Ex parte Algoe

• Decision Date: 20 September 1905
• Parties: EX PARTE ALGOE.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

74 Neb. 353

104 N.W. 751

EX PARTE ALGOE.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Sept. 20, 1905.

Syllabus by the Court.

The subject of chapter 93, p. 493, Laws 1901, which provides penalties for blackmail, extortion, and kindred felonies, is expressed by its title with sufficient clearness to meet the requirements of section 11, art. 3, of the Constitution.

Application of Lillian Algoe for a writ of habeas corpus. Denied.John O. Geiser, for applicant.

Norris Brown, Atty. Gen., and W. T. Thompson, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State.

BARNES, J.

Lillian Algoe was charged in the district court of Douglas county with violating the provisions of section 2, c. 93, p. 493, Laws 1901 (section 2105, Cobbey's Ann. St. 1903) entitled “An act to provide penalties for blackmail, extortion, and kindred felonies.” To that charge she pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to pay a fine of $250 and the costs of the prosecution, and to stand committed until said fine and costs were paid, or she should be otherwise discharged according to law. In default of payment she was placed in the custody of the sheriff, and was by him confined in the common jail of Douglas county. To regain her liberty she filed her petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court. A writ was issued, directed to said sheriff, returnable on the 6th day of July, 1905. To said writ the respondent made return, setting forth the foregoing facts as his warrant for her detention, and also a plea of former adjudication. The petitioner demurred to the return, and the cause was thereupon submitted to the court.

Her first and principal contention is that the provisions of the act in question, and especially of the section thereof under which she was prosecuted, are broader than its title, and violative of that clause of section 11, art. 3, of the Constitution, which provides that: “No bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title.” To support this contention counsel cite State v. Persinger, 76 Mo. 346. That case clearly announces the principle contended for; but an examination of the act there under consideration discloses that the Legislature of Missouri, under the following title: “An act to change the penalty for disorderly conduct”--not only changed the penalty for that crime, as already defined by the statutes, but also included therein other acts which had not theretofore been declared disorderly conduct, making them a crime and fixing a penalty therefor. The Supreme Court of Missouri could well say in that case that the title to the act gave no notice that a new definition of what should constitute disorderly conduct was to be given therein. Indeed, by the plain language of the title it clearly appeared that nothing was to be accomplished by the act but a change of penalty for the violation of the provisions of an existing penal statute. It is quite clear that the title to the act in that case was much narrower in its scope than the one in question herein. Therefore we do not feel constrained to follow that decision. The question involved in this controversy has not heretofore, in its present form, been presented to us. But one quite analogous to it was decided in the case of Granger v. State, 52 Neb. 352, 72 N. W. 474, where we held that a title which read, “An act to punish cattle stealing, and to punish persons receiving or buying stolen cattle, and to punish all...