Everson v. Williams

• Decision Date: 21 May 2019
• Docket Number: No. 340521,340521
• Citation: 328 Mich.App. 383,937 N.W.2d 697
• Parties: Marsheri D.D. EVERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Delores J. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

328 Mich.App. 383

937 N.W.2d 697

Marsheri D.D. EVERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Delores J. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 340521

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted April 12, 2019, at Detroit.

May 21, 2019, 9:20 a.m.

John J. Cooper for plaintiff.

The Darren Findling Law Firm, PLC (by Darren Findling and Andrew J. Black, Royal Oak) for defendant.

Before: Markey, P.J., and Fort Hood and Gadola, JJ.

Fort Hood, J. Plaintiff Marsheri D.D. Everson appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition and quieting title to 20280 Kentfield, Detroit, Michigan (the Kentfield property) in favor of defendant Delores J. Williams. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. THE KENTFIELD PROPERTY

This action involves the Kentfield property, which originally belonged to plaintiff’s grandparents, Cedric D. Everson and Elizabeth A. Everson. While plaintiff was still a minor,¹ her grandparents conveyed their interest in the Kentfield property to plaintiff, while retaining life estates in the property. The conveyance provided, in pertinent part, as follows:

With the filing of this Quit Claim Deed it is hereby noted that the Grantors Cedric and Elizabeth Everson Becomes [sic] Tenants of the subject property[.] [I]t is therefore a conditio[n] of this Conveyance that Cedric D. Everson and Elizabeth A. Everson enjoy Peaceful and Continual Occupan[c]y of said property for the remainder of their natural lives.

Cedric died on January 17, 1997. On April 2, 1997, plaintiff, 11 years old at the time, purportedly conveyed her interest in the Kentfield property to Elizabeth by way of a quitclaim deed. Following proceedings in the Wayne Probate Court that will be discussed in detail subsequently in this opinion, on August 26, 1999, Elizabeth executed a warranty deed for the Kentfield property to Rondalyn Everson for the sum of $70,000. Rondalyn subsequently defaulted on her mortgage against the property, and a sheriff’s deed on mortgage sale was entered on February 26, 2004. On March 12, 2004, Ameriquest Mortgage Company quitclaimed the property to WM Specialty Mortgage, LLC. WM Specialty Mortgage executed a covenant deed to Charles Smith for the Kentfield property on January 25, 2005. Finally, on February 24, 2010, Smith quitclaimed the Kentfield property to defendant. Elizabeth died on July 18, 2014.

B. THE PRESENT ACTION

On August 19, 2016, plaintiff filed the instant action seeking to quiet title to the Kentfield property. As pertinent to this appeal, defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10), claiming that plaintiff’s action was (1) barred by the applicable statute of limitations and (2) precluded by the application of the doctrine of res judicata, and asserting that title to the Kentfield property should be quieted in favor of defendant. Plaintiff responded, arguing that (1) her claim was not time-barred because it did not accrue until Elizabeth’s death in July 2014 and (2) Elizabeth did not have legal authority to convey plaintiff’s interest in the Kentfield property. Plaintiff also pointed out that she did not receive any proceeds from the sale of the Kentfield property or an interest in the property that Elizabeth purchased using the proceeds from the sale of the Kentfield property. Following a hearing on defendant’s motion, the trial court granted summary disposition in favor of defendant and entered a concomitant order stating that plaintiff’s interest in the Kentfield property was extinguished. Plaintiff now appeals as of right.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review de novo the trial court’s ruling in response to defendant’s motion for summary disposition.

Beach v. Lima Twp. , 489 Mich. 99, 105, 802 N.W.2d 1 (2011). The trial court’s written order reflects that summary disposition was granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10). A motion for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10)

tests the factual support of a plaintiff’s claim. In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court considers the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and other relevant documentary evidence of record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant a trial. [ Walsh v. Taylor , 263 Mich. App. 618, 621, 689 N.W.2d 506 (2004) (citation omitted).]

