Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Tp, No. 52

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtBLACK
Citation330 U.S. 1,67 S.Ct. 504,91 L.Ed. 711,168 A.L.R. 1392
PartiesEVERSON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF EWING TP. et al
Docket NumberNo. 52
Decision Date10 February 1947

330 U.S. 1
67 S.Ct. 504
91 L.Ed. 711
EVERSON

v.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF EWING TP. et al.

No. 52.
Argued Nov. 20, 1946.
Decided Feb. 10, 1947.
Rehearing Denied March 10, 1947.
See 330 U.S. 855, 67 S.Ct. 962.

Appeal from the Court of Errors and Appeals of the State of New jersey.

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Messrs. Edward R. Burke and E. Hilton Jackson, both of Washington, D.C., for appellant.

Mr. William H. Speer, of Jersey City, for appellees.

[Argument of Counsel from page 2 intentionally omitted]

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Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

A New Jersey statute authorizes its local school districts to make rules and contracts for the transportation of children to and from schools.1 The appellee, a township board of education, acting pursuant to this statute authorized reimbursement to parents of money expended by them for the bus transportation of their children on regular busses operated by the public transportation system. Part of this money was for the payment of transportation of some children in the community to Catholic parochial schools. These church schools give their students, in addition to secular education, regular religious instruction conforming to the religious tenets and modes of worship of the Catholic Faith. The superintendent of these schools is a Catholic priest.

The appellant, in his capacity as a district taxpayer, filed suit in a State court challenging the right of the Board to reimburse parents of parochial school students. He

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contended that the statute and the resolution passed pursuant to it violated both the State and the Federal Constitutions. That court held hat the legislature was without power to authorize such payment under the State constitution. 132 N.J.L. 98, 39 A.2d 75. The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals reversed, holding that neither the statute nor the resolution passed pursuant to it was in conflict with the State constitution or the provisions of the Federal Constitution in issue. 133 N.J.L. 350, 44 A.2d 333. The case is here on appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 344(a), 28 U.S.C.A. § 344(a).

Since there has been no attack on the statute on the ground that a part of its language excludes children attending private schools operated for profit from enjoying state payment for their transportation, we need not consider this exclusionary language; it has no relevancy to any constitutional question here presented.2 Furthermore, if the exclusion clause had been properly challenged, we do not know whether New Jersey's highest court would construe its statutes as precluding payment of the school

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transportation of any group of pupils, even those of a private school run for profit.3 Consequently, we put to one side the question as to the validity of the statute against the claim that it does not authorize payment for the transportation generally of school children in New Jersey.

The only contention here is that the State statute and the resolution, in so far as they authorized reimbursement to parents of children attending parochial schools, violate the Federal Constitution in these two respects, which to some extent, overlap. First. They authorize the State to take by taxation the private property of some and bestow it upon others, to be used for their own private purposes. This, it is alleged violates the due process clause of the F urteenth Amendment. Second. The statute and the resolution forced inhabitants to pay taxes to help support and maintain schools which are dedicated to, and which regularly teach, the Catholic Faith. This is alleged to be a use of State power to support church schools contrary to the prohibition of the First Amendment which the Fourteenth Amendment made applicable to the states.

First. The due process argument that the State law taxes some people to help others carry out their private

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purposes is framed in two phases. The first phase is that a state cannot tax A to reimburse B for the cost of transporting his children to church schools. This is said to violate the due process clause because the children are sent to these church schools to satisfy the personal desires of their parents, rather than the public's interest in the general education of all children. This argument, if valid, would apply equally to prohibit state payment for the transportation of children to any non-public school, whether operated by a church, or any other nongovernment individual or group. But, the New Jersey legislature has decided that a public purpose will be served by using tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of all school children, including those who attend parochial schools. The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals has reached the same conclusion. The fact that a state law, passed to satisfy a public need, coincides with the personal desires of the individuals most directly affected is certainly an inadequate reason for us to say that a legislature has erroneously appraised the public need.

