Ewing Tp. v. City Of Trenton.

• Decision Date: 05 September 1945
• Docket Number: 148/536.
• Citation: 43 A.2d 813
• Parties: EWING TP. et al. v. CITY OF TRENTON.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

43 A.2d 813

EWING TP. et al.

v.CITY OF TRENTON.

148/536.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Sept. 5, 1945.

Suit under the Declaratory Judgments Act by the Townshrip of Ewing and another against The City of Trenton to determine the rights of the parties to a contract relating to payment to be made by named plaintiff for its use of defendant's sewage system. On defendant's motion for an order striking out the bill of complaint.

Order striking out bill advised.

Syllabus by the Court

.

1. Under the express terms of the Declaratory Judgments Act, the controversial or doubtful question must be one within the jurisdiction of the court in which the declaratory judgment or decree is sought.

2. A declaration of legal rights may be had only in the courts of law.

3. The doctrine of equitable estoppel, although the creature of equity, is now recognized and administered by the courts of law.

4. Complexity is not a ground, per se, of equitable jurisdiction.

5. Equitable cognizance of a cause which is the subject of concurrent jurisdiction rests in sound judicial discretion, and is usually declined where there is a wholly effectualy remedy at law, and there are no special circumstances calling for equitable interposition.

George H. Bohlinger, Jr., of Trenton (H. Collin Minton, Jr., of Trenton, of counsel), for complainants.

Louis Josephson, of Trenton (John J. Connell, of Trenton, of counsel), for defendant.

JAYNE, Vice Chancellor.

The defendant proposes that this court should not entertain the alleged cause of action of the complainants. The defendant's motion for an order striking out the bill of complaint as amended presents that question for decision. Two major grounds are specified in support of the motion: (1) That adequate and complete remedies, if factually and legally sustained, are available to the complainants in an action at law heretofore authorized an directed to be instituted immediately on behalf of the defendant; (2) that there are no equitable considerations reasonably requiring the aid of this court. A study of the essential nature of the bill and of the facts therein disclosed recommends the conclusion that the position taken by the defendant is tenable.

The Commissioners of the City of Trenton, after many conferences with representatives of the Township of Ewing, resolved that the Township had committed a breach of its contract dated April 25, 1930, relating to the payments to be made to the City for the connection of properties in the Township, directly or indirectly, with the sewers operated by the City, and the rentals payable for the use of such connections. Efforts to compromise became futile and the Commissioners by resolution instructed the City counsel to institute an action against the Township for the recovery of consequential damages resulting from the alleged breach of the contract. The Township and one Walter Gerstnicker, who is not a party to the contract, thereupon filed the present bill pursuant to the authority of the Declaratory Judgments Act. R.S. 2:26-66 et seq., N.J.S.A. 2:26-66 et seq.

Initially, I am constrained to doubt that such auxiliary legislation was intended to be utilized defensively to bag in advance an imminent and impending law suit.

In Empire Trust Co. v. Board of Commerce, etc., 124 N.J.L. 406, 11 A.2d 752, 754, Mr. Justice Heher stated: ‘Moreover, the pleaded transactions, in substantial part at least, had ripened had ripened into a cause of action, if they could give rise to a right of action; and the declaratory judgments act is designed to provide a remedy for the adjudication of justiciable rights, duties, status and other legal relations of the parties before rights have been invaded or wrongs committed, and its provisions are not ordinarily invocable where another adequate remedy is at hand. The declaratory judgment was intended to modify the common law rule that there is no justiciable controversy until a right has been invaded. It supplements, and is not a substitute for, existing remedies; and whether relief shall be afforded under its terms is ordinarily a matter resting in sound judicial discretion.’

However, it must be conceded that under the express terms of the act, the controversial or doubtful question must be one within the jurisdiction of the court in which the declaratory judgment or decree is sought. A declaration of legal rights may be had only in the courts of...