Ex Parte Adams

• Decision Date: 11 April 2008
• Docket Number: 2061164.
• Citation: 11 So.3d 243
• Parties: Ex parte Lynn ADAMS. (In re Fleet Force, Inc. v. Lynn Adams).
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

11 So.3d 243

Ex parte Lynn ADAMS (In re Fleet Force, Inc. v. Lynn Adams).

2061164.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

April 11, 2008.

William L. Utsey of Utsey & Utsey, Butler; and Max Cassady of Cassady & Cassady, P.C., Fairhope, for petitioner.

David Neal of Bedford, Rogers & Bowling, P.C., Russellville, for respondent.

PITTMAN, Judge.

Lynn Adams("the employee")petitions for a writ of mandamus directed to the Franklin Circuit Court compelling, among other things, that court to transfer an action brought in that court pursuant to the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act(now codified at § 25-5-1 et seq.,Ala.Code 1975) by Fleet Force, Inc., to the Choctaw Circuit Court.We deny the petition.

In March 2007, Fleet Force filed a complaint in the Franklin Circuit Court alleging that it was a corporation doing business in Franklin County and that the employee was an individual residing in Toxey, Alabama, who had claimed to have suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment with Fleet Force in November 2004 while in Albuquerque, New Mexico.Fleet Force further alleged that the parties were subject to the Act, that Fleet Force had paid compensation to and had conferred medical and rehabilitation benefits upon the employee pursuant to the Act, and that the parties disputed the existence and extent of any permanent physical impairment and any vocational disability resulting from the injury to the employee.Fleet Force requested that the Franklin Circuit Court enter a judgment determining, among other things, whether the employee had suffered a compensable injury under the Act, whether the employee's claimed physical difficulties stemmed from a workplace injury, and whether Fleet Force was responsible for providing medical and vocational benefits under the Act.

Later that month, the employee filed a motion seeking a transfer of the case to Choctaw County on the basis that venue did not lie in Franklin County or, in the alternative, that venue was proper in Choctaw County based upon considerations of convenience and justice (see generallyAla.Code 1975, § 6-3-21.1).The employee filed affidavits in support of her motion in which she testified, in pertinent part, that she had resided in Choctaw County"each day that [she] was ever employed by" Fleet Force and that many of her prospective witnesses were also located far from Franklin County; she also filed affidavits of two of those prospective witnesses indicating their inability to attend a trial in Franklin County.Fleet Force then filed a response in which it contended that the employee had signed an employment agreement providing that the venue for determining any disputes between the parties to the agreement would be Franklin County; the employee filed a reply to Fleet Force's response and moved to strike the alleged employment agreement on the purported bases (1) that the response was untimely filed and (2) that her signature on the agreement was forged.The employee then filed an answer to Fleet Force's complaint in which she admitted that Fleet Force was a corporation doing business in Franklin County and that she had been injured in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

On August 3, 2007, the trial court denied the employee's request to transfer the case to Choctaw County.The employee filed on September 14, 2007, a petition for a writ of mandamus, seeking an order of this court directing the trial court to (1) transfer the case to Choctaw County on the basis that Franklin County is an improper venue; (2) transfer the case to Choctaw County on the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens; and (3) strike the employment agreement that was allegedly signed by the employee and that had purportedly specified Franklin County as the venue for hearing any disputes between the parties.Because the employee's mandamus petition seeks relief in a matter in which this court has appellate jurisdiction, i.e., a workers' compensation action, and has been filed within 42 days after the entry of the order denying the employee's motion to transfer, which is a presumptively reasonable time, we have jurisdiction to consider that petition.SeeEx parte Gamble,709 So.2d 67, 71(Ala. Civ.App.1998), andRule 21(a)(3), Ala. R.App. P.Our Supreme Court, in Ex parte Scott Bridge Co.,834 So.2d 79, 80-81(Ala.2002), set forth the following principles that govern our review of the petition:

"A petition for the writ of mandamus is the proper method by which to seek review of a denial of a motion for a change of venue.Ex parte Alabama Great Southern R.R.,788 So.2d 886(Ala.2000).'Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ, to be issued only where there is (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.'Ex parte Integon Corp.,672 So.2d 497, 499(Ala.1995).[An appellate court] reviews a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a ruling on venue under an abuse-of-discretion standard.Id.

