Everson v. Sci Tenn. Funeral Servs., LLC
| Decision Date | 20 April 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 3:15-cv-01478,3:15-cv-01478 |
| Parties | OMMER EVERSON, Plaintiff, v. SCI TENNESSEE FUNERAL SERVICES, LLC d/b/a FOREST LAWN FUNERAL HOME AND MEMORIAL GARDENS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 28). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition (Doc. No. 34), and Defendant has replied. (Doc. No. 42). For the reasons discussed below, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiff Ommer Everson alleges unlawful employment practices against his former employer, Defendant SCI Tennessee Funeral Services, LLC d/b/a Forest Law Funeral Home and Memorial Gardens. Plaintiff asserts claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") and the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges FMLA retaliation and interference, and ADA disability discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate.
Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a funeral director and most recently a general manager from 1996 until January 11, 2015. (Doc. No. 100 at 1). Plaintiff was diagnosed with Meniere's Disease in 2000, but does not recall it affecting his work until 2010 when he had his first outpatient ear procedure. (Id. at 2). Prior to his ear procedure in 2010, Plaintiff notified Jeffrey Duffer ("Duffer"), Defendant's Market Director and Plaintiff's supervisor, of his ear condition and requested approximately one week to ten days off from work, which Duffer granted. (Id.). In October 2014, Plaintiff had a second ear procedure and requested an afternoon off from work for the procedure, which Duffer granted. (Id. at 3).
On January 9, 2015, Plaintiff informed Duffer that he was scheduled for a third ear procedure at the end of January and requested approximately one week off of work. (Doc. No. 100 at 3). Duffer responded, (Id. at 12). Plaintiff was terminated from his position two days later and claims that the reason given for termination was a pretext for discrimination. (Doc. No. 34 at 12).
In response, Defendant argues that Plaintiff was terminated for leaving an unembalmed body at one of the facilities without refrigeration in violation of Defendant's policy. (Doc. No. 29 at 12). Defendant denies discriminating or retaliating against Plaintiff under the ADA and FMLA, denies interfering with Plaintiff's FMLA rights, and denies failing to accommodate Plaintiff's disability. Defendant seeks summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion and identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts. Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003). The moving party may satisfy this burden by presenting affirmative evidence that negates an elementof the non-moving party's claim or by demonstrating an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id.
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court views the facts in the light most favorable for the nonmoving party, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 242 (6th Cir. 2015); Wexler v. White's Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 570 (6th Cir. 2003). The Court does not weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of the matter. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Rather, the Court determines whether sufficient evidence has been presented to make the issue of material fact a proper jury question. Id. The mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's position is insufficient to survive summary judgment; instead, there must be evidence of which the jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003).
The FMLA enables employees covered by the Act to take up to twelve weeks of leave per year for various purposes specified in the statute, including the employee's own "serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee." 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). A "serious health condition" is defined as "an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves (A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11). At the expiration of the employee's leave period, he must be reinstated to his position or to a position equivalent in pay, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1).
The Sixth Circuit recognizes two theories of liability under the FMLA: (1) interference claims, in which employers interfere with or deny an employee's exercise of his FMLA rights; and (2) retaliation or discrimination claims, in which employers take adverse employment actions against employees for exercising their FMLA right to take leave. Both claims are analyzed using the familiar burden-shifting analysis established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). This analysis applies when, as here, a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence to prove that an employer discriminated or retaliated against the employee. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action. Bryson v. Regis Corp., 498 F.3d 561, 570 (6th Cir. 2007). If the defendant articulates such a reason, the burden then "shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant's proffered reason is a pretext for unlawful discrimination." Id.
To establish a prima facie case that Defendant interfered with Plaintiff's FMLA rights, Plaintiff must show: (1) he was an eligible employee; (2) Defendant was an employer subject to the FMLA; (3) he was entitled to leave under the FMLA; (4) he gave Defendant notice of his intention to take FMLA leave; and (5) Defendant denied him FMLA benefits to which he was entitled. Romans v. Michigan Dept. of Human Services, 668 F.3d 826, 840 (6th Cir. 2012). The fourth and fifth elements are disputed here. Defendant argues Plaintiff: (1) failed to provide notice of his need for FMLA leave; and (2) was never denied any benefits to which he was entitled.
To invoke FMLA protection, an employee must provide notice and a qualifying reason for requesting leave. Notice must take a certain form, namely, the employee must "comply with [the employer's] usual and customary notice and procedural requirements . . . absent unusualcircumstances." 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(d); Cundiff v. Lenawee Stamping Corp., 597 Fed. Appx. 299, 300 (6th Cir. 2015). This regulation, which took effect January 16, 2009, "explicitly permits employers to condition FMLA-protected leave upon an employee's compliance with the employer's usual notice and procedural requirements, absent unusual circumstances." Srouder v. Dana Light Mfg., LLC, 725 F.3d 608, 614 (6th Cir. 2015). "An employee also may be required by an employer's policy to contact a specific individual." Alexander v. Kellogg USA, Inc., 674 Fed. Appx. 496 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(d)).
Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to give notice of his intent to take FMLA leave. Specifically, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff failed to follow Defendant's notice requirements and contact the SCI Leave and Disability Center to request FMLA leave as outlined in the employee handbook. (Doc. No. 31-1 at 120). In response, Plaintiff argues that the law does not require an employee to invoke the FMLA by name. (Doc. No. 34 at 11). Plaintiff contends that providing notice to Duffer that he needed a week off in late January for a procedure related to his Meniere's Disease was sufficient to put Defendant on notice that he was invoking FMLA protection. (Id.).
Prior to 2009, Plaintiff's arguments would have merit. However, the 2009 amendment to 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(d) "explicitly permits employers to condition FMLA-protected leave upon an employee's compliance with the employer's usual notice and procedural requirements, absent unusual circumstances." Srouder, 725 F.3d at 614. Defendant's employee handbook requires employees to contact the SCI Leave and Disability Center to give notice of any FMLA leave. (Doc. No. 31-1 at 120). Plaintiff received, read through, and signed Defendant's employee handbook acknowledging his familiarity with it. (Doc. No. 100 at 5). However, Plaintiff never requested FMLA leave or asked anybody at SCI for FMLA leave. (Doc. No. 31-1 at 58). Plaintiff has not identified any unusual circumstances that would prevent him from complying withDefendant's notice requirement for FMLA leave. Accordingly, because Plaintiff failed to comply with Defendant's notice requirement for requesting FMLA leave, he is unable to establish a prima facie case for interference.1 See Alexander v. Kellogg USA, Inc., 674 Fed. Appx. 496, 500 (6th Cir. 2017) (); Cundiff, 597 Fed. Appx. at 300 (same); Srouder, 725 F.3d at 615 (same). The Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's FMLA interference claim.
Plaintiff next claims that Defendant retaliated against him when he notified Duffer of his intent to take FMLA...
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