Evanston Hosp. v. Crane
| Decision Date | 27 August 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-89-3139,1-89-3139 |
| Citation | 193 Ill.Dec. 870,254 Ill.App.3d 435,627 N.E.2d 29 |
| Parties | , 193 Ill.Dec. 870 EVANSTON HOSPITAL and Unknown Counterdefendants, Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Appellees, v. Arnold L. CRANE, Defendant-Counterplaintiff-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Arnold L. Crane, pro se.
Alan J. Schumacher, Pretzel & Stouffer, Chtd., Chicago (Robert Marc Chemers, James A. Knox, Jr., of counsel), for plaintiffs.
Plaintiff, Evanston Hospital, commenced this action to collect a medical bill from defendant, Arnold Crane. Crane filed a counterclaim alleging medical malpractice and consumer fraud on the part of Evanston Hospital. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the hospital as to the medical malpractice count and dismissed the consumer fraud count for failure to state a cause of action. Crane brings this pro se appeal from these rulings.
The relevant facts are as follows. On February 14, 1985, Evanston Hospital filed suit against Crane to collect a debt in the amount of $1,373.13 for hospital and medical services provided to Crane from September 10 to September 23, 1983. On March 14, 1985, Crane, appearing pro se, filed an answer and counterclaim alleging medical malpractice and consumer fraud.
On September 19, 1986, Crane filed a third amended counterclaim. In Count I, Crane alleged that he had been admitted to the hospital's emergency room on September 10, 1983 with abdominal cramps, recurring diarrhea stemming from Crohn's disease, shortness of breath, chest pains, and a urinary tract infection. Crane had previously undergone a triple coronary bypass and suffered from insulin-dependent diabetes. Crane claimed that Evanston Hospital failed to:
1. carefully monitor his condition and the medical care he was receiving to determine whether his extended hospital stay was necessary;
2. immediately investigate, properly diagnose and inform him of his condition, and properly treat his condition by, among other things, referring him to a cardiologist for treatment of his heart condition and breathing problems;
3. give him medical advice and medical treatment to alleviate his abnormal breathing and shortness of breath even though he "vociferously complained" to nurses, doctors, and other hospital employees;
4. properly treat his Crohn's disease by proper administration of Questran and a "Precision Isotonic Diet";
5. notify the gastroenterologist that the "Precision Isotonic Diet" was causing him to have acute diarrhea;
6. follow "explicit orders" regarding the timing and frequency of his meals;
7. prescribe any medication for his diarrhea, cramping, and intestinal discomfort;
8. properly treat an oral fungus infection, by proper administration of Mycostatin;
9. inform him that his condition relating to Crohn's disease was deteriorating, that an operation might be necessary to alleviate such condition, and that vitamin supplements were necessary to maintain reasonable health; and
10. inform him of the effects of discontinuing insulin injections and of exercise on his body.
In addition, Crane alleged that Evanston Hospital wrongfully:
1. served him a meal of baked chicken with unremoved skin--a dish that was "extremely high in cholesterol";
2. failed to inform him of the foods to avoid to prevent Crohn's disease "flare-ups";
3. forced him to use the same container twice for his bowel movement samples and failed to remove the container promptly, such that he had to use another bathroom 4. woke Crane up with radio music at 3:00 a.m.;
5. charged too much for various medications;
6. assigned nurses to Crane who complained about Evanston Hospital and its doctors; and
7. failed to offer him a facility for registering his complaints.
In Count II of his counterclaim, Crane alleged that Evanston Hospital intentionally made false statements in various published newsletters regarding its commitment to quality medical care. Crane alleged that these statements were untrue and were made for the purpose of inducing him to be treated at Evanston Hospital, to his detriment.
On June 12, 1989, Evanston Hospital filed a motion for summary judgment as to count I of Crane's third amended counterclaim. The affidavit of Dr. Richard C. Stalzer was submitted in support of the motion. Dr. Stalzer graduated from Loyola University Medical School in 1960 and thereafter completed a Mayo Clinic fellowship. He had served as a senior attending physician at Evanston Hospital since 1966 and as Chief of its General Internal Medicine department since 1987. Dr. Stalzer was board certified in internal medicine and was an assistant professor of clinical medicine at Northwestern Medical School.