It is true that this Court has, in rare instances, struck down state statutes on the ground that the purpose for which tax-raised funds were to be expended was not a public one. Citizens' Savings & Loan Association v. City of Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 22 L.Ed. 455; City of Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U.S. 487, 1 S.Ct. 442, 27 L.Ed. 238; Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 57 S.Ct. 364, 81 L.Ed. 510. But the Court has also pointed out that this far-reaching authority must be exercised with the most extreme caution. Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 240, 40 S.Ct. 499, 501, 64 L.Ed. 878. Otherwise, a state's power to legislate for the public welfare might be seriously curtailed, a power which is a primary reason for the existence of states. Changing local conditions create new local problems which may lead a state's people and its local authorities to believe that laws authorizing new types of public services are necessary to promote the general well-being

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of the people. The Fourteenth Amendment did not strip the states of their power to meet problems previously left for individual solution. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 103, 104, 24 L.Ed. 616; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31, 32, 5 S.Ct. 357, 360, 28 L.Ed. 923; Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 157, 158, 17 S.Ct. 56, 62, 63, 41 L.Ed. 369.

It is much too late to argue that legislation intended to facilitate the opportunity of children to get a secular education serves no public purpose. Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370, 50 S.Ct. 335, 74 L.Ed. 913; Holmes, J., in Interstate Consolidated Street Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 87, 28 S.Ct. 26, 27, 52 L.Ed. 111, 12 Ann.Cas. 555. See opinion of Cooley, J., in Stuart v. School District No. 1 of Village of Kalamazoo, 1878, 30 Mich. 69. The same thing is no less true of legislation to reimburse needy parents, or all parents, for payment of the fares of their children so that they can ride in public busses to and from schools rather than run the risk of traffic and other hazards incident to walking or 'hitchhiking.' See Barbier v. Connolly, supra, 113 U.S. at page 31, 5 S.Ct. at page 359. See also cases collected 63 A.L.R. 413; 118 A.L.R. 806. Nor does it follow that a law has a private rather than a public purpose because it provides that tax-raised funds will be paid to reimburse i dividuals on account of money spent by them in a way which furthers a public program. See Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 518, 57 S.Ct. 868, 876, 81 L.Ed. 1245, 109 A.L.R. 1327. Subsidies and loans to individuals such as farmers and home owners, and to privately owned transportation systems, as well as many other kinds of businesses, have been commonplace practices in our state and national history.

Insofar as the second phase of the due process argument may differ from the first, it is by suggesting that taxation for transportation of children to church schools constitutes support of a religion by the State. But if the law is invalid for this reason, it is because it violates the First Amendment's prohibition against the establishment of religion

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by law. This is the exact question raised by appellant's second contention, to consideration of which we now turn.

Second. The New Jersey statute is challenged as a 'law respecting an establishment of religion.' The First Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth, Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 872, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 146 A.L.R. 81, commands that a state 'shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.' These words of the First Amendment reflected in the minds of early Americans a vivid mental picture of conditions and practices which they fervently wished to stamp out in order to preserve liberty for themselves and for their posterity. Doubtless their goal has not been entirely reached; but so far has the Nation moved toward it that the expression 'law respecting an establishment of religion,' probably does not so vividly remind present-day Americans of the evils, fears, and political problems that caused that expression to be written into our Bill of Rights. Whether this New Jersey law is one respecting the 'establishment of religion' requires an understanding of the meaning of that language, particularly with respect to the imposition of taxes. Once again,4 therefore, it is not inappropriate briefly to review the background and environment of the period in which that constitutional language was fashioned and adopted.

A large proportion of the early settlers of this country came here from Europe to escape the bondage of laws which compelled them to support and attend government favored churches. The centuries immediately before and contemporaneous with the colonization of America had been filled with turmoil, civil strife, and persecutions,...

