EWING v. CALIFORNIA

Decision Date05 March 2003
Citation538 U.S. 11
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus

EWING v. CALIFORNIA

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

No. 01-6978. Argued November 5, 2002-Decided March 5, 2003

Under California's three strikes law, a defendant who is convicted of a felony and has previously been convicted of two or more serious or violent felonies must receive an indeterminate life imprisonment term. Such a defendant becomes eligible for parole on a date calculated by reference to a minimum term, which, in this case, is 25 years. While on parole, petitioner Ewing was convicted of felony grand theft for stealing three golf clubs, worth $399 apiece. As required by the three strikes law, the prosecutor formally alleged, and the trial court found, that Ewing had been convicted previously of four serious or violent felonies. In sentencing him to 25 years to life, the court refused to exercise its discretion to reduce the conviction to a misdemeanor-under a state law that permits certain offenses, known as "wobblers," to be classified as either misdemeanors or felonies-or to dismiss the allegations of some or all of his prior relevant convictions. The State Court of Appeal affirmed. Relying on Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, it rejected Ewing's claim that his sentence was grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment and reasoned that enhanced sentences under the three strikes law served the State's legitimate goal of deterring and incapacitating repeat offenders. The State Supreme Court denied review.

Held: The judgment is affirmed. Mfirmed.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE KENNEDY, concluded that Ewing's sentence is not grossly disproportionate and therefore does not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. Pp. 20-31.

(a) The Eighth Amendment has a "narrow proportionality principle" that "applies to noncapital sentences." Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 996-997 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The Amendment's application in this context is guided by the principles distilled in JUSTICE KENNEDY'S concurrence in Harmelin: "[T]he primacy of the legislature, the variety of legitimate penological schemes, the nature of our federal system, and the requirement that proportionality review be guided by objective factors" inform the final principle that the "Eighth Amendment does not require strict propor-

12

Syllabus

tionality between crime and sentence [but] forbids only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime." Id., at 100l. Pp.20-24.

(b) State legislatures enacting three strikes laws made a deliberate policy choice that individuals who have repeatedly engaged in serious or violent criminal behavior, and whose conduct has not been deterred by more conventional punishment approaches, must be isolated from society to protect the public safety. Though these laws are relatively new, this Court has a longstanding tradition of deferring to state legislatures in making and implementing such important policy decisions. The Constitution "does not mandate adoption of anyone penological theory," 501 U. S., at 999, and nothing in the Eighth Amendment prohibits California from choosing to incapacitate criminals who have already been convicted of at least one serious or violent crime. Recidivism has long been recognized as a legitimate basis for increased punishment and is a serious public safety concern in California and the Nation. Any criticism of the law is appropriately directed at the legislature, which is primarily responsible for making the policy choices underlying any criminal sentencing scheme. Pp. 24-28.

(c) In examining Ewing's claim that his sentence is grossly disproportionate, the gravity of the offense must be compared to the harshness of the penalty. Even standing alone, his grand theft should not be taken lightly. The California Supreme Court has noted that crime's seriousness in the context of proportionality review; that it is a "wobbIer" is of no moment, for it remains a felony unless the trial court imposes a misdemeanor sentence. The trial judge justifiably exercised her discretion not to extend lenient treatment given Ewing's long criminal history. In weighing the offense's gravity, both his current felony and his long history of felony recidivism must be placed on the scales. Any other approach would not accord proper deference to the policy judgments that find expression in the legislature's choice of sanctions. Ewing's sentence is justified by the State's public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons, and amply supported by his own long, serious criminal record. He has been convicted of numerous offenses, served nine separate prison terms, and committed most of his crimes while on probation or parole. His prior strikes were serious felonies including robbery and residential burglary. Though long, his current sentence reflects a rational legislative judgment that is entitled to deference. Pp. 28-3l.

JUSTICE SCALIA agreed that petitioner's sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, but on the ground that that prohibition was aimed at excluding only certain modes of punishment. This case demonstrates why

13

a proportionality principle cannot be intelligently applied, and why Solem v. Helm, 463 U. S. 277, should not be given stare decisis effect. Pp.31-32.

JUSTICE THOMAS concluded that petitioner's sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments because the Amendment contains no proportionality principle. P.32.

O'CONNOR, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and KENNEDY, J., joined. SCALIA, J., post, p. 31, and THOMAS, J., post, p. 32, filed opinions concurring in the judgment. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined, post, p. 32. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined, post, p. 35.

Quin Denvir, by appointment of the Court, 535 U. S. 1076, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were David M. Porter, Karyn H. Bucur, and Mark E. Haddad.

Donald E. De Nicola, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Jaime L. Fuster, Kristofer S. Jorstad, and David C. Cook, Deputy Attorneys General.

Assistant Attorney General Chertoff argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, John P. Elwood, and Joel M. Gershowitz. *

*Donald M. Falk, Andrew H. Schapiro, and Mary Price filed a brieffor Families Against Mandatory Minimums as amicus curiae urging reversal.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Alabama et al. by William H. Pryor, Jr., Attorney General of Alabama, Nathan A. Forrester, Solicitor General, and Michael B. Billingsley, Deputy Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Steve Carter of Indiana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska,

14

Opinion of O'CONNOR, J.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE KENNEDY join.

In this case, we decide whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the State of California from sentencing a repeat felon to a prison term of 25 years to life under the State's "Three Strikes and You're Out" law.

