Ex Parte Alabama Dept. of Human Resources

• Decision Date: 20 June 2008
• Docket Number: 1070042.
• Citation: 999 So.2d 891
• Parties: Ex parte ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES. (In re Alabama Department of Human Resources v. Ideal Truck Service, Inc.).
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

999 So.2d 891

Ex parte ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES.

(In re Alabama Department of Human Resources v. Ideal Truck Service, Inc.).

1070042.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

June 20, 2008.

Troy King, atty. gen., and Sharon E. Ficquette and Jennifer M. Bush, asst. attys. gen., Department of Human Resources, for petitioner.

Submitted on petitioner's brief only.

COBB, Chief Justice.

On January 9, 2008, this Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari filed by the Alabama Department of Human Resources ("DHR") to review the Court of Civil Appeals' holding that the sovereign-immunity provision of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 did not bar the motion filed by Ideal Truck Service, Inc., seeking to compel the Alabama Child Support Payment Center ("the payment center"), which is operated by DHR, to take certain actions to correct an error in disbursing child-support moneys withheld from the paycheck of an employee of Ideal Truck Service. Alabama Dep't of Human Res. v. Ideal Truck Serv., Inc., 999 So.2d 888 (Ala. Civ.App.2007). Because we conclude that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, we vacate the trial court's order and dismiss the appeal.

Facts

On August 10, 2000, Laurie L. Miller ("the mother") filed a complaint for divorce from William J. Miller ("the father") in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, case no. DR-00-501918. Two children had been born of their marriage; one was six years old and the other four years old at the time the complaint was filed. On January 19, 2001, the trial court issued a judgment of divorce, awarding the mother custody of the children, allowing the father to visit the children, and requiring the father to provide a certain sum of money monthly for the support of the children. On February 8, 2001, the trial court issued an income-withholding order for payment of child support; that order was subsequently amended.

Pursuant to the income-withholding order, the father's employer would regularly withhold the amount of child support so ordered from his paycheck and remit that amount to the payment center. The payment center, in turn, normally deposited the child-support money withheld from the father's paycheck into an account held by the mother. Through a contract with DHR, Tier Technologies, Inc., operates the payment center.

During the years following the divorce, the father changed jobs and employers several times and was unemployed at times. At some point, the father was employed by Ideal Truck Service. On March 22, 2005, Ideal Truck Service was served with a copy of an income-withholding order regarding the father. Pursuant to the income-withholding order, Ideal Truck Service began withholding income from the father's paycheck and remitting the withheld funds to the payment center. On November, 18, 2005, Ideal Truck Service submitted a check to the payment center in the amount of $837.72. On November 29, 2005, Ideal Truck Service submitted a second check to the payment center in the amount of $139.62. These two checks represented funds withheld from the father's paycheck pursuant to his court-ordered support obligations to his children. However, Ideal Truck Service mistakenly wrote on those two checks the case number for the divorce action of a former Ideal Truck Service employee, whose child-support payments had previously been processed by the payment center. The payment center deposited the funds from the two misidentified checks into the account of the former employee's ex-wife. As a result, the father's account showed that he was behind in his child-support payments in the amount of $977.34 (the combined value of the misidentified checks) and his account accrued interest based on that "delinquency."

On December 13, 2005, Ideal Truck Service filed an "Instanter Third Party Motion to Correct Accounting" in the divorce action between the mother and the father. In its motion, Ideal Truck Service asked the trial court to order the payment center to credit the proper child-support account with the money withheld from the father's paycheck and remitted to the payment center by the incorrectly identified checks. Ideal Truck Service further requested that the trial court order the payment center to remove any interest the father had incurred on his child-support obligations as a result of the error in crediting the wrong person with the payment and placing the money in the wrong person's account. In its motion, Ideal Truck Service did not ask the trial court to issue any order to a DHR official or to Tier Technologies. The certificate of service on Ideal Truck Service's motion reflects that Ideal Truck Service served the motion on the mother, the father, and the "Alabama Child Support Payment Center."

On December 15, 2005, the trial court issued the following order:

"UPON CONSIDERATION of the Instanter Motion to Correct Accounting filed by Ideal Truck Service, Inc., employer of the Defendant, [the father], and the Affidavit in Support of the Instanter Motion to Correct Accounting, it is hereby

"ORDERED AND ADJUDGED BY THE COURT AS FOLLOWS:

"1. The Alabama Child Support Payment Center shall recover immediately the funds in the amount of [n]ine hundred seventy-seven and 34/100 Dollars ($977.34) erroneously paid to the recipient [K.J.C.] (Case number DR 1999____) and said funds shall be paid back to Ideal Truck Service, Inc. at 60 White Avenue, Fairhope, Alabama 36532.

"2. Ideal Truck Service, Inc. is hereby ordered to pay the sum of [n]ine hundred seventy-seven and 34/100 Dollars ($977.34) which it withheld from the Defendant's wages to [the mother]'s account in the above referenced case."

(Capitalization in original.)

Subsequently, Ideal Truck Service paid $977.34 to the payment center to be credited to the mother's account, but the payment center did not recover the funds it had erroneously paid to the former employee's wife or return those funds to Ideal Truck Service.

On January 12, 2006, DHR filed a motion requesting the trial court to vacate its December 15, 2005, order. In its motion, DHR argued that, because DHR is ultimately responsible for the operation of the payment center, the sovereign-immunity provision in Article I, § 14, Const. of Ala. 1901, as construed by this Court, divested the trial court of jurisdiction to order the payment center to recover the misapplied funds and credit the correct account.

The trial court denied DHR's postjudgment motion, and DHR appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's order. DHR filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court, seeking review of the Court of Civil Appeals' decision, and we granted the petition.

Standard of Review

"`[I]f an action is an action against the State within the meaning of § 14, [Const. of Ala.1901,] such a case "presents a question of subject-matter jurisdiction, which cannot be waived or conferred by consent."'" Ex parte Davis, 930 So.2d 497, 499-500 (Ala.2005) (quoting Haley v. Barbour County, 885 So.2d 783, 788 (Ala.2004), quoting in turn Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So.2d 137, 142-43 (Ala. 2002)). On questions of subject-matter jurisdiction, this Court is not limited by the parties' arguments or by the legal conclusions of the trial and intermediate appellate courts regarding the existence of jurisdiction. Rather, we are obligated to dismiss an appeal if, for any reason, jurisdiction does not exist. See Ex parte Smith, 438 So.2d 766, 768 (Ala. 1983) ("Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties and it is the duty of an appellate court to consider lack of subject-matter jurisdiction ex mero motu." (citing City of Huntsville v. Miller, 271 Ala. 687, 688, 127 So.2d 606, 608 (1958))).

Analysis

The relief sought by Ideal Truck Service against the payment center—an order compelling the payment center to take action to correct the erroneous deposit of the child-support money from the father's paycheck into the wrong account—is in the nature of an injunction against the payment center. Cf. Dawkins v. Walker, 794 So.2d 333, 335 (Ala.2001) ("An injunction is defined as `[a] court order commanding or preventing an action.' Black's Law Dictionary 788 (7th ed.1999). Because the order at issue in this case directs the [defendant] to take action ... we conclude that the order ... was injunctive in nature."). Therefore, will evaluate the relief Ideal Truck Service seeks as injunctive relief for purposes of our sovereign-immunity analysis.

Article I, § 14, Const. of Ala. 1901, provides "[t]hat the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity." Section 14 affords absolute immunity to both the State and State agencies. Alabama Dep't of Transp. v. Harbert Int'l, Inc., 990 So.2d 831, 839 (Ala.2008) (noting that it "`is now well established'" that "`absolute immunity ... extends to the State and to State agencies'" (quoting Raley v. Main, 987 So.2d 569, 583 (Ala.2007) (Murdock, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result))); Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So.2d 1203, 1206 (Ala.2006) (citing Lyons v. River Road Constr., Inc., 858 So.2d 257, 261 (Ala.2003)) ("When an action is one against the State or a State agency, § 14 wholly removes subject-matter jurisdiction from the courts."). "This absolute immunity from suit also bars suits for relief by way of mandamus or injunction." Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Transp., 978 So.2d 17, 22 (Ala.2007) (citing Ex parte Troy Univ., 961 So.2d 105, 110 (Ala.2006)). The wall of absolute immunity created by § 14 for protecting the State and its agencies from liability is "nearly impregnable." Ex parte Davis, 930 So.2d 497, 500 (Ala.2005). We have long held, however, that an action for an order or injunction compelling a State official, in his or her official capacity, to perform his or her legal duties is not an action against the State within the meaning of § 14 and, therefore, is not prohibited by § 14. See Ex parte Carter, 395 So.2d 65, 68 (Ala. 1980)...