Evansville & T.H.R. Co. v. Talbot

Decision Date02 February 1892
Citation131 Ind. 221,29 N.E. 1134
PartiesEVANSVILLE & T. H. R. CO. et al. v. TALBOT.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from circuit court, Warrick county; G. L. REINHARD, Judge.

Action for malicious prosecution by Frank C. Talbot against the Evansville & Terre Haute Railroad Company, William D. Ewing, et al. There was judgment for plaintiff against the company and Ewing, who appeal. Affirmed.

John E. Iglehart and Edwin Taylor, for appellants. Geo. Palmer, D. B. Kumler, and J. B. Cockrum, for appellee.

McBRIDE, J.

The appellee was prosecuted on a charge of embezzlement, and acquitted. He then commenced this suit against the appellant railroad company and certain of its officers, charging that the prosecution was instigated by them, and that it was malicious and without probable cause. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment in his favor against the company and one of the officers, and in favor of the other officers sued. The principal question argued here is the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict. The appellants contend with much earnestness that it is insufficient. As the testimony comes to us in the bill of exceptions, if we were authorized to weigh it, and to decide with the party having the preponderance, we would unhesitatingly reverse the judgment. As it thus reaches us, the appellee not only has not a preponderance, but the evidence seems to preponderate strongly in favor of the appellants. The examination of this question necessarily involved the reading of the testimony,-a work of no small magnitude. As a result, we are not able to say that there is no evidence tending to sustain the verdict. No good purpose would be subserved by quoting or examining here any portion of the testimony, which covers over 1,000 pages of manuscript. It is enough to say that there is testimony which is susceptible of an interpretation that will sustain the verdict. While it is also open to a different construction, in accordance with the claim of the appellants, it is evident that the jury and the trial judge decided the question of interpretation adversely to them. One of the principal reasons for the rule of practice, now so firmly established, that this court will not weigh conflicting evidence, is that the jury and trial judge, hearing the testimony as it falls from the lips of the witnesses, with opportunity to observe their demeanor and manner of testifying, and having the benefit of many surrounding and attendant circumstances which can never reach this court through the medium of a bill of exceptions, are in better situation to draw correct inferences, and to construe and weigh the testimony, than we are. We cannot, therefore, reverse the case on the evidence.

The appellants also insist that excessive damages were awarded. The verdict was for $6,500. Courts seldom disturb verdicts on the ground that compensation for an injury to character has been estimated by too high a standard. In cases of this character a new trial will not be granted on the ground of excessive damages unlessthey are so outrageous as to induce the belief that the jury acted from prejudice, partiality, or corruption. Guard v. Risk, 11 Ind. 156;Alexander v. Thomas, 25 Ind. 268;Crocker v. Hadley, 102 Ind. 416, 1 N. E. Rep. 734. An action for malicious prosecution, like actions for libel or slander, involves the question of compensation for an injury to character. We cannot disturb the verdict on that ground.

The appellants asked the court to give several special instructions, which were refused. The correctness of this ruling is questioned. We find, on examining the instructions given by the court, and comparing them with those refused, that, in so far as those asked and refused were correct, they were substantially and fairly embodied in those given. The third instruction, given by the court on its own motion, is as follows: (3) Before the plaintiff will be entitled to recover anything, he must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, (1) that the plaintiff was charged with the crime of embezzlement; (2) that he was arrested upon said charge; (3) that he was tried and acquitted upon said charge; (4) that the defendants, or such as are held liable,...

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