Ewing v. Timmons

• Decision Date: 31 October 1963
• Docket Number: No. 1,Nos. 19569,19630,s. 19569,1
• Citation: 193 N.E.2d 497,135 Ind.App. 274
• Parties: Estelle M. EWING, Appellant, v. James TIMMONS, Appellee. Estelle M. EWING, Appellant, v. Diana Leigh TIMMONS, by her next friend, James Timmons, Appellee
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 497

193 N.E.2d 497

135 Ind.App. 274

Estelle M. EWING, Appellant, v. James TIMMONS, Appellee.

Estelle M. EWING, Appellant, v. Diana Leigh TIMMONS, by her next friend, James Timmons, Appellee.

Nos. 19569, 19630.

Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 1.

Oct. 31, 1963.

Armstrong, Gause, Hudson & Kightlinger, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Stewart & Richardson, Lebanon, for appellee.

CARSON, Presiding Justice.

Both actions were negligence actions growing out of a collision between two motor vehicles at a semaphore controlled street intersection in the city of Indianapolis, Indiana. The actions were consolidated on appeal. The motions for new trial in each of the actions covered substantially the same specifications and with one minor exception both the appellant and the appellee argued the error assigned as applicable to both cases.

The action of Diana Leigh Timmons by her next friend, James Timmons, was for personal injuries, and the action by James Timmons was for loss of services of Diana Leigh Timmons. The actions grew out of an automobile accident in which the car of the appellant collided with an automobile operated by one Vivian Turner and in which automobile, Diana Leigh Timmons was riding as a passive guest.

To the complaints filed by each of the appellees the appellant filed answer under rule 1-3 of the Supreme Court of Indiana, the actions were consolidated and tried by jury. At the close of all of the evidence the appellant moved for a directed verdict in both cases which motions were denied.

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, Diana Leigh Timmons, in the amount of $3,000.00 and for James Timmons in the amount of $500.00. Consistent judgments were rendered by the court upon the verdicts of the jury. The appellant filed a motion for new trial in the case of Diana Leigh Timmons setting up that the damages were excessive, the verdict of the jury was not sustained by sufficient evidence, the verdict of the jury was contrary to law and error of law occurring at the trial with respect to instructions. In the case involving James Timmons the motion for new trial set out that the verdict was not sustained by sufficient evidence, the verdict of the jury was contrary to law and error of law occurring at the trial with respect to instructions. Both motions for new trial were overruled on the 6th day of September, 1960.

In the appellant's assignment of error we shall first consider the fourth proposition, namely error of law occurring at the trial with respect to the giving of instructions requested by the appellees and the refusal to give certain instructions tendered by the appellant.

Instruction number one given by the court for appellees is based upon the motor vehicles laws of the state of Indiana with respect to the speed regulations and may be found in § 47-2004, Burns' 1959 Pocket Supplement. To this instruction, the appellant objected for the reason that there was not evidence in the case with reference to speed from which the jury could find directly or by inference that the appellant operated her car at a speed in excess of the statutory requirement.

The appellees in their complaints allege that the appellant operated her automobile at a high and unreasonable rate of speed, to wit, 40 miles per hour. The appellant submitted an instruction that this paragraph of the appellee's complaints should be withdrawn from the consideration of the jury in arriving at its verdict in these cases.

In passing upon instructions, it has long been the holding of this court that instructions will be regarded as a total charge to the jury and if an instruction which might be erroneous standing by itself is cured by other instructions in the charge then no reversible error exists. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Company v. Mercantile National Bank, Administrator, etc. (1960), 130 Ind.App. 638, 654, 165 N.E.2d 382, H. E. McGonigal, Inc. v. Etherington (1948), 118 Ind.App. 622, 636, 79 N.E.2d 777. If, however, one or more of the instructions given is prejudicial to the rights of either of the parties, or a proper instruction is refused, then such action by the trial court can well be the basis for a reversal.

The trial judge by reason of training and experience has, under our procedure, been vested with the responsibility of...