I A

California's three strikes law reflects a shift in the State's sentencing policies toward incapacitating and deterring repeat offenders who threaten the public safety. The law was designed "to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses." Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 667(b) (West 1999). On March 3, 1993, California Assemblymen Bill Jones and Jim Costa introduced Assembly Bill 971, the legislative version of what would later become the three strikes law. The Assembly Committee on Public Safety defeated the bill only weeks later. Public outrage over the defeat sparked a voter initiative to add Proposition 184, based loosely on the bill, to the ballot in the November 1994 general election.

On October 1, 1993, while Proposition 184 was circulating, 12-year-old Polly Klaas was kidnaped from her home in Petaluma, California. Her admitted killer, Richard Allen Davis, had a long criminal history that included two prior kidnaping convictions. Davis had served only half of his

W A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, John Cornyn of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, Christine O. Gregoire of Washington, and Hoke MacMillan of Wyoming; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation et al. by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson.

Dennis L. Stout and Grover D. Merritt filed a brief for the California District Attorneys Association as amicus curiae.

15

most recent sentence (16 years for kidnaping, assault, and burglary). Had Davis served his entire sentence, he would still have been in prison on the day that Polly Klaas was kidnaped.

Polly Klaas' murder galvanized support for the three strikes initiative. Within days, Proposition 184 was on its way to becoming the fastest qualifying initiative in California history. On January 3, 1994, the sponsors of Assembly Bill 971 resubmitted an amended version of the bill that conformed to Proposition 184. On January 31, 1994, Assembly Bill 971 passed the Assembly by a 63 to 9 margin. The Senate passed it by a 29 to 7 margin on March 3, 1994. Governor Pete Wilson signed the bill into law on March 7, 1994. California voters approved Proposition 184 by a margin of 72...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2340 cases
  • People v. Baker
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • February 22, 2018
    ......Jeffrey A. BAKER, Defendant and Appellant. D071383 Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California. Filed February 22, 2018 David L. Annicchiarico, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney ...As Baker notes, the People misconstrue those cases as authorizing life sentences for minor theft offenses. (See Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 28–29, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 ["At the threshold, we note that Ewing incorrectly frames the issue. The ......
  • People v. Cornejo
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • May 25, 2016
    ......Adam CORNEJO et al., Defendants and Appellants. C072053 Court of Appeal, Third District, California. Filed May 25, 2016 Audrey R. Chavez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Adam Cornejo; Eric Weaver, Albany, under ... “cruel and unusual punishments” and “contains a ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ ” ( Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 quoting Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 996–997, 111 S.Ct. 2680, ......
  • People v. Cornejo
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • January 20, 2016
    ......635 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Adam CORNEJO et al., Defendants and Appellants. C072053 Court of Appeal, Third District, California. Filed January 20, 2016 Audrey R. Chavez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Adam Cornejo; Eric Weaver, under ... “cruel and unusual punishments” and “contains a ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ ” ( Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 quoting Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 996–997, 111 S.Ct. 2680, ......
  • Davis v. Johnson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
    • February 22, 2019
    ......DAVIS, Petitioner, v. Deborah K. JOHNSON, Respondent. Case No. 15-cv-05760-HSG United States District Court, N.D. California. Signed February 22, 2019 359 F.Supp.3d 836 Marc Jonathan Zilversmit, Attorney at Law, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner. Jill Marietta Thayer, ...Em (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 964, 976–977 [90 Cal.Rptr.3d 264] ( Em ), citing Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 [123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108] ; Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 1001 [111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 firm's commentaries
44 books & journal articles
  • Punishment Phase
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Texas Criminal Lawyer's Handbook. Volume 2 - 2016 Contents
    • August 17, 2016
    ...to life under a “three strikes” law for theft of a set of golf clubs is not a grossly disproportionate sentence. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003). §20:120 Sentencing §20:121 General Provisions A trial court retains the plenary power to modify its sen......
  • Punishment phase
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Texas Criminal Lawyer's Handbook. Volume 1-2 Volume 2
    • May 5, 2022
    ...to life under a “three strikes” law for theft of a set of golf clubs is not a grossly disproportionate sentence. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003). §20:120 SENTENCING §20:121 General Provisions 20:121.1 Statutory Law Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Art. 42.15. F......
  • Punishment Phase
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Texas Criminal Lawyer's Handbook. Volume 2 - 2018 Contents
    • August 17, 2018
    ...to life under a “three strikes” law for theft of a set of golf clubs is not a grossly disproportionate sentence. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003). §20:120 Sentencing §20:121 General Provisions 20:121.1 Statutory Law Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Art. 42.15. F......
  • Proportionality and parole.
    • United States
    • University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 160 No. 6, May 2012
    • May 1, 2012
    ...are generally seen as legislative choices to which reviewing courts owe deference, particularly under principles of federalism. See 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (plurality opinion); see also id. ("Our traditional deference to legislative policy choices finds a corollary in the principle that the ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 provisions
  • Act 151, SB 191 – Reduction of Recidivism Act
    • United States
    • South Carolina Session Laws
    • January 1, 2010
    ...are allowed if based on reasonable suspicions; andWhereas, the United States Supreme Court has noted, in Ewing v.California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003), that recidivism is a grave concernthroughout the nation; andWhereas, the Untied States Supreme Court has held in numerouscases that the Fourth Ame......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT