Ewing v. Mytinger Casselberry 19 8212 20, 1950

Decision Date29 May 1950
Docket NumberNo. 568,568
Citation94 L.Ed. 1088,70 S.Ct. 870,339 U.S. 594
PartiesEWING, Federal Security Administrator, et al. v. MYTINGER & CASSELBERRY, Inc. Argued April 19—20, 1950
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

See 71 S.Ct. 69.

Mr. Robert L. Stern, Washington, D.C., for appellants.

Mr. Charles S. Rhyne, Washington, D.C., for appellee.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal1 from a three-judge District Court specially constituted on appellee's application for an injunction to restrain enforcement of a portion of an Act of Congress for repugnance to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.2

Section 304(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1044, 21 U.S.C. § 334(a), as amended, 62 Stat. 582, 21 U.S.C.Supp. III § 334(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 334(a), permits multiple seizures of misbranded articles 'when the Administrator has probable cause to believe from facts found, without hearing, by him or any officer or employee of the Agency that the misbranded article is dangerous to health, or that the labeling of the misbranded article is fraudulent, or would be in a material respect misleading to the injury or damage of the purchaser or consumer.'3

Appellee is the exclusive national distributor of Nutrilite Food Supplement, an encapsulated concentrate of alfalfa, water cress, parsley, and synthetic vitamins combined in a package with mineral tablets. There is no claim that the ingredients of the preparation are harmful or dangerous to health. The sole claim is that the labeling was, to use the statutory words, 'misleading to the injury or damage of the purchaser or consumer' and that therefore the preparation was 'misbranded' when introduced into interstate commerce.

This was indeed the administrative finding behind eleven seizures resulting in that number of libel suits, between September and December, 1948. The misbranding, it was found, resulted from the booklet which accompanied the preparation.4 Shortly thereafter the present suit was instituted to have the multiple seizure provision of § 304(a) declared unconstitutional and to dismiss all libel cases except the first one instituted. The District Court held that appellants had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the Fifth Amendment in instituting multiple libel suits without first affording the appellee a hearing on the probable cause issue; that the multiple seizure provision of § 304(a) was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; and that appellants should be permanently enjoined from instituting any action raising a claim that the booklet accompanying the preparation was a misbranding since it was not fraudulent, false, or misleading. D.C., 87 F.Supp. 650.

First. The administrative finding of probable cause required by § 304(a) is merely the statutory prerequisite to the bringing of the lawsuit. When the libels are filed the owner has an opportunity to appear as a claimant and to have a full hearing before the court.5 This hearing, we conclude, satisfies the requirements of due process.

At times a preliminary decision by an agency is a step in an administrative proceeding. We have repeatedly held that no hearing at the preliminary stage is required by due process so long as the requisite hearing is held before the final administrative order becomes effective. See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 68 S.Ct. 1294, 92 L.Ed. 1694; Inland Empire Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 65 S.Ct. 1316, 89 L.Ed. 1877; Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator of Wage & Hour Division of Dept. of Labor, 312 U.S. 126, 61 S.Ct. 524, 85 L.Ed. 624.

But this case does not go as far. Here an administrative agency is merely determining whether a judicial proceeding should be instituted. Moreover, its finding of probable cause, while a necessary prerequisite to multiple seizures, has no effect in and of itself. All pro- ceedings for the enforcement of the Act or to restrain violations of it must be brought by and in the name of the United States. § 307. Whether a suit will be instituted depends on the Attorney General, not on the administrative agency. He may or may not accept the agency's recommendation. If he does, seizures are made and libels are instituted. But the seizures and suits are dependent on the discretion of the Attorney General.

It is said that these multiple seizure decisions of the Administrator can cause irreparable damage to a business. And so they can. The impact of the initiation of judicial proceedings is often serious. Take the case of the grant jury. It returns an indictment against a man without a hearing. It does not determine his guilt; it only determines whether there is probable cause to believe he is guilty. But that determination is conclusive on the issue of probable cause. As a result the defendant can be arrested and held for trial. See Beavers v. Henkel, 194 U.S. 73, 85, 24 S.Ct. 605, 607, 48 L.Ed. 882; Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 250, 53 S.Ct. 129, 131, 77 L.Ed. 283. The impact of an indictment is on the reputation or liberty of a man. The same is true where a prosecutor files an information charging violations of the law. The harm to property and business can also be incalculable by the mere institution of proceedings. Yet it has never been held that the hand of government must be stayed until the courts have an opportunity to determine whether the government is justified in instituting suit in the courts. Discretion of any official may be abused. Yet it is not a requirement of due process that there be judicial inquiry before discretion can be exercised. It is sufficient, where only property rights are concerned, that there is at some stage an opportunity for a hearing and a judicial determination. Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S. 589, 596—597, 51 S.Ct. 608, 611, 75 L.Ed. 1289; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 520, 64 S.Ct. 641, 650, 88 S.Ct. 892; Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 442—443, 64 S.Ct. 660, 675, 676, 88 L.Ed. 834.

One of the oldest examples is the summary destruction of property without prior notice or hearing for the pro- tection of public health. There is no constitutional reason why Congress in the interests of consumer protection may not extend that area of control. It may conclude, as it did here, that public damage may result even from harmless articles if they are allowed to be sold as panaceas for man's ills. A requirement for a hearing, as a matter of constitutional right, does not arise merely because the danger of injury may be more apparent or immediate in the one case than in the other. For all we know the most damage may come from misleading or fraudulent labels. That is a decision for Congress, not for us. The decision of Congress was that the administrative determination to make multiple seizures should be made without a hearing. We cannot say that due process requires one at that stage.

Second. The District Court had no jurisdiction to review the administrative determination of probable cause.

The determination of probable cause in and of itself had no binding legal consequence any more than did the final valuation made by the Interstate Commerce Commission in United States v. Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co., 273 U.S. 299, 47 S.Ct. 413, 71 L.Ed. 651. It took the exercise of discretion on the part of the Attorney General, as we have pointed out above, to bring it into play against appellee's business. Judicial review of such a preliminary step in a judicial proceeding is so unique that we are not willing easily to infer that it exists.

Judicial review of this preliminary phase of the administrative procedure does not fit the statutory scheme nor serve the policy of the Act. Congress made numerous administrative determinations under the Act reviewable by the courts. 6 But it did not place the finding of probable cause under § 304(a) in that category. This highly selective manner in which Congress has provided for judicial review reinforces the inference that the only review of the issue of probable cause which Congress granted was the one provided in the libel suit. Cf. Switchmen's Union of North American v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297, 305—306, 64 S.Ct. 95, 99, 88 L.Ed. 61.

The purpose of the multiple seizure provision is plain. It is to arrest the distribution of an article that is dangerous, or whose labeling is fraudulent or misleading, pending a determination of the issue of adulteration or misbranding. The public therefore has a stake in the jurisdictional issue before us. If the District Court can step in, stay the institution of seizures, and bring the administrative regulation to a halt until it hears the case, the public will be denied the speedy protection which Congress provided by multiple seizures. It is not enough to say that the vitamin preparation in the present case is not dangerous to health. This preparation may be relatively innocuous. But the statutory scheme treats every 'misbranded article' the same in this respect—whether it is 'dangerous to health,' or its labeling is 'fraudulent,' or materially 'misleading to the injury or damage of the purchaser or consumer.'7 What we do today determines the jurisdiction of the District Court in all the case in that category. If the court in the present case can halt all multiple seizures but one, so can the court in other cases. The means which Congress provided to protect consumers against the injurious consequences of protracted proceedings would then be seriously impaired. Congress weighed the potential injury to the public from misbranded articles against the injury to the purveyor of the article from a temporary interference with its distribution and decided in favor of the speedy, preventive device of multiple seizures. We would impair or destroy the effectiveness of that device if we sanctioned the interference which a grant of jurisdiction to the District Court would entail. Multiple seizures are...

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