Defendant also moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), claiming that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations as well as the doctrine of res judicata. "In reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), a court considers the affidavits, pleadings, and other documentary evidence presented by the parties and accepts the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations as true, except those contradicted by documentary evidence." McLean v. Dearborn , 302 Mich. App. 68, 72-73, 836 N.W.2d 916 (2013). Similarly, this Court reviews de novo the trial court’s determination regarding whether the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to plaintiff’s claim. Washington v. Sinai Hosp. of Greater Detroit , 478 Mich. 412, 417, 733 N.W.2d 755 (2007).

III. ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, plaintiff argues that this action seeking to quiet title to the Kentfield property is not barred by the applicable 15-year statute of limitations because her claim did not accrue until 2014, when Elizabeth died and Elizabeth’s life estate in the Kentfield property was terminated. We agree.

MCL 600.5801 provides, in pertinent part:

No person may bring or maintain any action for the recovery or possession of any lands or make any entry upon any lands unless, after the claim or right to make the entry first accrued to himself or to someone through whom he claims, he commences the action or makes the entry within the periods of time prescribed by this section.

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(4) In all other cases under this section, the period of limitation is 15 years.

Similarly, MCL 600.5829 offers guidance with respect to when a claim to recover land accrues . It provides:

The right to make an entry on, and the claim to recover land accrue:

(1) Whenever any person is disseised, his right of entry on and claim to recover land accrue at the time of his disseisin;

(2) When he claims as heir or devisee of one who died seised, his claim accrues at the time of the death, unless there is another estate intervening after the death of the ancestor or devisor in which case his claim accrues when the intermediate estate expires or would have expired by its own limitation;

(3) When there is an intermediate estate, and in all other cases where the party claims by force of any remainder or reversion, his claim accrues when the intermediate or precedent estate would have expired by its own limitation, notwithstanding any forfeiture of the intermediate or precedent estate for which he might have entered at an earlier time.

(4) The provision of (3), does not prevent any person from entering when he is entitled to do so by any forfeiture or breach of condition, but if he claims under either of them his claim accrues when the forfeiture is incurred or the condition broken.

(5) In all cases not otherwise provided for, the claim accrues when the claimant or the person under whom he claims first becomes entitled to the possession of the premises under the title upon which the entry or action is founded. [Emphasis added.]

Plaintiff contends that her interest in the property did not accrue until the death of Elizabeth and the termination of her life estate on July 18, 2014. Therefore, plaintiff argues, her complaint seeking to quiet title, filed on August 19, 2016, was timely. Specifically, plaintiff argues that her cause of action did not accrue until Elizabeth died in 2014, because plaintiff held a remainder in the Kentfield property subject to the life estates of Elizabeth and Cedric. Plaintiff is correct in her assertion, and it is supported by the applicable caselaw.

MCL 554.7 provides that "[e]states, as respects the time of their enjoyment, are divided into estates in possession, and estates in expectancy." An estate in possession is one in which the owner of the estate "has an immediate right to the possession of the land," and an estate in expectancy is one in which "the right to the possession is postponed to a future period." MCL 554.8. When an estate is to commence on a future day, it is a future estate. MCL 554.9. "A future estate is an estate limited to commence in possession at a future day, either without the intervention of a precedent estate, or on the determination, by lapse of time or otherwise, of a precedent estate, created at the same time." MCL 554.10. If dependent on "a precedent estate," a future estate is classified as a "remainder," MCL 554.11, and the person who holds it is called a "remainderman," Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.). In Wengel v. Wengel , 270 Mich. App. 86, 101, 714 N.W.2d 371 (2006), this Court observed, in the context of considering whether adverse possession may extinguish the right of a remainderman to real property, that "[i]n relation to their time of enjoyment, estates are divided into estates in possession and estates in expectancy, and estates in expectancy, denominated as future estates and reversions, exist where the right to possession is postponed until a future date."

"A future estate is an estate limited to commence in possession at a future day, either without the intervention of a precedent estate, or on the determination, by lapse of time or otherwise, of a precedent estate, created at the same time." MCL 554.10. A remainder is created when a future estate is dependent upon the precedent estate. MCL 554.11. Future estates are contingent "whilst the person to whom, or the event upon which they are limited to take effect remains uncertain." MCL 554.13. ... "When a remainder on an estate for life ... shall not be limited on a contingency, defeating or avoiding such precedent estate, it

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