"`The burden of proving improper venue is on the party raising the issue and on review of an order transferring or refusing to transfer, a writ of mandamus will not be granted unless there is a clear showing of error on the part of the trial judge.'

"Ex parte Finance America Corp.,507 So.2d 458, 460(Ala.1987)."

AccordEx parte Cavalier Home Builders, L.L.C.,920 So.2d 1105, 1108(Ala.Civ.App.2005).

Before the inception of the Act in 1919, employees desiring to obtain compensation from unwilling employers for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment were required to prosecute actions in tort and prove that the injuries were the fault of the pertinent employers; frequently, those actions failed because of the difficulty in proving negligence and the availability of affirmative defenses to defendant employers.See generallySteven W. Ford & James A. Abernathy II, "Historical Development of Alabama's Workers' Compensation Law,"61 Ala. Law. 48(2000).Under the Act, employees no longer may assert rights they held at common law to pursue a complete recovery of all damages recoverable in tort in a civil action against the employer, but in lieu of those rights they are afforded "immediate and certain medical care" and "immediate and certain limited compensation for disability" under the Act's remedial scheme.Id. at 52.

Although the Act largely supplanted the prevailing substantive rules and remedies in the area of workplace injuries, the framers of the Act elected to vest in a familiar place the authority to hear and determine controversies arising thereunder.In no fewer than three separate sections of the Act, the Legislature specified that such controversies were to be submitted to the circuit court that would have heard a tort claim before the Act became effective.For example, § 21(1) of the Act stated:

"In case of a dispute between employer and employee ... with respect to the right to compensation under this act or the amount thereof either party may submit the controversy to the circuit court of the county which would have jurisdiction of a civil case in tort between the same parties.Such controversy shall be heard and determined by such judge or judges of said court as would hear and determine a civil action between the same parties arising out of tort...."

ActNo. 245, 1919 Ala.Acts, § 21(1)(emphasis added).The Act further provided the following procedural directions:

"Either party to a controversy arising under this act may file a verified complaint in the circuit court of the county which would have jurisdiction of an action between the same parties arising out of tort which shall set forth ... such ... facts as may be necessary to enable the court to determine what, if any, compensation the employee ... [is] entitled to under this act."

Id.§ 28(emphasis added).Finally, and most notably, the Act originally contained a section in which the term "the court" was specifically defined as "the circuit court which would have jurisdiction in an ordinary civil case involving a claim for the injuries or death in question."Id.§ 36(2)(m)(emphasis added).

Although the Act has been amended on numerous occasions since its original enactment in 1919, it continues to retain the principle that actions to determine the compensation to be awarded to injured employees under the substantive provisions of the Act should be brought in the same court that would have considered a tort action concerning the injury had the Act not been passed.See, e.g., Ex parte Cavalier Home Builders,920 So.2d at 1106 n. 1(noting that "[v]enue of actions brought under the Act is the same as that applicable in tort actions generally").In particular, each of the quoted sections of the Act as originally enacted has been brought forward into our current Code.SeeAla.Code 1975, §§ 25-5-81(a)(1),25-5-88, and25-5-1(18).Thus, since the passage of the Act, any party—employee or employer—desiring an adjudication of the rights and duties of the parties with respect to an injury arising out of and in the course of employment within the scope of the Act has been required to seek that adjudication from the same court that, had the Act not been adopted, would have heard an employee's tort claim for damages against the pertinent employer with respect to the injuries or death in question.

The attachments to the employee's mandamus petition indicate that Fleet Force is a corporation and is located in Franklin County.Because Fleet Force is a corporation, venue of a hypothetical tort action brought by the employee against Fleet Force would be governed by Ala.Code 1975, § 6-3-7, which specifies the proper venue for civil actions brought in Alabama courts against corporations.That section provides:

"(a) All civil actions against corporations may be brought in any of the following...