Everett v. Dean
| Docket Number | 3:20-CV-01260 (AMN/ML) |
| Decision Date | 24 August 2023 |
| Parties | JAHMIER A. EVERETT, Plaintiff, v. SHAWN DEAN and RONALD LUSSI, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
JAHMIER A. EVERETT Plaintiff, Pro Se
HON LETITIA JAMES OF COUNSEL KOSTAS D. LERIS, ESQ. Attorney for Defendants.
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 13, 2020, Plaintiff pro se Jahmier Everett (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), alleging various constitutional, statutory, and common law claims stemming from an investigation and criminal charge by New York State Police (“NYSP”) Investigator Shawn Dean and NYSP Senior Investigator Ronald Lussi (collectively “Defendants”). See Dkt. No. 1. This case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Miroslav Lovric, who, on February 26, 2021, issued an Order and Report-Recommendation (“ReportRecommendation”), granting Plaintiff's amended in forma pauperis (“IFP”) application, Dkt. No. 5,[1] and recommending that Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment false arrest and malicious prosecution claims proceed against Defendants. See Dkt. No. 7. On March 30, 2021, the Court adopted the Report-Recommendation in its entirety. See Dkt. No. 10.
On March 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 9. Magistrate Judge Lovric conducted a sua sponte review and recommended that the following four claims proceed: (1) fabrication of evidence against Defendant Dean; (2) defamation against Defendant Dean; (3) Fourth Amendment false arrest against Defendants; and (4) Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution against Defendants. See Dkt. No. 12.[2] On July 19, 2021, the Court adopted the ReportRecommendation in its entirety, see Dkt. No. 13, and on September 20, 2021, Defendants filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint. See Dkt. No. 22.
On August 19, 2022, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (“Motion”), Dkt. No. 39, and on October 20, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Cross-Motion for summary judgment (“CrossMotion”) and an Opposition. Dkt. No. 50.[3] On November 4, 2022, Defendants filed an Opposition to the Cross-Motion and a Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition. See Dkt. No. 51. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion is granted in its entirety and Plaintiff's Cross-Motion is denied.
II. BACKGROUND[4]
This action arises out of Plaintiff Jahmier Everett's August 28, 2019 arrest, as a result of which he was charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance (“CSCS”) in the third degree under New York Penal Law § 220.39(1).[5] Dkt. No. 9 at 4.[6] Plaintiff alleges that he “was falsely arrested and unlawfully imprisoned” on the basis of an “illusionary drug sale” fabricated by Defendants[7] in order to implicate him in an unrelated homicide that occurred in Tioga County, New York. Id. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Defendants' actions, he suffered “loss of wages[,] mental anguish[,] humiliation [and] anxiety[,] and [was] displaced from his children and loved ones.” Dkt. No. 9 at 6.
In May 2019, the NYSP Troop C Major Crimes Unit (“Major Crimes”) contacted Troop C VGNET requesting that they conduct a controlled purchase (“Controlled Purchase”). Dkt. No. 395 at ¶ 4.[8] The subject of the Controlled Purchase was Plaintiff, who also goes by the street name “Jah Diggz.” Dkt. No. 39-2 at ¶ 7. Major Crimes contacted VGNET to conduct the Controlled Purchase because “Plaintiff was a known drug dealer in the Greater Binghamton Area” and the “NYSP ha[d] information that Plaintiff has been selling narcotics in the Greater Binghamton Area dating back to the mid-2000s.” Dkt. No. 39-2 at ¶ 7; Dkt. No. 39-5 at ¶ 5. Defendant Dean was the lead agent assigned to the Controlled Purchase, and Defendant Lussi's role was to “oversee the controlled purchase and supervise [Defendant] Dean's handling of the case.” Dkt. No. 39-3 at ¶ 8.