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1293 practice notes
  • Woodring v. Jackson Cnty., No. 20-1881
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • February 2, 2021
    ...U.S. Const. amend. I. It applies to states and municipalities through the Fourteenth Amendment. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp. , 330 U.S. 1, 8, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947). The basic policy behind the Establishment Clause "is the principle that the ‘First Amendment mandates gov......
  • Frissell v. Rizzo, No. 78-1863
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • February 20, 1979
    ...considered, although not without dispute, the merits of cases in which standing was based on state law rules. Everson v. Bd. of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 20 S.Ct. 121, 44 L.Ed. 168 (1899); Cf. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S......
  • American Atheists, Inc. v. Detroit Downtown Development Authority, No. 07-2398.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • May 28, 2009
    ...from using its power either to "favor" or to "handicap" any one religion or religion in general. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 18, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947). The Religion Clauses command the States to "be a neutral" in their "relations with groups of religious believ......
  • Fulton v. City of Phila., No. 19-123
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 17, 2021
    ...U. S. 652 (1925); Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U. S. 245 (1934); Cantwell, 310 U. S. 296; Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1 (1947). And we have long applied that Amendment to actions taken by those responsible for enforcing the law. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indi......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1279 cases
  • Woodring v. Jackson Cnty., No. 20-1881
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • February 2, 2021
    ...U.S. Const. amend. I. It applies to states and municipalities through the Fourteenth Amendment. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp. , 330 U.S. 1, 8, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947). The basic policy behind the Establishment Clause "is the principle that the ‘First Amendment mandate......
  • Frissell v. Rizzo, No. 78-1863
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • February 20, 1979
    ...considered, although not without dispute, the merits of cases in which standing was based on state law rules. Everson v. Bd. of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 20 S.Ct. 121, 44 L.Ed. 168 (1899); Cf. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S......
  • American Atheists, Inc. v. Detroit Downtown Development Authority, No. 07-2398.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • May 28, 2009
    ...its power either to "favor" or to "handicap" any one religion or religion in general. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 18, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947). The Religion Clauses command the States to "be a neutral" in their "relations with gr......
  • Fulton v. City of Phila., No. 19-123
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 17, 2021
    ...U. S. 652 (1925); Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U. S. 245 (1934); Cantwell, 310 U. S. 296; Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1 (1947). And we have long applied that Amendment to actions taken by those responsible for enforcing the law. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indi......
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13 books & journal articles
  • ESTABLISHMENT'S POLITICAL PRIORITY TO FREE EXERCISE.
    • United States
    • Notre Dame Law Review Vol. 97 Nbr. 2, January 2022
    • January 1, 2022
    ...the primary, regime-shifter. Other forces had as much or greater influence. But the Court did its work. (83) See Everson v. Bd. of Educ, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). (84) There had been constitutional free exercise exemption cases before the midtwentieth century, but these, too, had been infrequent. ......
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    • The Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy Nbr. 18-2, July 2020
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    ...Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n (American Legion), 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2090 (2019). 2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 3. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947). 4. American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2077. 5. Id. at 2090. 6. Id. at 2098 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). 7. Lujan v. Defe......
  • Separating Church and State or Guaranteeing Religious Expression?
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    • Review of Public Personnel Administration Nbr. 22-4, December 2002
    • December 1, 2002
    ...719-742.Ettorre, B. (1996). Religion in the workplace: Implications for managers. ManagementReview,85, 15-20.Everson v.Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).Flynn, T. (1999). Outlawing unbelief. Free Inquiry,20,13-18.Frierson, J. G. (1988). Religion in the workplace: Dealingin good faith. P......
  • Public Schools, Religious Establishments, and the U.S. Supreme Court
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    • American Politics Research Nbr. 37-1, January 2009
    • January 1, 2009
    ...Court compen-dium: Data, decisions, and developments (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: CongressionalQuarterly Press.Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).Firestone, D. (2001, December 12). Court voids law covering school prayer in Louisiana.The New York Times, p. A20.Glass, G. V., Cahen......
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