The demand was based upon an account for the value of legal services allegedly rendered by Miss Evans to Valentin over the period from April 1, 1944, to October 1, 1944, together with numerous items of expense allegedly incurred by Miss Evans in connection with her performance of such services. The total account upon which the demand was originally based showed debits of $1,808.43, from which there was deducted a credit of $500, leaving a balance allegedly due Miss Evans of $1,308.43.

Following the disallowance of her claim in the probate court, Miss Evans appealed to the circuit court, wherein she recovered a judgment for the full amount of $1,308.43. Defendant, Ben F. York, the guardian of Valentin's person and estate, thereupon appealed to this court, where the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded upon the ground that an indeterminate portion of the amount of the judgment represented a recovery for services rendered and expenses incurred after the appointment of the guardian on June 21, 1944. It was pointed out in the opinion that the statutory provision for the probate court's allowance of demands against the estate of a person adjudged to be insane and under guardianship is confined to demands accruing before the granting of letters of guardianship (Sec. 471, R.S.Mo.1939, Mo. R.S.A. § 471), and that disputed claims accruing after guardianship must be heard and determined, not in the probate court, but in a court of competent jurisdiction, with a copy of any judgment exhibited to the probate court for payment out of the insane person's estate. Such decision on the prior appeal, which contains a full statement of the facts of the case, is reported as Evans v. York, Mo.App., 195 S. W.2d 902.

During the pendency of the prior appeal in this court, and before submission of the case, there was a suggestion of Valentin's death, whereupon it was ordered by the court that Ben F. York, administrator cumtestamento annexo of Valentin's estate, be substituted as defendant in the place of Ben F. York, the guardian of Valentin's person and estate.

Upon the retrial of the case in the circuit court, Miss Evans apparently reduced her claim to the sum of $1,163 as comprising the aggregate of those items of her account accruing before the time of the appointment of the guardian.

It will be recalled from the prior opinion that Miss Evans based her right to represent Valentin upon a power of attorney purportedly executed by Valentin on April 11, 1944, four days after the filing of an information in the probate court charging that he was a person of unsound mind and incapable of managing his own affairs.

About a month previously Valentin had been received as a patient at McMillan Hospital, a clinic operated by the Washington University Medical School in connection with the Barnes Hospital group, and on March 28th had been discharged in the care of his relatives and placed in a private nursing home upon the recommendation of the hospital staff that his condition was such as to render him incapable of caring for either himself or his affairs, and that a proceeding should be instituted for the appointment of a legal guardian. Thereafter Miss Evans, taking advantage of a favorable opportunity, had removed him from the home without the consent and against the will of either his relatives or the management of the home, and after having had him examined by Dr. Francis M. Barnes, who had pronounced him legally capable of handling his affairs, had forthwith taken him before a notary public and had held and guided his hand while he purported to affix his signature to a power of attorney already prepared by Miss Evans, which, on its face, constituted and appointed her as his attorney to represent him in all his personal and business affairs of practically every kind and character.

While there were no formal pleadings in the case, the record indicates that the defense was based primarily on the ground that at the time of his purported execution of the power of attorney, Valentin was of unsound mind and incapable of making a contract or of understanding and comprehending the nature and quality of his act in permitting his signature to be affixed to the power of attorney.

Other defenses were that Valentin's signature to the power of attorney, considering the circumstances under which it was placed upon the document, was in reality the act of Miss Evans herself and not the act of Valentin; that everything done by Miss Evans in the way of the rendition of services was done in her own personal interest and not in the interest of Valentin; and that whatever services she rendered were not beneficial to Valentin, and were of no value to him.

Tried to a jury, a verdict was returned finding the issues in favor of defendant. Judgment was thereupon rendered in conformity with the verdict; and following an unavailing motion for a new trial, Miss Evans gave notice of appeal, and by subsequent steps has caused the case to be transferred to this court for our review.

For her first and principal point Miss Evans challenges the propriety of certain instructions which were given at the instance and request of defendant, her objection being that they erroneously submitted the question of whether Valentin had possessed sufficient mental capacity to bind himself by the power of attorney upon which she relied for her employment. While she purports to complain of some seven separate...