Ex parte Allgood

• Decision Date: 07 May 1925
• Docket Number: 3 Div. 707
• Citation: 213 Ala. 426,104 So. 851
• Parties: Ex parte ALLGOOD, State Auditor. v. STATE ex rel. WILSON. ALLGOOD, Auditor,
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

104 So. 851

213 Ala. 426

Ex parte ALLGOOD, State Auditor.

ALLGOOD, Auditor, v. STATE ex rel. WILSON.

3 Div. 707

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 7, 1925

Rehearing Denied June 25, 1925

Certiorari to Court of Appeal.

Petition of W.B. Allgood, as State Auditor, for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, to review and revise the judgment and decision of that court in the case of Allgood, Auditor v. State ex rel. Wilson, 104 So. 847. Writ awarded judgment reversed, and cause remanded.

Sayre and Thomas, JJ., dissenting in part.

Harwell G. Davis, Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Thos B. Hill, Jr., of Montgomery, and H.T. Burns, of Wedowee, for appellee.

ANDERSON C.J.

Section 3672 of the Code of 1923, reads as follows:

"Earnings of Convict Paid Him on Reversal or Rendering His Case on Appeal.--When any person is convicted of a felony and takes an appeal from said judgment of conviction to the Supreme Court of Alabama, and pending said appeal he elects to not have said judgment and sentence suspended, pending said appeal, and goes to the penitentiary and performs labor as directed under said sentence of judgment, if the case be reversed and remanded or rendered, the state of Alabama must at once pay him or his attorney of record the amount earned while performing said labor under said sentence. When such persons elect to have said judgment and sentence suspended pending said appeal, and the case is affirmed and such person goes to the penitentiary, and performs labor as directed under said sentence of judgment, and if upon rehearing the case is reversed and remanded or rendered, the state of Alabama must at once pay to such person or his attorney of record, the amount earned while performing said labor under said sentence. The amount to be paid him is the amount which the state would have received from the proceeds of his labor if said judgment of conviction had not been reversed and remanded or rendered."

But for the last sentence of the statute there might be some room for doubt and uncertainty as to the legislative intent, that is, whether the convict was to receive his gross or net earnings. This question, however, is answered and foreclosed by the last sentence which says:

"The amount to be paid him is the amount which the state would have received from the proceeds of his labor, if said judgment of conviction had not been reversed and remanded or rendered."

This seems to be a legislative...