At the time Major Crimes contacted VGNET, Plaintiff was being investigated by Major Crimes for a homicide which occurred in May 2019 in Tioga County, New York. Dkt. No. 39-5 at ¶¶ 4, 7. Major Crimes obtained a telephone number, (607) 232-7303 (“the telephone number”), which was allegedly connected to the homicide, and requested that VGNET contact this number as part of the Controlled Purchase and verify that the telephone number belonged to Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 6-7.[9]
The NYSP Special Investigations Unit provided VGNET with a confidential informant (“CI”) who “was known to have knowledge of” Plaintiff, to conduct the Controlled Purchase. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.[10] In May 2019, Defendant Dean requested that the CI contact the telephone number and arrange to purchase crack cocaine from Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 13. The CI contacted the telephone number in the presence of Defendants and arranged for a purchase of narcotics. Id. at ¶¶ 15-16.[11] The CI was searched prior to the purchase to confirm that the CI was not in possession of any contraband, and the CI was supplied with a recording device and cash. Id. at ¶ 18. The CI then went with an undercover officer in an unmarked patrol vehicle to meet Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 19. Defendants followed the unmarked vehicle and parked in a location where they could not visually see the alleged transaction between the CI and Plaintiff but could hear the entire conversation through the recording device provided to the CI. Id. at ¶¶ 20-22.[12] After a short period of time, the CI returned to the NYSP undercover vehicle without the cash and with drugs, which later field tested positive for the presence of cocaine. Id. at ¶¶ 23, 25-26.[13]
The CI was interviewed in the presence of Defendants and provided a supporting deposition which Defendant Dean transcribed by hand. Id. at ¶¶ 27-28.[14] The CI reviewed the statement and signed it “verifying its authenticity.” Id. at ¶ 29.[15] VGNET then alerted Major Crimes that the Controlled Purchase was completed. Id. at ¶ 30. Major Crimes requested that VGNET “wait to arrest [Plaintiff] until the homicide investigation was complete,” which VGNET agreed to. Id. at ¶¶ 31-32.[16] On August 28, 2019, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with CSCS in the Third Degree. Dkt. No. 39-4 at ¶¶ 41, 45. Defendants were not present when Plaintiff was arrested, processed, and interviewed. Id. at ¶¶ 42, 44. Plaintiff alleges that while he was questioned about allegations related to being a drug dealer, he was mostly questioned about a homicide case. Dkt. No. 50 at 2.
Defendant Dean, as lead agent, prepared and signed a Felony Complaint with respect to the CSCS charge. Dkt. No. 9 at 8; Dkt. No. 39-5 at ¶ 46.[17] Additionally, an Arrest Report was prepared and Defendants reviewed and signed the Report. Dkt. No. 39-5 at ¶¶ 47-49.[18] Plaintiff was arraigned in Binghamton City Court and remanded to the Broome County Jail. Id. at ¶ 51.
On September 12, 2019, Defendant Dean testified before a Grand Jury in Tioga County regarding Plaintiff's homicide case. Id. at ¶ 53. In the course of his testimony, Defendant Dean testified regarding the May 2019 Controlled Purchase and stated that the CI contacted Plaintiff using the telephone number and subsequently purchased narcotics from Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 54.[19]
On March 17, 2020, Senior Assistant District Attorney Anthony Frank (“Senior ADA Frank”)[20] dismissed Plaintiff's CSCS charge related to the May 2019 Controlled Purchase. Dkt. No. 39-5 at ¶ 59. Senior ADA Frank asserts that he dismissed Plaintiff's charge for two reasons, judicial economy and lack of a speedy trial. Dkt. No. 39-5 at ¶ 60.[21] Senior ADA Frank had received information that Plaintiff was indicted for “charges of murder, burglary, and weapons possession” in Tioga County, which carried significantly greater sentences than the CSCS charge, and believed “it was no longer in the best interest of judicial economy to reveal the [CI] who made the controlled purchase in order to proceed with grand jury and ultimately trial.” Id. at ¶¶ 61-63.[22]Defendants were not involved in the decision to dismiss the CSCS charge against Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 39-2 at ¶ 29; Dkt. No. 39-3 at ¶ 24.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is properly granted only if, upon reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Richardson v. Selsky, 5 F.3d 616, 621 (2d Cir. 1993). A court first determines “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a [factfinder] or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). “When analyzing a summary judgment motion, the court ‘cannot try issues of fact; it can only determine whether there are issues to be tried.'” Galeotti v. Cianbro Corp., No. 5:12-cv-00900 (MAD/TWD), 2013 WL 3207312, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. June 24, 2013) (quoting Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1994)).
The party seeking summary judgment “bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts establish [their] right to judgment as a matter of law.” Rodriguez v. City of N.Y., 72 F.3d 1051, 1060-61 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). To determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); accord Gibbs-Alfano v. Burton, 281 F.3d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 2002). A “material” fact is one that would “affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a dispute...
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