Dr. Stalzer had reviewed Crane's complete medical chart and the allegations of Crane's counterclaim. Dr. Stalzer determined that at the time of Crane's admission to Evanston Hospital, he was suffering from acute exacerbation of Crohn's disease, anemia, acute renal insufficiency, and a urinary tract infection. He was aware that Crane had previously undergone a coronary artery bypass and a partial bowel resection several years before, and that he suffered from insulin-dependent diabetes since his bypass procedure. Dr. Stalzer also was aware that Crane had come to the hospital's emergency room with complaints of weakness, shortness of breath, malaise and chest pain, and that he had been admitted to the hospital under the care of Dr. Kim Meyers.
Dr. Stalzer stated his opinion that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the care rendered to Crane at Evanston Hospital by the physicians, nurses, and other hospital staff was consistent with, and not a deviation from, the applicable standard of care. He concluded that all of Crane's medical conditions were appropriately recognized, evaluated and treated. In a letter attached to the affidavit, Dr. Stalzer stated:
Crane did not file an expert counteraffidavit in response to Evanston Hospital's motion. Instead, he submitted his own affidavit, which restated the allegations of his counterclaim. He also filed a "motion to dismiss" Evanston Hospital's motion for summary judgment. Crane asserted that he did not need expert testimony to overcome summary judgment because the hospital's negligent acts were within the common knowledge of laymen. Crane filed a motion to strike Dr. Stalzer's affidavit on the ground that Dr. Stalzer had failed to state facts supporting his conclusion that Evanston Hospital had not been negligent.
On August 18, 1989, the trial court granted Evanston Hospital's motion for summary judgment as to count I of the third amended counterclaim because Crane had failed to submit any expert medical opinion in support of his claim. The court held that the hospital was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of Dr. Stalzer's affidavit.
On September 5, 1989, Crane moved to vacate the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Crane contended that Evanston Hospital had wrongfully failed to produce its bylaws and other documents in response to a production request Crane had filed on November 6, 1987, and that the bylaws and other requested documents would have established Evanston Hospital's standard of care. In an agreed order, Evanston Hospital had been granted until April 30, 1988 to respond to Crane's discovery requests. Evanston Hospital did not comply with that order. Crane did not file a motion to compel or otherwise bring Evanston Hospital's failure to respond to the attention of the trial court prior to the summary judgment hearing. Subsequently, on September 12, 1989, Crane filed a request to compel the production of documents by Evanston Hospital. In response, by a letter dated September 26, 1989, the hospital offered to produce the requested documents, and asked Crane to advise as to copying arrangements. Crane failed to respond to the letter. On October 23, 1989, the trial court denied Crane's motion to vacate.
On July 14, 1989, Crane had filed a fourth amended counterclaim. Count I sounded in negligence and was identical to count I of the third amended counterclaim, as to which the court had entered summary judgment. In count II, Crane alleged that Evanston Hospital was liable to him under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 121 1/2, par. 261 et seq.) Crane alleged that a footnote contained in "Prime Time," a medical newsletter issued by the hospital, was deceptive in that he did not in fact receive assistance from Evanston Hospital in the manner described in the footnote.
In addition, Crane alleged that Evanston Hospital's "Patient Guide" was deceptive in stating that the hospital was committed to high-quality patient care, when he did not receive such care. Furthermore, Crane alleged that Evanston Hospital's "Going Home" guide was deceptive in that he did not receive medical guidance upon discharge as the guide represented. Crane asserted that the statements in Evanston Hospital's literature were material, false, and intentionally made "to deceive [him] in rendering service to [him] and charging thousands of dollars for the service."
On August 21, 1989, Evanston Hospital filed a motion to dismiss count II pursuant to section 2-615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987,...
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